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Résumé en Français
Les systèmes d'information actuels, qu'il s'agisse de réseaux d'entreprises, de services en ligne
ou encore d'organisations gouvernementales, reposent très souvent sur des systèmes distribués,
impliquant un ensemble de machines fournissant des services internes ou externes. La sécurité de
tels systèmes d'information est construite à plusieurs niveaux (défense en profondeur). Lors de
l'établissement de tels systèmes, des politiques de contrôle d'accès, d'authentification, de filtrage
(firewalls, etc.) sont mises en place afin de garantir la sécurité des informations. Cependant,
ces systèmes sont très souvent complexes, et évoluent en permanence. Il devient alors difficile de
maintenir une politique de sécurité sans faille sur l'ensemble du système (quand bien même cela
serait possible), et de résister aux attaques auxquelles ces services sont quotidiennement exposés.
C'est ainsi que les systèmes de détection d'intrusions sont devenus nécessaires, et font partie du jeu
d'outils de sécurité indispensables à tous les administrateurs de systèmes exposés en permanence
à des attaques potentielles.
Les systèmes de détection d'intrusions se classifient en deux grandes familles, qui diffèrent
par leur méthode d'analyse: l'approche par scénarios et l'approche comportementale. L'approche
par scénarios est la plus courante, et elle est utilisée par des systèmes de détection d'intrusions
bien connus tels que Snort [59], Prélude [75] et d'autres. Cette approche consiste à reconnaître
des signatures d'attaques connues dans le trafic réseau (pour les IDS réseau) et des séquences
d'appels systèmes (pour les IDS hôtes). Il s'agit donc de détecter des comportements anormaux
du système liés à la présence d'attaques. Bien que l'on puisse ainsi détecter un grand nombre
d'attaques, cette approche ne permet pas de détecter de nouvelles attaques, pour lesquelles aucune
signature n'est connue. Par ailleurs, les malwares modernes emploient souvent des techniques dites
de morphisme binaire, afin d'échapper à la détection par signatures. L'approche comportementale,
à l'inverse de l'approche par signature, se base sur la modélisation du fonctionnement normal du
système. Cette approche permet ainsi de détecter de nouvelles attaques tout comme des attaques
plus anciennes, n'ayant recours à aucune base de données de connaissance d'attaques existantes. Il
existe plusieurs types d'approches comportementales, certains modèles sont statistiques, d'autres
modèles s'appuient sur une politique de sécurité.
Dans cette thèse, on s'intéresse à la détection d'intrusions dans des systèmes distribués, en
adoptant une approche comportementale basée sur une politique de sécurité. Elle est exprimée
sous la forme d'une politique de flux d'information. Les flux d'informations sont suivis via une
technique de propagation de marques (appelée en anglais taint marking) appliquées sur les objets du
système d'exploitation, directement au niveau du noyau. De telles approches existent également
au niveau langage (par exemple par instrumentation de la machine virtuelle Java, ou bien en
modifiant le code des applications) [50, 51] ou encore au niveau de l'architecture [67, 78] (en
émulant le microprocesseur afin de tracer les flux d'information entre les registres, pages mémoire
etc.), et permettent ainsi une analyse fine des flux d'informations. Cependant, nous avons choisi
de nous placer au niveau du système d'exploitation, afin de satisfaire les objectifs suivants:
• Détecter les intrusions à tous les niveaux du système, pas spécifiquement au sein d'une ou
plusieurs applications.
• Déployer notre système en présence d'applications natives, dont le code source n'est pas
nécessairement disponible (ce qui rend leur instrumentation très difficile voire impossible).
• Utiliser du matériel standard présent sur le marché. Il est très difficile de modifier physique-
ment les microprocesseurs, et leur émulation a un impact très important sur les performances
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Vue d'ensemble
Nous avons ainsi étendu un modèle de propagation de marques, en nous appuyant sur des tech-
niques existantes, issues de précédents travaux au sein de l'équipe CIDre. Ensuite, ce modèle de
propagation a été implémenté via la réalisation d'un prototype. Ce nouveau modèle permet de
prendre en compte les spécificités du suivi de flux d'information dans un système d'exploitation de
type Unix, mais peut aussi être utilisé dans des environnements distribués. Ce modèle attache des
marques (ou tags) aux objets du système d'exploitation, dans le but de suivre leur propagation
tout au long de la vie du système. Les objets tels que les fichiers, les processus et les sockets réseau
sont ainsi marqués par chaque flux d'information. Nous avons implémenté ce modèle dans le noyau
Linux, en tant que module de sécurité. La conception et l'implémentation de ce modèle représen-
tent la première contribution de cette thèse. Nous avons publié et présenté ce modèle lors de
la conférence internationale ICC 2011 (IEEE International Conference on Communications) [65].
Nous avons ensuite étendu ces travaux afin de prendre en considération les flux d'information
sur le réseau. Cette extension du modèle permet de définir une politique réseau afin de contrôler
les interactions autorisées entre les applications ou utilisateurs vis à vis de l'information surveillée.
Cette politique définit d'une part quelles informations sont autorisées à quitter le système via le
réseau, et d'autre part dans quelles conditions de nouvelles informations, arrivant par le réseau
depuis des sources connues ou inconnues, sont autorisées à se mélanger avec des informations
existantes sur le système surveillé. Cette politique est définie de manière globale au système. Les
règles qui concernent l'information sortante protègent la confidentialité des données, tandis que les
règles qui concernent l'information entrante protègent leur intégrité. La possibilité de définir une
telle politique pour protéger des données privées offre de nouvelles solutions quant à la détection
de violations de la vie privée ou au vol d'informations personnelles. Cette seconde contribution
a été publiée et présentée lors de la conférence internationale AISC 2012 (Australasian Information
Security Conference) [32].
Enfin, notre dernière contribution concerne la généralisation du précédent modèle à la détection
d'intrusions en environnement distribué. En prenant de multiples machines (que nous réunissons
en groupes de machines) en considération, il devient possible de définir une politique adaptée à des
systèmes plus complexes, tout en gardant une approche à grain fin, c'est à dire en conservant une
spécification fine de la politique. Une telle politique est définie à l'échelle d'un groupe de machines.
Elle est distribuée au sein de chaque machine du groupe, et définit les interactions autorisées entre
processus de machines différentes, ainsi qu'entre processus locaux. Cette dernière contribution
a donné lieu à une publication, qui a été acceptée et présentée lors de la conférence internationale
ICC 2013 [31].
Modèle de détection
Notre modèle de détection fait intervenir des marques appelées tags afin de suivre les flux d'information
entre objets du système d'exploitation surveillé. Ces objets sont considérés comme conteneurs
d'information, et à tout moment, nous souhaitons pouvoir déterminer le contenu de chaque objet
afin de vérifier qu'il correspond à un état normal du système. La spécification de cet état normal,
ou contenu normal, se fait via une politique de sécurité. Cette politique dissocie les données pas-
sives du code actif des applications: le code d'une application est considéré comme passif lorsqu'il
est stocké dans un fichier, mais il est considéré comme actif lorsque qu'il est en cours d'exécution.
Cette distinction nous permet d'exprimer finement la politique de sécurité. Nous considérons ainsi
comme étant de l'information tout élément passif (donnée ou code stockés) ou actif (code en cours
d'exécution).
La définition de la politique ainsi que le suivi de flux d'informations font intervenir quatre types
de tags:
• Les tags d'information, ou information tags, décrivent le contenu des objets (ou conteneurs)
auxquels ils sont attachés, à tout instant. Ils contiennent des meta-informations, permettant
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• Les tags de politique, ou policy tags, décrivent la politique des objets auxquels ils sont at-
tachés. Ils décrivent quelles sont les combinaisons légales d'information que ces objets peuvent
contenir. Toute déviation vis à vis de cette politique indique un comportement anormal du
système.
• Les tags de politique d'exécution, ou execute policy tags, décrivent le comportement légal des
processus résultant de l'exécution de code marqué. Ils sont attachés aux fichiers exécutables.
Ces tags ne sont utilisés qu'au moment de l'exécution, afin de déterminer les tags de politique
des processus.
• Le tag de politique réseau, ou network policy tag, détermine les interactions légales entre
processus et données vis à vis du réseau. Il détermine quels processus (en se basant sur
la marque du code exécuté) peuvent légalement recevoir ou envoyer quelles informations à
quels autres processus distants, au sein d'un système distribué. Il n'existe qu'un seul tag de
politique réseau par machine, celui-ci définit toutes les interactions légales entre processus,
information et réseau.
Ce modèle a été implémenté dans le noyau Linux, sous la forme d'un module de sécurité. Nous
suivons les flux d'information entre les fichiers, les sockets réseau, les zones de mémoire partagée,
les files de messages, les inodes etc. Cette implémentation utilise des mécanismes standard du
noyau, et les opérations complexes utilisent des structures de données optimisées afin de limiter
l'impact sur les performances. Le code a été testé sur plusieurs architectures, et a été reporté
comme fonctionnel sur la plateforme Android.
Résultats expérimentaux
Les travaux réalisés au sein de cette thèse ont été vérifiés expérimentalement dans plusieurs cas
de figure. Outre les tests de validation de l'implémentation vis à vis du modèle mis en ÷uvre,
nous avons réalisé deux scénarios correspondant à des cas d'utilisation réels d'un système de dé-
tection d'intrusions. Dans le premier cas, les attaques contre la confidentialité ont été visées. Ce
premier scénario met en ÷uvre une attaque contre le navigateur web Firefox1, en utilisant une
version vulnérable du plugin Java2, et vise à valider notre approche quant à la détection de fuites
d'informations impliquant des données confidentielles, via l'exploitation d'une vulnérabilité (CVE
2008-5353) au sein d'une page web malveillante. Afin de détecter de telles fuites d'informations,
nous avons tout d'abord marqué chaque information confidentielle avec un tag unique, puis nous
avons configuré le système avec une politique de sécurité interdisant l'émission d'informations
marquées. La propagation de marques entre les objets du système permet ainsi de suivre les in-
formations de bout en bout, et de lever une alerte lorsque des informations marquées arrivent au
niveau des sockets réseau.
Le second scénario mis en ouvre s'applique aux systèmes distribués. Nous avons considéré un
ensemble de plusieurs machines supervisées, fournissant un service web distribué, composé d'un
serveur web (Apache), d'un serveur de bases de données (PostgreSQL) et du moteur de blog Word-
press3. Le moteur de blog utilise le plugin de e-commerce Foxypress, qui présente une vulnérabilité
(EDB-ID 18991). Cette vulnérabilité permet l'upload de fichiers arbitraires et l'exécution de code
à distance sur la machine qui héberge le service vulnérable. Le serveur web et la base de données
hébergent deux sites web, l'un étant public et accessible depuis l'internet, et l'autre privé et acces-
sible uniquement depuis le réseau local. Notre objectif ici était de démontrer la capacité de notre
système de détection d'intrusion à détecter les attaques réussies, non seulement au niveau de la
machine directement visée, mais également au niveau de chaque machine qui compose le système
distribué, afin de pouvoir émettre un diagnostic plus riche de l'attaque a-posteriori. L'attaque que
nous avons mis en ÷uvre implique un attaquant extérieur qui souhaite accéder aux informations
confidentielles du site web privé.
1http://www.mozilla.org/firefox/
2http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/
3http://www.wordpress.org
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composant le service distribué, localement sur chaque système ainsi que sur le réseau lors de leurs
communications. Cette politique autorise le serveur web ainsi que le serveur de bases de données à
traiter des requêtes concernant un seul des deux sites web à la fois. Ceci est rendu possible par le fait
que, Apache et PostgreSQL créent un nouveau processus pour traiter chaque connexion, et en aucun
cas les informations des deux sites ne sont mélangées lorsque le système fonctionne normalement.
L'attaque que nous avons déployée injecte un script PHP contenant du code malveillant, en utilisant
la vulnérabilité présentée précédemment, sur le site public (seul site accessible depuis l'extérieur).
L'attaquant a ainsi la main sur le processus en question, et peut désormais effectuer des requêtes
concernant le second site web. Dès lors qu'il effectue une telle requête, le processus attaqué, qui
jusqu'alors était marqué avec des informations du site web public, se voit également marqué avec
des informations du site web privé, et viole ainsi la politique de sécurité. Une alerte est levée sur
la machine locale (le serveur web), et toute connexion entre le processus infecté et un processus
d'une autre machine supervisée provoque la contamination de ce dernier, levant ainsi des alertes
sur les autres machines.
Évaluation
Une évaluation de notre modèle et de son implémentation est présentée en conclusion du chapitre 8.
En terme de performances, notre implémentation ajoute une pénalité maximale de 30% en terme de
consommation mémoire, et de 40% en terme de consommation CPU. Le temps maximal d'exécution
de certaines opérations peut également s'élever à 300% dans des conditions extrêmes, limite dûe
à une utilisation excessive du système de fichier, que l'on estime aisément contournable à l'aide
d'optimisations (présentées dans la section 7.8).
L'évaluation de systèmes de détection d'intrusions fait généralement intervenir la notion de
taux de faux positifs et de faux négatifs. Par conception, notre approche est conservatrice et
surapproxime à tout moment la quantité d'information impliquée dans les flux d'informations.
Ceci a pour effet de limiter très fortement la présence de faux négatif, qui à l'exception de canaux
cachés ou de défauts dans la définition de la politique de sécurité, sont considérés comme inexistants
dans notre système. Par ailleurs, le taux de faux positifs est directement lié à la précision avec
laquelle nous observons les flux d'information. Nous identifions ainsi deux cas de figure: les cas où
nous sommes contraints d'effectuer une forte surapproximation, par exemple lors de l'utilisation
de mémoire partagée entre plusieurs processus, et les cas où nous effectuons une surapproximation
plus modérée. Dans le premier cas, un grand nombre de faux positifs est généré, rendant difficile
l'utilisation de notre système. Ceci est dû au niveau d'abstraction auquel nous nous plaçons dans
le système. Depuis le noyau, il est impossible d'observer de façon exacte les accès à la mémoire
effectués par les applications. Il s'agit de la principale limitation de notre approche, et nous
envisageons plusieurs solutions afin d'affiner l'analyse des flux. Dans le second cas, la précision de
notre analyse est plus fine, et nous sommes ainsi capables de détecter les intrusions avec un faible
taux de faux positifs. Ces aspects sont présentés plus en détails dans la section 8.4 de ce manuscrit.
Nous avons ainsi mis en ÷uvre et implémenté un modèle de détection d'intrusions au niveau
noyau, capable de détecter les intrusions aussi bien dans des machines isolées, qu'au sein de systèmes
distribués. La mise en ÷uvre d'expérimentations nous a permis de valider notre approche de
détection, et d'identifier ses limitations. Des travaux en cours au sein de l'équipe CIDre s'appuient
sur notre travail, et ont pour objectif de mettre en ÷uvre des mécanismes de coopération entre des
moniteurs de suivi de flux à plusieurs niveaux (niveau langage et niveau système d'exploitation),
visant ainsi un affinement du suivi de flux afin de réduire les taux de faux positifs.
Cette thèse est organisée de la manière suivante: la première partie, composée des deux pre-
miers chapitres, présente le contexte de recherche dans lequel notre travail s'inscrit. Le chapitre
1 introduit les fondements de notre approche, ainsi que les travaux précédents existants dans la
littérature. Le chapitre 2 compare la base de notre modèle avec les modèles classiques de contrôle
d'accès et de contrôle de flux d'information.
La seconde partie de cette thèse présente notre première contribution. Le chapitre 3 détaille
notre modèle de détection d'intrusions, et le chapitre 4 présente son implémentation.
Enfin, la dernière partie de cette thèse présente l'extension de notre modèle au réseau et aux sys-
7tèmes distribués, dans les chapitres 5 et 6, suivie de nos résultats expérimentaux dans le chapitre 8.
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Abstract
Modern organisations rely intensively on information and communication technology infrastruc-
tures. Such infrastructures offer a range of services from simple mail transport agents or blogs
to complex e-commerce platforms, banking systems or service hosting, and all of these depend on
distributed systems. The security of these systems, with their increasing complexity, is a chal-
lenge. Cloud services are replacing traditional infrastructures by providing lower cost alternatives
for storage and computational power, but at the risk of relying on third party companies. This risk
becomes particularly critical when such services are used to host privileged company information
and applications, or customers' private information. Even in the case where companies host their
own information and applications, the advent of BYOD (Bring Your Own Device [48]) leads to
new security related issues.
In response, our research investigated the characterization and detection of malicious activities
at the operating system level and in distributed systems composed of multiple hosts and services.
We have shown that intrusions in an operating system spawn abnormal information flows, and
we developed a model of dynamic information flow tracking, based on taint marking techniques,
in order to detect such abnormal behavior. We track information flows between objects of the
operating system (such as files, sockets, shared memory, processes, etc.) and network packets
flowing between hosts. This approach follows the anomaly detection paradigm. We specify the
legal behavior of the system with respect to an information flow policy, by stating how users and
programs from groups of hosts are allowed to access or alter each other's information. Illegal
information flows are considered as intrusion symptoms. We have implemented this model in
the Linux kernel4, as a Linux Security Module (LSM), and we used it as the basis for practical
demonstrations. The experimental results validated the feasibility of our new intrusion detection
principles.
This research is part of a joint research project between Supélec (École supérieure d'éléctricité)
and QUT (Queensland University of Technology).
4The source code is available at http://www.blare-ids.org.
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Introduction
Over the last decade, the huge development of internet and home networks led to new online
services, social networks and online mass market. Information systems have been expanded to fit
more and more users with increasing data volumes. This made distributed systems very common
and widely used. Nowadays, popular services store large amounts of user data online, in the
cloud. It is thus desirable that the underlying systems offer good security properties. Such security
properties have to be defined and implanted into each system component through a security policy.
This is defined as a set of rules specifying how the system is authorized to manage information, i.e.,
what is legal within the system in terms of information and operations. Existing mechanisms have
been designed to implant such policies, such as access control and firewalls. However, these are
very difficult to maintain in complex growing environments, where perpetual bug fixes in software
development make evasion possible for potential attackers.
As a result of this, intrusion detection systems (IDSes) have become a necessary addition to
the security infrastructure of nearly every organization. IDSes typically record information from
observed events and notify the system administrators when possibly illegal events occur. Most
of the current approaches focus on misuse detection, by detecting patterns of abnormal behavior
of the monitored system, i.e., these are based on learned profiles or signatures of known attacks.
Such approaches generally generate a high number of false positives, making it difficult for system
administrators to successfully identify real attacks. Furthermore, these systems are not able to
detect previously unseen attacks also known as zero day attacks. An alternative approach to
misuse detection is anomaly detection, describing deviations from an established normal state of
the monitored system.
The aim of this research is to investigate the characterization and detection of malicious activ-
ities at the operating system level and in distributed systems composed of groups of hosts. Our
approach follows the anomaly detection paradigm. It is based on a security policy describing the
legal behavior of the system, an approach also known as policy-based intrusion detection. Detection
of illegal activity is done by tracking information flows within the operating system and between
hosts. An information flow policy defines the legal behavior of the system, by determining where
information is allowed to flow, and which users or programs are allowed to access it. Any violation
of this policy is considered as a symptom of intrusion, and raises an alert.
In order to achieve these goals, we have first designed and implemented a model of taint marking,
labeling objects of the operating system with tags, so as to track their content by propagating taint
data. Objects such as files, sockets and processes, amongst others, are tainted. It was implemented
in the Linux kernel as a Linux security module. The design and implementation of this model
represents our first contribution.
The consideration of network aspects, such as the policy regarding network interaction of appli-
cations, users and containers of information (e.g., files, memory pages, etc.), represents our second
contribution. This includes an extension of our model and implementation so as to take network
sockets and packets into consideration. We introduced a network policy, defining the legality of
information flows involving outgoing data, in terms of confidentiality, and incoming new data, in
terms of integrity. It defines how new and possibly untrusted data is allowed to mix with data
already present in the system. Specifying such a policy for e.g., private user data offers a novel
solution for tracking privacy violations caused by applications.
Finally, our last contribution is the generalization of this approach in order to detect intrusions
in distributed systems. Taking multiple hosts into account (we gather hosts in groups, in which each
host is aware of the others), allows us to specify a distributed policy suitable for larger systems,
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while keeping a high granularity. Such a policy is distributed at the host level in each group, and
defines the legal interactions between processes running on different hosts. It states how pieces of
authorized information may be accessible by applications and users from any given host of a group.
The model and implementation that we present in this thesis focus on the confidentiality and
integrity aspects of information. Attacks against availability are not covered by our approach.
We only use off-the-shelf components on commodity hardware, and the only trusted code is our
modified operating system kernel.
The reminder of this thesis is organized as follows. The first part introduces the context of
this research. It first presents the necessary background in terms of access control, firewalls and
information flow control. After this, related work in the field is reviewed and compared to our
approach. The second part focuses on intrusion detection in isolated hosts. It presents our model
of intrusion detection based on taint marking and its implementation. The last part presents
the extensions of our model and implementation to detect intrusion detection in network and
distributed environments, as well as our experiments and results.
Part I
Research Context
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Chapter 1
Background and Related Work
This Ph.D. project focuses on detecting intrusions at the operating system kernel
level, based on an information flow tracking model implemented on top of access con-
trol mechanisms (the Linux Security Modules). These three aspects are central to our
approach, therefore, this chapter provides an overview of the background literature in
these fields. Access control is first introduced, opposing traditional discretionary ac-
cess control coming as standard with most operating systems, with mandatory access
control as implemented in SELinux amongst others. Classic information flow control
models are then introduced, followed by modern decentralized approaches as well as
related work in terms of information flow tracking and taint marking. Finally, an
overview of existing research in the field of intrusion detection is presented.
1.1 Traditional security mechanisms
When it comes to secure information systems, firewalls and access control provide basic security by
enforcing OS and network level security properties. These are available in most if not all operating
systems. The first part of this chapter is dedicated to these mechanisms, and highlights their
shortcomings with respect to the problem we aim to address.
1.1.1 Firewalls
Firewalls are devices or software that filter network traffic at different layers of the ISO network
model. They can be set up to restrict access to a personal machine or a company's network from
other untrusted networks, thus creating trust boundaries [35]. Individuals can use software firewalls
on their personal/portable computers to define and enforce policies concerning both incoming and
outgoing network traffic.
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) firewalls identify anomalous patterns in traffic volumes by in-
specting both the headers and content of packets. They provide the capability of identifying
anomalous network traffic as well as managing normal traffic. They also form the core of many
commercially-available firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS). Tamer et al. [1] present a
survey of the Deep Packet Inspection algorithms, implementation techniques, research challenges
and their usage in several existing technologies for intrusion detection systems. Some of the high-
lighted challenges include the complexity of research algorithms, the ever-increasing number of
attack signatures (which negatively impacts on performance) and the increasing prevalence of en-
crypted data which DPI cannot examine.
Considering the problem we seek to address, that is, detecting intrusions in potentially complex
distributed systems, firewalls have several limitations:
• Regular (i.e. non DPI) firewalls filter traffic based on reduced sets of properties, extracted
from packets headers. This is not suitable when dealing with advanced security policies.
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• DPI firewalls can be used to analyse network traffic in a more fine-grained manner, however,
since both the packets headers and packets content are analyzed, the overall process implies
high performance overhead.
1.1.2 Access control
Access control is the fundamental security mechanism of all operating systems. Though the generic
concept of access control exists in many forms, and may be applied to any kind of resource (e.g.
databases, web content etc.) our primary focus in this thesis is operating system security. Amongst
the available variants of access control, Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) and Role Based Access Control (RBAC) are most commonly implemented in
commodity operating systems. The following first introduces the notion of access control policy,
along with the various mechanisms to represent it, and then presents those three access control
variants, as well as implementations of MAC in modern operating systems.
Access control policy
When setting up a system, it is important to clearly understand the security requirements that
are involved, and to list them explicitly. This is done by specifying a policy. It is defined at a
high level of abstraction, and it represents a concise and formalized set of goals and requirements
[2]. In the case of access control, the security policy (access control policy) defines how subjects
(e.g. users or processes) are allowed to access objects (e.g. files), by specifying a set of authorized
operations (e.g. read, write). Common representations of such policies include Lampson's matrix,
access control lists and capabilities.
In 1974, Lampson described an access control matrix [41]. It is a table indexed by subject and
object (Lampson uses the term resources). The cells of the matrix contain access attributes that
specify the kinds of access each subject is allowed to perform on each object. Figure 1.1 shows an
example of access control matrix.
/etc/passwd /etc/apache2.conf /var/log/messages
Alice {read} {write} {read}
Bob {} {write} {read}
Carol {read} {} {read}
Figure 1.1: Access control matrix
For each object, the corresponding column lists all the kinds of access any subjects have to that
object.
Access Control Lists (ACL) associate each object with an access control list, which is a column
in Lampson's matrix. ACLs are the most common way to represent access control authority
relationships in modern operating systems. An ACL specifies which subjects are allowed to operate
on the object, as well as which operations are permitted. When using ACLs, objects are identified
by path names and other forgeable1 references. On UNIX, ACLs contain an owner, a group, and
rights in (R,W,X) standing for read, write, execute respectively. Different rights can be assigned
for the owner, the group and the other subjects.
Another way to express an access control policy is to use capabilities. A Capability is a commu-
nicable and (assumed) unforgeable token of authority. A user or process that possesses a capability
will have the right to access certain objects, as described by this capability. Processes can perform
some operations on capabilities such as deleting them, passing them to another process or trans-
forming them into less privileged ones. Capabilities are implemented as privileged data structures
residing in kernel memory. A capability system associates each subject with a list of capabilities
1Such a reference does not give any information about who holds it and which access rights are associated with
it.
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(also called C-list) which can be represented as a row in Lampson's matrix. However, Miller et
al. [49] claim that capabilities based models have dynamic aspects that cannot be represented in
Lampson's matrix, as it is only a static representation of access rights. Miller et al. show that ca-
pabilities systems are actually more sophisticated than access rights, and that a direct comparison
using Lampson's matrix is not accurate. It should be emphasized that "Portable Operating System
Interface for Unix" (POSIX) capabilities are a different kind of capabilities, and are not associated
with any object. A process owning a POSIX capability will have some privileges associated with
some operations, like listening to ports under 1024 which normally requires root privileges. It is a
coarse grained approach aimed to parcel the power of the root user, avoiding the use of setuid.
Discretionary access control
Discretionary access control (DAC) is the most commonly used access control mechanism and is the
default on UNIX based systems. Access is restricted given the identity and the group of subjects
trying to access objects. It is said to be discretionary because subjects are able to transfer certain
permissions to each other at their own discretion. This involves security related issues in systems
where end-to-end security policies need to be enforced.
Role Based Access Control
With Role Based Access Control (RBAC), the permissions to perform operations are assigned to
specific roles. Permissions are not directly assigned to subjects, but to roles instead. It differs from
the ACLs and allows finer grain management of user rights. User rights are managed in a way that
has a meaning at the application or OS level, rather than using low level attributes. It has been
shown to be a good model for implementing the separation of duties.2 Each subject and object
has a set of security attributes, and any operation requires to test that it conforms to the policy.
It is therefore a particular case of mandatory access control.
Mandatory access control
Mandatory access control (MAC) is based on authorization rules (policy) enforced by the oper-
ating system, that are not modifiable by users (it is not discretionary). The Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [55], also known as Orange Book, defines MAC as a means
of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the informa-
tion contained in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects to access
information of such sensitivity. A later publication from the NSA [43] states that this view of
MAC is tightly coupled with Multi Level Security (MLS, see Section 1.2.1), and is insufficient to
meet the needs of either the US Department of Defense or private industry as it ignores critical
properties such as intransitivity and dynamic separation of duty. In response, the NSA proposed
a more general notion of mandatory security that was first introduced by the Secure Computing
Corporation [15]. A mandatory security policy is considered to be any security policy where the
definition of the policy logic and the assignment of security attributes is tightly controlled by a
system security policy administrator [43].
Generally speaking, mandatory access control policies are expressed in terms of security labels
attached to subjects and objects [62], as is the case with MLS systems. A label on an object is
called a security classification, and a label on a subject is called a security clearance.
With MAC, regular users cannot change the classification of information, and the policy is
enforced by the operating system at the kernel level (see the following subsection about MAC
frameworks). Some works have been focusing on the verification of the policy consistency against a
given set of security goals [12, 38]. By using MAC mechanisms, one can finely control the operations
each subject is allowed to perform on the objects of the system. When configured correctly, those
mechanisms can significantly improve security by rejecting illegal accesses that would have been
allowed otherwise.
2Also known as segregation of duties, it is a concept of having more than one person required to complete a task.
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MAC frameworks
Advances in common operating systems include the improvement of access control mechanisms.
While traditional discretionary access control remains widely used, previous research on mandatory
access control has led to implementations in common operating systems, such as Linux, FreeBSD,
MacOS X and Windows. Examples include SELinux [64], AppArmor [54], Smack [63], Tomoyo
[30] for Linux, and TrustedBSD [70] for FreeBSD. When used in so-called enforcement mode, they
block illegal accesses to objects. When used in permissive mode, their behavior is comparable to
an intrusion detection system, and alerts are logged when the policy is violated.
The following describes SELinux and AppArmor in further details.
SELinux [64] emerged from research led by the National Security Agency of the USA. It is the
first security module available in Linux, and it has been designed to implement a flexible MAC
mechanism called domain and type enforcement (DTE). Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) has
been presented [DTE95,DTE96] as a model that improves access control. DTE groups processes
into domains and files into types. It restricts access from domains to types as well as from domains
to other domains. The kinds of access modes that are considered by SELinux can be any of read,
write, execute, create, and directory descend. Domain access refers to the right to send signals as
well as to transition to a new domain. At any given time, a process belongs to exactly one domain.
Transition to a new domain is done by executing a file which has been defined in the policy as
an entry point to the new domain. There are three types of domain transitions: auto, exec, or
none. For instance, if a domain DA has auto access to another domain DB , and a process in DA
executes an entry point for DB , it will automatically switch to DB . The exec property is similar,
except that the process can choose whether to switch to a new domain or not, by executing one of
its entry points.
AppArmor [54] is a simple MAC implementation available in the Linux kernel as an alternative
to SELinux. AppArmor aims to be easier to use and configure than SELinux. It is used by default
by Novell in their products and comes with a predefined policy, and a set of generic definitions to
ease the difficulty of creating new policies.
A significant amount of work has been done on defining default security policies for SELinux
and AppArmor, offering rules for many server applications interacting with insecure data coming
from unknown clients through network connections. This makes those tools valuable for system
administrators, reducing the work needed to set up complex security policies in real life systems.
Distributed MAC
With the growing number of distributed environments and services across the internet, especially
during the last decade, researchers have focussed their interest on the extension of mandatory access
control [46, 33, 72] policies to distributed systems so as to control interaction between applications
of multiple hosts.
1.1.3 Limitations of access control
Access control, and especially MAC systems are useful to enforce strict policies, dramatically im-
proving the security of operating systems. As compared to traditional discretionary access control,
MAC offers tight control over access to objects by subjects or processes, in a centralized fashion.
However, access control focuses on the access to resources (i.e., system objects containing informa-
tion), rather than information, and does not make any distinction between the two. Information
flow control and taint marking models allow for more flexibility. The next section further discusses
these aspects.
1.2 Information flow control
Contrary to access control policies, which enforce security policies by controlling access to objects
containing information (which we call containers of information), information flow control focuses
on the information itself. Thus, rather than preventing illegal (direct) access to containers, it pre-
vents illegal (direct or indirect) access to information, by specifying a policy regarding information
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flows between classes of information. This is a key difference between access control policies and
information flow policies. The term taint marking is often used to refer to models of information
flow, where taint data is propagated in labels. Information flow tracking models do not enforce a
policy, but rather observe information flows and report illegal actions.
file 1 file 2 file 3
Alice {read} {write} {read}
Bob {read} {read} {}
Figure 1.2: Example: Access control rights
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate an example of illegal information flow. Figure 1.2 defines the
access control rights for Alice and Bob on three files of the system, in the form of an access control
list. Figure 1.3 shows how an illegal flow is possible by indirect interaction between Alice and Bob:
Bob is able to access information he shouldn't have access to. Bob does not have the right to
read file 3, but Alice does. Alice reads file 3 and writes its content to file 2. Bob has read access
on file 2. This example highlights the key difference between access control and information flow
control: access control does not prevent indirect access to information. Enforcing an information
flow policy would have prevented bob to access file 2.
Figure 1.3: Example of illegal indirect flow.
1.2.1 Multi Level Security
The following presents the most common approaches of multi-level security. Though such models
can be considered as MAC to some extent, these enforce information flow policies. Therefore, we
qualify them as information flow control rather than access control.
In 1973, the Bell-LaPadula model was introduced [42], with the primary goal of protecting
confidentiality. It is also known as Multilevel Security, and systems that implement it are called
Multilevel secure or MLS systems [2]. In this model, subjects and objects are labeled with a security
level, which represents their sensitivity or clearance. Any information flow from a high security
classification to a lower security classification is illegal [4, 19, 23]. Implementations of MLS try
to accurately observe data manipulations in order to prevent illegal information flows. Operating
systems with MLS implementation include SELinux, FreeBSD, Solaris and BAE XTS-400.
In 1976, Denning introduced a lattice model of secure information flow [17]. She defined it
as a mathematical framework suitable for formulating the requirements of secure information flow
among security classes. This formal model involves objects, processes and a set of security classes.
Objects each belong to a security class, subjects are objects, and processes are the active agents
responsible for all information flows. The set of security classes encompasses the concepts of security
classifications. Denning also introduces a flow relation and the class combining operator, which
together with a set of security classes forms a Lattice.
In 1977, the Biba model [7] was introduced, protecting integrity. It is often viewed as the Bell-
LaPadula model upside down [2]. It defines the Biba integrity property as follows: a high integrity
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process cannot read lower-integrity data, execute lower-integrity programs or obtain lower-integrity
data in any other manner.
In 1987, Clark and Wilson proposed the Clark-Wilson integrity model [14]. As opposed to
Biba, it is not a direct derivative of the Bell-LaPadula model, and it does not use label based
classification. It is derived from a concept of double entry bookkeeping an old practice used in
accounting [2]. In this model, low integrity data can flow to high integrity data only if it goes
through a Filter (an information flow channel). Clark and Wilson also claim that the security
needs in the commercial area are as important as those of the Department of Defense.
The models of Bell-LaPadula, Biba and Clark-Wilson can be represented as Lattice models in
Denning's framework. Furthermore, combining the Biba and Bell and LaPadula models results in
a Lattice, as lattice-based information flow policies that combine several lattices can be cast within
a single lattice [62].
The Chinese wall model introduced by Bewer and Nash in 1989 [6] is a hybrid security policy
that addresses both confidentiality and integrity. The motivation behind the Chinese wall policy
is to group datasets into conflict of interest classes. In such a model, the subjects can access at
most one dataset belonging to the same conflict of interest class. A common example to illustrate
this model is the example of consultants dealing with confidential company information for their
clients. A consultant should not have access to the information of two concurrent banks, or two
concurrent companies of the same sector because it would create a conflict of interest and affect
the way the consultant behaves. There is a dynamic aspect with the Chinese wall policy: before a
consultant actually accesses confidential information from a specific company, say a bank company,
he is allowed to access the information of any bank company. As soon as he has accessed the
information from one bank, he cannot access any information from any other bank.
1.2.2 Decentralized models
In 1997, Myers and Liskov proposed a decentralized model for information flow control [50]. This
model applies to systems with mutual distrust and decentralized authority. It differs from multi-
level security models by allowing users to declassify information in a decentralized way and improves
support for fine-grained data sharing. This model allows users to associate confidentiality and
integrity labels with data and to restrict information flows based on these labels.
With MAC systems, an administrator sets a system-wide policy. When a server runs multiple
third-party applications, it is difficult for a central administrator to understand in detail the se-
curity of all the applications. With Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC), the policy is
partially delegated to the individual applications [40]. Flume, Asbestos and Histar [40, 76, 21] are
implementations of decentralized information flow control at the operating system level. Flume [40]
has been implemented in Linux and uses the standard operating system abstractions commonly
found on UNIX systems (processes, pipes, etc.). In Flume, processes are confined according to a
flow control policy. Histar [76] is an operating system aiming to minimize the amount of code that
must be trusted. It provides a secure operating system using mostly untrusted user-level libraries
(the only fully trusted code being the kernel). It uses Asbestos [21] labels on six OS level object
types (threads, address spaces, segments, gates, containers and devices).
1.3 Related work
In the previous sections, we have shown how information flow control addresses the problem of
tracking indirect information flows within a system. Our work uses such mechanisms so as to track
information flows at the operating system level. Recent work have been focussing on information
flows control and information flow tracking at different levels for malware analysis, detect privacy
violations or to enforce complex security policies. These include VTT et al.'s model, Panorama [73],
TaintCheck [53], TaintDroid [22], Laminar [25], Pedigree [74], Aeolus [13] and DStar [77]. This
section first presents each approach individually and then compares them together.
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1.3.1 VTT model
In 2009, Valérie Viet Triem Tong (VTT) et al. [66] proposed a model for specifying and enforcing
a fine-grained information flow policy. This model relies on tainting techniques in order to provide
information flow tracking commodities. Content and containers are distinguished: content are
pieces of information while containers are logical storage objects such as files or memory pages.
Information flows are observed using tainting techniques. Tainting is performed by propagating
tags: containers are each labelled with two tags, an information tag describing the current content
of the container and a policy tag defining the policy regarding the information that can flow towards
this container. Content and policy are described in such tags at any stage and for any supervised3
container in the system. The information flow policy can either be automatically constructed from
a DAC policy or configured by an administrator. VTT et al.'s model is used as a basis in the
work presented in this thesis. We will come back to it later in the next chapter for a comparison
with classic multilevel security models as well as decentralized information flow control models.
The reminder of this section presents recent information flow models and how these differ from our
approach.
1.3.2 Panorama
Panorama [73] is a system-wide information flow tracking model based on dynamic taint analysis,
focussed on detection and analysis of malware for Microsoft Windows. It combines taint propaga-
tion information at the hardware level with operating system knowledge, so as to generate taint
graphs. Such graphs represent information flows made by processes on tainted information, and
help identify how information is propagated in the system. Using such taint graphs along with
a policy allows for automatic detection of malicious code. Panorama provides a fine-grained in-
formation flow analysis, involving a small number of false positives. It suffers from a significant
slowdown of 20 times in average. However, given the purposes of such an analysis, this perfor-
mance overhead is not considered as a severe limitation. Automatic detection is done in three steps,
test, taint and analyse. A test engine first runs series of automated tests. Then, a taint engine
monitors how sensitive information is propagated within the system. A malware detection engine
along with a set of policies is able to detect malicious code. Finally, a malware analysis engine
can be used to examine the taint graphs, and provides detailed analysis information. Panorama
was implemented on top of QEMU, for processor emulation, along with a kernel module called
module notifier, loaded on the guest Microsoft Windows operating system. As compared to our
current work (based on VTT et al.'s model), Panorama differs in the sense that it provides finer
granularity when observing information flows, but it also involves a high performance penalty, and
requires hardware emulation, which differs from our objectives, presented in Section 2.3.
1.3.3 Taintcheck
TaintCheck [53] dynamically taints incoming data from untrusted sources (e.g. network) and
detects when tainted data is used in any way that could be an attack. It uses full system emulation
at the instruction level so as to provide a very fine-grained approach. However, as with Panorama,
the main limitation of such instruction-level models is a very high penalty in terms of performances;
a slowdown of 1.5 to 40 times is to be expected, according to its authors. For the same reasons,
this approach is not in accordance with our objectives.
1.3.4 Argos
Argos [58] is an emulator, based on Qemu, for generating signatures of attacks automatically.
It observes information flows in the guest (emulated) system so as to track illegal use of unsafe
information, such as information from the network. Information from unsafe sources is tainted with
tags. Such tags are attached to the memory at the byte granularity, and to CPU registers using a
single tag per register. Argos traces access to physical memory addresses, and generates logs when
3Supervised containers have a policy tag, non supervised containers eventually obtain an information tag as these
get tainted.
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a violation is detected. Such logs contain registers and memory information (memory dumps), and
are used for automatic generation of signatures (in Snort rules format) as well as manual analysis.
Argos is able to detect attacks in userspace as well as in kernelspace. When an attack occurs,
Argos injects its own shellcode, using the address space of the attacked process, so as to gather
additional information from this process. Such information may for instance be transmitted to the
host (running the emulator) for forensics analysis. In order to generate signatures, Argos looks for
patterns by comparing the memory dumps and the traffic generated by the attack (after filtering
out useless information, such as traffic on untargeted ports). As for Taintcheck and Panorama, the
objectives of our work, presented in Section 2.3, differ from these of Argos.
1.3.5 Taintdroid
TaintDroid [22] is an information flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smart-
phones. It is based on taint marking at four different levels of granularity, respectively at the
variable, message, method and file levels. TaintDroid has a performance overhead of 14% on the
CPU. This approach is similar to the approach we have taken in this current work. However,
TaintDroid is focussed on the Android platform using the Dalvick interpreter and therefore it does
not apply to native applications, which represent most of the software present on standard desktop
and server operating systems. Furthermore, it does not propose a fine-grained information flow
policy, but rather focusses on some specific data with respect to privacy issues.
1.3.6 Laminar
Laminar [61] is a hybrid solution combining language level and operating system level Decentralized
Information Flow Control (DIFC). It requires light modifications (less than 10%) in the code of the
programs, where programmers can use secrecy and integrity labels so as to express security policies.
It uses the same abstractions for OS-level resources, and heap allocated objects. It implemented as
a modified Java virtual machine along with a Linux security module. The performance overhead of
this approach varies from 1% to 56%. While Laminar offers interesting results by combining several
approaches, it requires modifications in the code of applications, where our approach focusses on
the use of unmodified applications on commodity hardware.
1.3.7 Pedigree
Pedigree [74] enforces information flow control across a network for legacy applications and operat-
ing systems. It implements two functions: a trusted labeller and a central controller. The trusted
labeler propagates labels on each host, it runs as a trusted module at the operating system level,
and tracks information flows at the level of files and processes. The central controller enforces the
policy. Therefore, the so-called data plane (forwarding of labels) is separated from the control plane
(enforcement of the policy). The security model of Pedigree is based on a lattice, and the policy is
centralized. 64-bit labels are attached to each resource (i.e., files or processes) and contain taint.
On each host, a label store, implemented as an in-memory structure, attaches labels to resources.
A global label store is also maintained, and used by a network enforcer to enforce information flows
between different hosts. Taint may be of two kinds: secrecy or integrity. Users are allowed to
create new taint, modify a taint that they own, and modify labels on a resource that they own,
based on their capabilities. A capability database manages the capabilities, and users can have the
capability to set or unset the secrecy bit of a taint (s` and s´), to set or unset the integrity bit of
a taint (i` or i´) and to add or remove users who may manage the capabilities of a taint (o` or
o´). The main difference of our approach as compared to Pedigree is the information flow policy
itself. We compare Pedigree with our approach in Section 6.6.
1.3.8 Aeolus
Aeolus [13] is a platform for building secure distributed applications. It performs decentralized
information flow tracking at the thread level. Similarly to other models of DIFC, it allows users
to define restrictions on the use of their own information. It is based on simple rules involving
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principals and tags, where tags are used to categorize information, and principals are the entities
interested in such information. It provides fine-grained delegation of authority, and supports revo-
cation. It makes use of a memory-safe language to isolate threads from each others. Support for
distributed programs involve a RPC mechanism, and provides the concept of boxes, allowing con-
fidential information to be communicated between two ends without tainting intermediates which
do not observe the information flow. Aeolus is OS-independent, and it is implemented as a set
of runtime libraries. Its main implementation supports Java, but it has also been ported to C#
and PHP. Contrary to language-based information flow tracking systems, Aeolus does not observe
individual variables. It remains more fine-grained than OS approaches, as it observes individual
threads. A comparison of our work with Aeolus is presented in Section 6.6.
1.3.9 DStar
In the field of decentralized information flow control, Zeldovich et al extended their previous
work [40, 21, 76] with DStar [77], so as to control information flows in distributed systems. Dstar
controls how information flows between processes on different machines. It provides DIFC mech-
anisms for use by applications, in order to define legal interactions between mutually distrustful
components. By opposition with MAC, where a central administrator controls the system, DIFC
gives control to application programmers, leading to a finer granularity. In DStar, labels are at-
tached to processes, and define the legal behavior of processes. By using such labels, Dstar ensures
that only processes allowed to communicate may do so. Each label contains a set of two categories:
secrecy and integrity. Secrecy categories in a message determine who is allowed to receive it, and
integrity constrains who may have sent it. It follows a no read-up, no write-down logic, with
respect to a partial order between labels, defined by the can flow to (Ď) function. It ensures
that untrusted code does not access inappropriate data. In DStar, each process also has a set of
privileges, which allow it to bypass some permissions that are normally forbidden by the Ď relation
between labels. Processes may also raise their own label given their clearance. When processes
own a category, these can raise the labels of other processes in that category. In order to carry
labels over the network, DStar uses so-called exporter daemons on each host, which are the only
processes sending or receiving DStar messages over the network. Trust is decentralized between
categories owners of each host, through local exporters. Trust between exporters relies on cryp-
tographic certificates, and exporters may delegate trust in a category to other exporters. As for
Pedigree and Aeolus, we propose a comparison of our work with DStar in Section 6.6.
1.3.10 Comparison of related work
Current information flow control and information flow tracking models can be categorized into three
types: language level, operating system level and architecture level [61]. Language level solutions
[50, 51] rely extensively on type system changes and modify the program structures. Such solutions
are not able to track security violations at the level of system objects (such as files and sockets).
Operating system level solutions [40, 76, 21] rely on page mappings and OS-level abstractions, and
cannot accurately monitor information flows into applications, as those do not have access to inner
data structures [61]. However, these are able to observe information flows over all the system. Our
work follows this approach, as presented in more details in Section 2.3. Architecture level solutions
[67, 78] are able to track data labels within applications but require trusted software to manage
the labels and involve high performance penalties in the case of full system emulation.
In terms of performance overhead, Taintcheck and Laminar have high performance penalty due
to their low-level approach (full system emulation). Though this provides a fine-grained approach
while observing information flows (which provides interesting results for malware analysis) this
approach is not practical for runtime monitoring of a full operating system, as required by our
intrusion detection approach (our requirements are explained in more details in Section 2.3).
Laminar, Pedigree, DStar, Aeolus and DIFC models enforce a security policy (i.e., these block
illegal information flows) while Panorama, Taintcheck, VTT et al. and Taintdroid taint information
and let illegal information flows occur. For a comparison of our approach with these related work,
see Sections 3.9 and 6.6.
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Implementation Performance overhead Distributed History
Panorama OS and architecture high no no
Taintcheck architecture high no no
Taintdroid OS/language low no no
Laminar OS and architecture high no no
Pedigree OS low no no
Aeolus Language low yes no
DStar OS/language low yes no
VTT et al. OS/language low no yes
Figure 1.4: Comparison of related work
Figure 1.4 compares recent approaches of information flow control and tracking, with respect
to the following criteria:
• Implementation refers to the level (i.e., layer) of deployment of the approach. OS refers
to operating system level approaches (userspace libraries wrappers or kernel), architecture
refers to full system emulation, and language refers to the modification of virtual machines
or interpreters, or instrumentation of the code of applications.
• Performance overhead is a rough estimation of the performance of each approach.
• History refers to the fact of keeping tracks of individual pieces of information throughout the
system.
• Distributed refers to mechanisms providing information flow control or tracking across mul-
tiple hosts over a network.
We believe that strict policies are not practical in all situations, as these can potentially break
functionalities by blocking legitimate information flows when the security policy is too strict, or,
on the contrary, allow illegitimate access when the security policy is too permissive. This becomes
particularly problematic when applying such mechanisms to complex distributed systems made
of heterogeneous hosts, using multiple applications with various security requirements altogether.
Furthermore, most systems use off-the-shelf components and applications, and these do not come
with predefined policies designed by the developers. Instead, the security requirements are specified
a-posteriori, which requires a lot of effort and leads to complex security policies. On the contrary,
tainting information without blocking allows for information flow tracking. To this extent, VTT
et al.'s model differs from existing tracking models as it provides fine-grained information flow
tracking and keeps information flow history. Its policy differs from traditional MLS and from DIFC
(this aspect is further developed in Chapter 2) as it allows to specify rules for individual pieces
of information within a system. It also differs from recent approaches, as these are either based
on non-interference between security levels (e.g., low/high) or lattice-based (usually representing
hierarchies of security classes such as secret, top-secret etc.). We used the model introduced by
VTT et al. as the basis of our work. It is presented in more details in Chapter 2.
1.4 Intrusion detection
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring and analysing system and network events, looking
for signs of intrusion. Intrusion detection systems (IDSes) are software layers which automate
these monitoring and analysis processes [16]. IDSes are used to detect attacks such as viruses and
malicious users or to monitor the security of a system to help in diagnosis and correction of flaws
[24].
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1.4.1 Host-based and network-based IDS
Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) have access to the operating system information
[16, 3]. Such IDSes are able to detect the presence of malware and targeted attacks by analysing
low level system objects and information. Furthermore, encrypted network attacks can also be
detected by analysing low level network traffic once it has been decrypted. HIDSes can generate
alerts corresponding to each malicious system event.
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) can monitor segments or sections of networks,
depending on their placement [16]. Those typically work in so-called promiscuous mode (only
capturing traffic) and have very little impact on the network. Such IDSes can consume system
resources when dealing with large or busy networks [38].
1.4.2 Anomaly detection and misuse detection
Among existing intrusion detection systems, two major approaches are used in order to differentiate
normal behavior and misuse. [82]. Anomaly detection defines a legal behavior that is known to be
safe. Any unknown action is considered as illegal. Statistical models are often used in this case.
Misuse detection, also called knowledge based, defines what is illegal, based on signatures of misuse
actions.
Misuse detection, is the most popular approach amongst commercial IDSes [80]. Misuse IDSes
make use of knowledge about known attacks, exploits and vulnerabilities and analyse system events
and network traffic looking for matching patterns. Such knowledge is often called signatures. One
of the drawbacks of this approach is that the signatures database has to be maintained up to date
in order to be effective [16] . Another drawback is that it is possible to forge fake matching patterns
in network traffic and/or system events, leading to false positives and overloading of the IDS. Also,
such IDSes can only detect known attacks that are already present in the signature database.
Debar et al.[16] have shown that misuse detection can be achieved using different methodolo-
gies. These include expert systems, signature analysis, petri nets and state-transition analysis. A
common method amongst commercial IDSes is the use of signature analysis along with patterns of
attacks reduced to a low level of semantics. Well-known misuse detection IDSes include Snort [59]
and Bro [57]. These are both open-source.
Anomaly detection IDSes aim to identify abnormal/unusual behaviour (anomalies) by com-
paring current behaviour to a known normal state. It was first introduced by Denning in 1976
[18]. Denning was assuming that traffic generated by attackers is clearly different from normal
traffic, which is recorded into profiles. One advantage of anomaly detection systems is their ability
to detect previously unknown attacks (zero day) [56], which attackers may seek to exploit before
patches are released to fix the targeted vulnerabilities. Another advantage is the ability to detect
different forms of the same attack, where signature-based IDS do not always have all the possible
matching signatures [56, 68].
Anomaly detection IDSes rely on several methodologies. Self learning systems (time series
based, such as artificial neural networks (ANN), or non time-series based such as descriptive statis-
tics and rule modelling) learn by example what constitutes the normal behavior of a system [3].
Programmed systems are taught by an administrator to detect abnormal behavior. Those can be
based on descriptive statistics algorithms, or on a default deny approach, stating only what is legal.
Statistical based anomaly detection models use statistics from different parameters [24]. As
stated by Gates and Taylor [25], most modern anomaly detection systems are based on Denning's
assumptions [18]. Those assumptions consider that attacks are rare (as compared to normal events)
and differ from the normal behavior of the system.
Hybrid systems [56] are combining both misuse detection and anomaly detection approaches.
1.4.3 Policy-based IDSes
Policy-based IDSes are anomaly detection IDSes following a default-deny approach. A number
of previous works exist in this domain, using sandboxing mechanisms at the language level [36]
or via Kernel based reference monitors such as BlueBox, REMUS, LIDS and Ko et al. system
wrappers [11, 28, 5, 39]. Similar sandboxing mechanisms also exist in user space, namely system
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introspection [69, 37]. Blare [81, 82, 66, 26] is an IDS deployed at the host level, and at the
Java Virtual Machine level. It relies on information flow models developped in the ISSN4 team
at Supélec. Its first model is host-based and was developed by Jacob Zimmermann [81, 82]. It
relies on the principle of non-interference. This principle was introduced in 1982 by Goguen and
Meseguer, and extended in 1984 by the same authors [27]. It is a strict multilevel security policy
model, where information is gathered in isolated security classes. Information cannot flow from
one security class to another. Hiet, Viet Triem Tong, Morin and Mé have used the first version of
the Blare model along with JBlare5 to control the legality of information flows in Java programs
using a non interference policy. This hybrid intrusion detection (OS/Language levels) allows to
refine information flow tracking, thus reducing the number of false positives [34].
1.4.4 Distributed IDSes
Even though distributed systems have become very popular, particularly since the explosion of
cloud infrastructures, little research focussed on new models of intrusion detection suitable for
such environments. Existing approaches are based on aggregation or centralization of events re-
ported by individualmisuse IDSes, such as Snort [59] or Bro [57]. Examples of this are the following
approaches. In [60], Roschke, Cheng and Meinel proposed and implemented an extensible IDS
management architecture, providing central management of several sensors. It integrates several
sensors through an event gatherer, with support for several implementations of well known ID-
Ses. In [45], Mazzariello, Bifulco and Canonico proposed an approach of misuse detection for an
opensource cloud computing environment. It targets denial of service attacks, and it is based on
Snort [59] for analyzing network traffic.
To our knowledge, the approach that is the most closely related to our current work is an
approach of anomaly detection introduced by Zimmermann and Mohay in [83]. It focuses on
detecting intrusions in clusters based on the principle of non-interference. Objects of the operating
system are supervised by monitoring the invocation of their methods (i.e. actions such as read or
write) and producing a trace. The policy specifies the legal behavior of the system, by associating
domains to objectmethods. Violations of the policy are detected by evaluating a trace of the system
using an unwinding theorem. Such a theorem makes it possible to identify the set of existing traces
matching the desired non-interference properties. Reference monitors are deployed on each node
of the system, and messages between nodes are instrumented.
4Now CIDre.
5JBlare is an implementation of Blare in the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) able to monitor information flows
withing Java programs.
Chapter 2
Information Flow Models
Our research is the continuation of previous work in the ISSN (Information Systems
Security and Networks) team at Supélec (now CIDre). Models for dynamic informa-
tion flow tracking have been previously proposed, and have shown to be successful in
detecting intrusions [66, 82]. Our model is an extension the VTT model, and we target
intrusion detection in both isolated and distributed environments. In this chapter, we
first present the VTT model (introduced in Section 1.4.3). Then we compare it with
existing models of information flow control and present a summary of the properties
offered by each model. We finally present our requirements for intrusion detection.
2.1 VTT model
The following is a description of the model introduced by Valerie Viet Triem Tong et al. [66] in
2009. This model is an information flow model based on taint marking techniques along with an
information flow policy, it protects both integrity and confidentiality. Objects of the operating
system potentially containing information, such as files, are called containers of information.
Definition 1. Labels called tags are attached to each container of information. Tags contain
meta-information, that are used to describe real content. These tags include a policy tag, and an
information tag :
• The information tag represents an over estimate of the information that the container may
contain.
• The policy tag represents the information flow policy for the container (i.e. which information
it can legally contain).
Any information flow towards a container, making changes to its content, requires an update
of its information tag so as to match the new content. After this, a legality check is performed in
order to ensure that its policy (as defined in its policy tag) has not been violated. If a violation of
the policy occurs, an alarm is raised.
2.1.1 Policy
The policy in the VTT model differs from other information flow models. It is decentralized at the
container level in the policy tags of each specific container, and states which information is allowed
to be contained in each container or in other words what can flow towards each container. The
policy for a container is expressed as a set of sets. Any set (or any subset of it) of the policy tag,
represents a legal combination of information for a given container, (i.e. a legal information tag).
Therefore, an information flow towards a container is legal if and only if the updated information
tag of the container after the information flow occurred is included in one of the sets of the policy
tag.
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• The integrity of containers is protected by controlling which subsets of information are allowed
to mix together inside the containers (i.e. how information may be altered).
• The confidentiality of information is controlled by determining which pieces of information
containers may contain (i.e. where information may flow).
Definition 2. Let C be the set of all containers. For any container c P C,
itagpcq lists the origin of content residing in the container, i.e. its information tag,
ptagpcq lists the policy attached to the container, i.e. its policy tag.
Updates of the information tag
When an information flow occurs from a container C1 to a container C2, the information tag of C2
is updated with the information tag of C1. Its new information tag (after the flow occurred) is the
union of its old information tag with the old information tag of C1 (before the flow occurred).
itagpC2qnew “ itagpC1qold Y itagpC2qold
Legality of an information flow
Definition 3. An information flow towards a container is legal if and only if its information tag
is included in one of the sets of its policy tag :
LegalpitagpCq, ptagpCqq ô Dp P ptagpCq|itagpCq Ď p
Example 1. Consider an information flow from C1 to C2 with the following tags:
itagpC1q “ t1, 2u
itagpC2q “ t2, 3u
ptagpC2q “ tt1, 2, 3, 4u, t5, 6uu
The following update on the information tag of C2 would occur :
itagpC2qnew “ itagpC2qold Y itagpC1qold “ t1, 2, 3u
This information flow is legal because itagpC2q is a subset of one of the sets of ptagpC2q : t1, 2, 3u Ď
t1, 2, 3, 4u.
With such a policy, the confidentiality and the integrity properties are independent. For in-
stance, the policy attached to a process might have a low level of confidentiality (i.e. it would only
have access to a small subset of the information on the system), and a high level of integrity (i.e.
the data cannot mix with other data) at the same time. Empirically, confidentiality and integrity
can be expressed as follows, and are compared to the same notions of the Bell-LaPadula and Biba
models later in Section 2.2.
• The confidentiality level of a policy tag is determined by the set of different atomic information
it allows in a container, regardless of how it allows them to mix together. The more different
pieces of information are legal in the container, the higher the level of confidentiality raises
for this container. The less information is legal in the container, the lower the level of
confidentiality. For instance, a process with a high level of confidentiality may have authorized
access to a lot of different pieces of information, and thus have a policy tag allowing it
to contain a high number of different pieces of information. The confidentiality level of a
container c can be measured by:
|
ď
pPptagpcq
|
• The integrity level of a policy tag is determined by the combinations of information it allows
in a container. The more the information is allowed to mix with other information, the
lower the integrity. The less it is allowed to mix, the higher the integrity. For instance, a
process with a high level of integrity may not mix its content with low integrity information
and would thus have a policy tag forbidding it. The integrity level of a container c can be
measured by:
|ptagpcq|
|ŤpPptagpcq |
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2.1.2 Dynamic aspect
In the VTT model, the set of authorized operations that processes can perform over objects (con-
tainers of information) is not constant. It may dynamically change over time: whether a process
can access an object depends on the information that it previously accessed. For instance, a process
might have the permission to write to a given container until it reads some data that is invalid in
this container, either for integrity reasons (e.g., the new data does not have a sufficient integrity
level), or for confidentiality reasons, (e.g., the new data cannot be mixed with less confidential
information). This notion of dynamic changes in the authorized behavior of processes could be
qualified as a dynamic clearance1.
This dynamic aspect can be summarized as follows:
• A policy is expressed on what containers are allowed to contain.
• The content of containers keeps changing (after each information flow).
• The clearance of a process is dynamic in time.
2.1.3 Lattice
The VTT model can be formally represented in Denning's framework, Lattice model of secure
information flow [17], and under certain assumptions, its components form a bounded lattice.
While the demonstration of this aspect is not covered here, we demonstrate this lattice property
later in Section 3.7 for our extension of the VTT model.
2.2 Comparison with lattice based models
The following is a comparison of the VTT model with the most common implementations of
multilevel security (MLS) systems and policies. We use the terms security class to refer to the
policy of one or more containers (see Section 3.7).
2.2.1 Chinese walls
The Chinese walls model is centered on the concept of separation of conflict of interest classes
(see Section 1.2.1). Such a dynamic property can be defined in a VTT policy. Recall the previous
example from Chapter 1 with a consultant working for a bank company. A Chinese wall policy
could be defined such that once the consultant had access to information from any bank, his or
her access to the information from any other bank would be denied.
In the following, we call IBankk the class of all the information related to the bank Bankk.
Therefore, in a context where N concurrent banks exist, if the consultant has accessed the infor-
mation from Bank1 (IBank1), his or her access to IBankk|2ďkďN is illegal.
Such a policy can be defined in the VTT model by attaching a user policy to the consultant
where each subset of the policy concerns the information from one specific bank. The following
policy is an example of this:
PUConsultant “ ttIBankku1ďkďNu
The multiple subsets of this policy have a meaning of exclusion: the legal information for user
Uconsultant is defined by at most one of the composing sets of the policy at one time. It can be
seen as an exclusive or relation between the composing sets, allowing only one set at a time.
2.2.2 Bell-LaPadula
The Bell-LaPadula model labels data with levels of classification. It can be summarized as follows:
• The simple security property also known as no read up states that no processes can read
data up from a higher level of classification.
1The notion of clearance here is the same as in the Bell-Lapadula model, defining a level of authorization for a
subject over an object. See Section 1.2.1.
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• The *-property also known as no write down states that no processes may write data down
to a lower level of classification.
While this model protects confidentiality, it does not protect integrity. In the VTT model, a
process may not read information that is illegal with respect to its policy tag (i.e., not contained
in one of the sets of its policy tag). This means that this information is contained in a higher
or incomparable security class in the policy's lattice. This is comparable to no read up in Bell-
LaPadula.
Example 2. A process with policy {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}} may not read a file containing {1,2,3,4}.
It may not read a file containing {5,6,7} either. Both are forbidden with respect to the policy.
However, {5,6,7} would be allowed if the policy was {{1,2,3},{4,5,6,7}}, which is considered as a
higher security class than {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}}in the policy's lattice (presented in Section 3.7).
In the VTT model, a process may not write information to a file if such information is not legal
with respect to the file's policy tag (i.e., not contained in one of the sets of its policy tag). The
meaning of this in terms of security class is that the involved information is contained in a higher
or incomparable security class in the policy's lattice. This notion is similar to no write down in
Bell-LaPadula.
Example 3. A process may not write information {1,2,3,4} in a file with policy {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}}.
It may not write information {5,6,7} either. Both are forbidden with respect to the policy. However,
{1,2,3,4} would be legal with the policy {{1,2,3,4,5,6}}, which would be a higher security class in
the policy's lattice.
There are however two major differences between the VTT model and Bell-LaPadula. With
VTT, information flows are illegal between different security classes with incomparable levels of
security. Also, the VTT policy makes it possible to define which information is allowed in which
containers, and is thus attached to containers themselves, it does not express any direct classifica-
tion of the information.
2.2.3 Biba
The differences between VTT and Biba are similar to those with Bell-LaPadula. Similarly to
confidentiality, data with the same level of integrity are isolated as those are considered as being
different security classes.
Integrity with VTT is protected on a by container basis, and given two pieces of information
i1 and i2, some containers may be allowed to mix them together (tti1, i2uu) while some other
containers may not (tti1u, ti2uu). The integrity which is protected is the integrity of the container,
not the integrity of the information itself.
2.2.4 Clark-Wilson
The Clark-Wilson model protects integrity. As opposed to Biba, it is not based on Bell-LaPadula,
and it does not make use of label-based classification. In this model, low-integrity data can flow
towards high integrity if it goes through a filter (declassification). This model is not based on a
lattice. It is not directly comparable to the VTT model in terms of policy.
2.2.5 DTE
DTE stands for Domain and Type Enforcement and SELinux is based on it. (See Section 1.1.2).
With DTE, a domain attribute is attached to subjects, and a type attribute is attached to objects.
Restrictions apply from domain to type, and also from domain to domain.
In the VTT model, the tags attached to processes and containers can be compared to domains
and types in DTE. Information flows between two containers are legal if their policy tags allow it.
The information tags state which information the containers contains, and the relation between
policy tags and information tags can be seen as domain to type or domain to domain in DTE. In
the VTT model, this relation is bilateral:
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• The relation between the information tag of a process and the policy tag of a file defines if
the process is allowed to access this file in write mode.
• The relation between the information tag of a file and the policy tag of a process defines if
the process is allowed to access this file in read mode or in exec mode.
However, the changes of domains in DTE have no equivalent in the VTT model. In DTE,
executing a binary program may cause a domain switch for the running process, and the new
domain can either extend or restrict the rights of the process. In the VTT model, any information
flow between a subject and an object may change the information tag of either the subject or the
object, thus restricting the policy in one direction: from the subject to the object if the information
tag of the subject has been modified, or the other way in the other case.
2.2.6 Myers and Liskov
As in the VTT model, the Myers and Liskov decentralised information flow control model (DIFC)
is related to mandatory access control in the sense that the security policies are mandatory, and not
enforced at the discretion of application writers [40]. Where the M&L model allows decentralization
of the policy with the applications being allowed to declassify information that they own, VTT
policy specification is centralized (though future works are planned to provide declassification in the
model). Both M&L and VTT are based on a lattice and protect both integrity and confidentiality
of data.
2.2.7 Summary of the comparison
The VTT model can be seen as a combination of Biba and Bell-LaPadula as it addresses both
confidentiality and integrity aspects at once. It has however a dynamic aspect in common with the
Chinese walls. Furthermore, it allows data isolation when security classes of the same level are not
directly comparable. This later aspect is comparable with models based on Multiple Independent
Levels of Security (MILS).
VTT B&LP Biba CW C&W M&L DTE
Confidentiality yes yes no yes no yes yes
Integrity yes no yes yes yes yes yes
Dynamic yes no no yes no yes yes
Decentralized no no no no no yes no
Declassification no no no no yes yes no1
Distributed no no no no no yes no
Content based yes no no no no yes no
Flow history yes no no no no no no
Figure 2.1: Comparison of information flow models.
1there is no declassification mechanisms in DTE. However, domain transitions may provide comparable
properties in some situations. extent.
Figure 2.1 is a comparison of information flow models: B&LP stands for Bell-LaPadula, CW
stands for Chinese walls, C&W stands for Clark-Wilson, M&L stands for Myers-Liskov. The
declassification aspect of the VTT model is a work in progress in the CIDre team. The term
decentralized refers to the way the policy is defined. If it is centrally defined by one single authority
as it is most often the case, then it is characterized as centralized. Distributed refers to the network
distributed systems such as web services with multiple hosts. Content based refers to the distinction
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between containers of information and content. Flow history refers to the ability to describe the
origins of all the content that is residing in a container.
2.3 Objectives and requirements for intrusion detection
In this Ph.D., we aim to dynamically detect intrusions in isolated hosts as well as in distributed
systems composed of multiple hosts. Our objectives are the following:
• Detecting violations of integrity and confidentiality (which we consider as intrusions).
• Detecting successful attacks targeting all kinds of components (applications, OS-level services
etc.).
• The ability to use off-the-shelf components: unmodified applications running on commodity
hardware.
Our approach of intrusion detection follows the anomaly detection paradigm: we observe illegal
information flows within the operating system, with respect to a security policy.
There exists a number of information flow control models in the literature. Some of these
models can be used in permissive mode, where the security policy is not enforced, but alerts are
raised instead. Such behavior allows the information flows to actually happen and modify the state
of the system. This is a first requirement for our approach of intrusion detection (we do not aim to
prevent intrusions). Another requirement is the ability to track the origin of information residing
within any of the objects of the operating system. Where most models of information flow control
would let information spread once configured in permissive mode, they would not taint information
: no tracking of the propagation of information within the operating system would be possible.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the VTT model fits both of these requirements :
• It is a permissive model: it does not enforce the policy, and it does not forbid information
flows. Flows happen and modify the state of the system.
• The information flow history is kept, and allows to track the origin of information residing
in any container of the system. This aspect relies on so-called taint marking techniques. It
will be further described later in Chapter 3.
For these reasons, our approach of intrusion detection is based on VTT's model. The contri-
butions of our work are presented in the next parts of this thesis. Our first contribution is an
extension of VTT's model and its implementation in the Linux kernel. This is presented in Part II.
Our second contribution is the extension of this first work to fit distributed systems, and it is
presented in Part III.
Part II
Intrusion Detection at the Host
Kernel Level
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Chapter 3
Extended Model
As presented in Chapter 2, a number of information flow models exist. These may be
applicable to intrusion detection when used in a permissive mode, where the policy
is not enforced and information flows actually occur even when these are illegal. Our
choice of not enforcing the policy is motivated by the fact that we are interested in
intrusion detection rather intrusion prevention. However, future research in this field
may also focus on the enforcement mode of information flow models. As shown in
Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2, the VTT model offers properties that best fit our require-
ments. Therefore, we use it as a basis in our intrusion detection approach. We have
however identified some evasion issues when using the model as-is for designing a host
kernel level monitor. Although the VTT model offers the properties that are needed
for our approach of intrusion detection, it lacks consideration of some aspects of the
operating system that are necessary for realistic intrusion detection. This chapter
first highlights the evasion issues we found, and then presents our extended model
and how it allows to detect intrusions in isolated machines (distributed aspects are
covered in the third part of this thesis).
3.1 A model based on VTT
The VTT model provides fine-grained information flow tracking between containers of information.
When applied to an operating system of the UNIX family, it allows to track information between
objects of the operating system such as files, sockets and the like, and users. This notion of user
differs from the traditional UNIX notion: users in VTT are considered as containers. Recall from
Chapter 2 that for any container c, itagpcq lists the origin of content residing in the container,
which we call its information tag. In VTT, this applies to users as well, as information tags are
attached to their representing containers. For instance, users A and B would be represented as
containers uA and uB , with itagpuAq “ iA and itagpuBq “ iB . If we now consider a container c
with the following policy: ptagpcq “ tiA, iBu, stating that c may only contain iA or iB , or both at
the same time (that is, any subset of tiA, iBu), then only users A and B are allowed to write in c
(no matter if one of them already wrote information to this container before the other).
3.1.1 Evading VTT
When applied to a real operating system, this model can be evaded through code execution, as it
does not confine executable code. Furthermore, the previous notion of users is only theoretical: no
process confinement mechanisms are defined in the model. Whereas information from an exclusive
list of users is allowed in each container, the reverse is undefined (i.e. how information is allowed
to flow towards a user). As an illustration of the shortcomings of this model with respect to code
execution, consider the following example:
Example 4. : A malicious user exploits a flaw in a service running on a web server, and injects
arbitrary code into the process running this service. The injected code is then interpreted and it
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writes a malicious script into a new file, before executing it as the current user.
In such a scenario, the VTT model would forbid the process to write into any file c (container)
for which access is not allowed to the user uweb running the web server (i.e. the policy attached to
c does not allow uweb). On the contrary, writing to any file allowing uweb in its policy is authorized,
and the same goes with the creation of new files (as in the previous example). In such a situation,
there is no way to detect the intrusion: this is one potential scenario of evasion.
3.1.2 Proposed extension
We have presented and published the following extension of the VTT model at ICC 2011 [65]. This
new model improves the following aspects :
1. The execution of code and programs is supervised, based on the distinction between active
code, that is executed by processes, and passive stored information.
2. Containers of information are considered separately, depending on whether these are stored in
memory or on-disk. The former are called volatile containers, and the latter are called persis-
tent containers. We also make the distinction between (passive) objects, storing information,
and (active) subjects (i.e. processes running code on behalf of users).
3. The information flow policy can be expressed separately for users, executable code (which
we also call programs1) and containers.
4. The information flow policy can be derived from a mandatory access control policy. We have
formally defined a method for deriving an AppArmor2 policy into an information flow policy
that is applicable to intrusion detection. It remains possible to derive an information flow
policy from a discretionary access control policy, as it has been done in previous work with
the VTT model.
We further detail these aspects in the reminder of this chapter.
3.2 Data and code distinction
Recall from Definition 1 in Chapter 2 that tags contain meta-information describing actual infor-
mation (or data3) of the system. In this new model, meta-information is represented by two sets
I and X as follows:
• I is the set of all meta-information describing passive data (i.e., stored in a file). Note
that executable code (e.g., shared libraries, binary programs, executable scripts) is equally
represented in I as long as it is not executed, i.e. as long as it is not running as the code of
a process. Thus, stored data representing code is represented in I.
• X is a set describing active code being executed (i.e., being run as code in processes). Each
element of X is an image of one passive information element of I, through the Run relation
defined below.
This distinction of I and X was inspired by Denning's assumption: Processes are the active agents
responsible for all information flow [17].
Definition 4. The execution of code is characterized by the following relation:
Run : I Ñ X
1In this thesis, we equally refer to executable code or program to refer to any given combination of executable
information, potentially being executed by one or several processes.
2As introduced in Chapter 1, AppArmor is a Linux security module developed by Novel.
3We both refer to information and data interchangeably.
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X is a bijection of I through the relation Run. Each program is described by one or more
elements of I when stored on disk, and by their image through Run when running as the code of a
process. We do not have any a-priori knowledge concerning the executable aspect of information.
Therefore, each passive information of I has an image in X , that is used upon eventual execution.
Definition 5. A program (or application) is defined as a set of executable information in ℘pIq4.
We define the set of all programs as Π:
@pi P Π, pi P ℘pIq5
Usually, we would label each supervised program with a unique meta-information of I, however,
in some cases, programs may be composed of multiple elements combined together, e.g. a C
program linked with shared libraries as in Example 5, or a virtual machine or interpreter loading
a script file, as it is the case with most dynamic languages such as Ruby, Python, PHP and many
others. In such cases, the final program is the set of all of its composing elements, and it is tainted
with multiple meta-information of I. This aspect allows us to define the legal interactions amongst
pieces of code or programs in the policy (which we introduce later in this chapter).
Example 5. Consider a C source file s, labelled with information is. When compiling such
source code and linking it with external libraries l1, . . . , ln, which files are respectively labelled with
information i1, . . . , in, the resulting binary program file f is tainted with S “ tis, i1, . . . , inu P ℘pIq,
i.e. itagpfq “ S.
3.3 Types of containers
At the operating system level, containers of information do not all behave the same. We found
that several kinds of containers have different properties. The first distinction we make concerns
subjects and objects. This notion is similar to the one used in access control models, where each
subject is able to perform actions on a set of objects. We use the terms active containers to
refer to subjects, and passive containers to refer to objects. We also make a distinction between
containers regarding their storage locations. We consider containers stored in memory as volatile
containers, as such containers would not survive power failure. Furthermore, even when no power
failure occurs, the lifetime of such containers is limited: most of them are destroyed after a given
time of execution, e.g. a socket is destroyed once a connection expires, a bunch of memory pages
is freed once a process calls free6 etc.. Therefore, we define:
• The set of volatile containers (objects) as CV .
• The set of persistent containers (objects) as CP .
• The set of processes (subjects) as CΠ.
The set of all containers is defined as:
C “ CV Y CP Y CΠ
It should be emphasized that users are not considered as containers in our extended model.
Processes are the only active agents of the system and thus we consider those as the only active
containers. Processes act as subjects, running code doing operations on behalf of users, towards
objects being either volatile (e.g. sockets) or persistent (e.g. files) containers. Therefore, confining
users as well as programs is done at the level of processes, and only the three previously introduced
types of containers exist in our model: volatile, persistent and processes.
4℘pAq (powerset) denotes the set of all the subsets of A.
5Empirically, processes are containers running the code of programs. The set of all programs is Π, therefore the
set of all processes is noted CΠ.
6In C programming, memory is allocated by calling the C library function malloc and released by calling the
function free.
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3.4 Supervision of processes
As mentioned previously, we follow Denning's assumption that processes are the active agents
responsible for all information flows. Therefore, tainting rules apply to operations made by pro-
cesses and involving potential7 information flows. As we distinguish (passive) data from (active)
code in the meta-information used in tags, different tainting rules are applied, depending on the
access mode and the kind of meta-information involved.
Definition 6. For any container c,
• the function itag : C Ñ ℘pI Y X q returns the information tag of c.
• the function ptag : C Ñ ℘p℘pI Y X qq returns the policy tag of c.
In the following, we represent the operating system as a state-transition system:
σi Ñτi σi`1
We note σ0, σ1, . . . , σn the states of the system, and τ0, τ1, . . . , τn the transitions between these
states. We consider the read, write, and exec operations made by processes to be transitions
between states of the containers. Therefore, each information flow is represented as a transition
between two states i and i ` 1, respectively referring to the state of information before and after
the information flow occurred.
3.4.1 Keeping tracks of running code
Before going into the details of tainting rules, let us clarify how this distinction between code and
data in meta-information affects the meaning of information tags. When describing the VTT model
in Chapter 2, we stated that information tags indicate the origin of content in containers. This
remains true when considering elements of I, describing passive information. However, elements
of the new set X do not have the same meaning. Instead, such elements keep tracks of active
code involved in information flows. In other words, the combination of elements of I and X in
information tags has a dual meaning, stating which couples xinformation, codey are involved in
information flows. It also depends on the kind of container:
• Any element a P X in the information tag of a processes defines that the process potentially
runs this code.
• Any element a P X in the information tag of any passive container indicates a process running
such code wrote information in the container.
This allows us to express additional properties in the information flow policy. We will come
back to this later in this chapter.
3.4.2 Write access
When a process p accesses a container c in write access, we distinguish two situations: either the
process overwrites the existing content, or it appends new information to the container. In the
first case (overwrite), we propagate the information tag of the process as-is towards the container.
itagpcqi`1 “ itagppqi
In the second case (append), the union of both the container and the process's information tags is
used as the new tag for the container:
itagpcqi`1 “ itagppqi Y itagpcqi
In any case, the new information tag of the container is tainted by both elements of I, i.e.
information that the process was holding at the time of the access, and elements of X , i.e. which
code the process was running at this time. This property allows to keep tracks of which processes
write information to containers, and to express policy rules based on it, as presented later in this
chapter.
7Recall that our analysis takes a maximum estimation of the possible content of containers into consideration.
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3.4.3 Execution
Recall the Run relation from previous Section 3.2 of this chapter. This relation characterizes the
execution of code or programs.
Definition 7. We extend the Run relation from Definition 4 as follows, so as to work with sets of
elements rather than individual elements:
Run : ℘pIq Ñ ℘pX q
RunpAq “ tRunpaq|a P Au
When a new process is created as the result of the execution of some code, its information
tag is initialized with the image of the information that was executed, through the relation Run.
Therefore, for any process p running code stored in a persistent container c, the information tag
of the new process is initialized as follows:
itagppqi`1 “ RunpitagpcqizX q
Elements of X in a running process give information related to the code that is currently
running. These meta-information also taint the containers where processes write information, as
described previously. Therefore, upon execution of content store in a container c, we discard
elements of X from the information tag of c: we do not want taint the new process with previous
writers of c (i.e., pieces of code being executed by previous processes which wrote information to
c).
3.4.4 Read access
When a process p accesses a container c in read access, it is tainted by the information tag of c,
as follows:
itagppqi`1 “ itagppqi Y pitagpcqizX q
We discard elements of X for the very same reasons described previously for the case of execu-
tion.
3.4.5 Summary of tainting rules
Operation i P I x P X
Read taint discard
Write taint taint
Execute taint with x “ Runpiq discard
Figure 3.1: Tainting rules
As shown on Figure 3.1, we apply different tainting rules, depending on whether processes read,
write or execute content. In this figure, taint means that the destination process or container
gets tainted by the meta-information. Discard means the destination process or container does
not get tainted by the meta-information. The latter only applies to elements of X , i.e. meta-data
attached to active code being executed.
3.5 Extended information flow policy
Before going into further details about how the (information flow) policy is attached to containers,
let us define the policy itself. In our model, the policy can be expressed separately for users,
programs and persistent containers. It should be emphasized that volatile containers do not have a
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policy because these directly depend on the processes creating them and acting on them. Checking
their content against the policy is done every time the acting process performs an operation tainting
its own information tag.
For any given system, let U be the set of all users, CP the set of all persistent containers and
Π the set of all programs (i.e. executable code).
The information flow policy is a triplet: P “ pPCP ,PU ,PΠ) where: PCP is the policy attached
to persistent containers, PU is the policy attached to users, and PΠ is the policy attached to the
executable code of programs.
• PCP Ď CP ˆ ℘pI Y X q.
For any persistent container c protected by the policy, PCP defines one or several sets S “
taY bu, a P ℘pIq and b P ℘pX q where:
1. Any subset of a may legally flow into c.
2. Applications or programs running any subset of b as their code are allowed to write
information into c.
• PU Ď U ˆ ℘pI Y X q.
For any user u that is supervised by the policy, PU defines one or several sets S “ taY bu, a P
℘pIq and b P ℘pX q where:
1. Processes on behalf of u are allowed to access any subset of a.
2. Processes on behalf of u are allowed to execute any subset of b.
• PΠ Ď Πˆ ℘pI Y X q.
For any executable information pi that is supervised by the policy, PΠ defines one or several
sets S “ taY bu, a P ℘pIq and b P ℘pX q where:
1. Processes running pi as their code are allowed to read any subset of a.
2. Processes running pi as code are allowed to execute any subset of b.
The (information flow) policy is attached permanently to persistent containers and to users,
and dynamically to processes as these are created, in their policy tags.
Definition 8. We define the relation maycontain as follows:
@x P tCP ,U ,Πu, pc, pq P Px ô c maycontain p
where c P x and p Ď ℘pI Y X q
Therefore, for any container c P C
ptagpcq “ tp|c maycontain pu
3.5.1 Constrained and unconstrained containers
Unconstrained containers have no policy attached to them, i.e., their policy tags are empty, whereas
constrained containers have a policy tag defining their legal content. For any c P C,
• If c is unconstrained, then ptagpcq “ H.
• If c is constrained, then ptagpcq ‰ H.
• If c is constrained, and must remain empty, then ptagpcq “ tHu “ K.
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3.5.2 Persistent policy
Tags are permanently attached to persistent containers when the policy is defined and applied.
These are distributed in all persistent containers in the system. We qualify such a policy as
permanent because it will remain until a new policy is defined and distributed over the system
again, replacing the policy in place. Killing processes, rebooting the system or power failures will
not alter such policy tags.
We attach two tags describing a policy to each persistent container: the first one describes the
legal content into the container, and corresponds to a set of rules included in PCP . (The set of all
of the policy tags of persistent containers is equal to PCP ).
The second one defines the policy attached to the potential executable content of the container
(program or code such as shared libraries). We call it execute policy tag, as it is used only when
the content is executed. The set of all of the execute policy tags of persistent containers is equal to
PCΠ . We call this tag the execute policy tag of the container.
3.5.3 Initialization
At the time when we set up the (information flow) policy, i.e. before we start to track information
flows, we attach information tags, policy tags, and execute policy tags to the persistent containers
we wish to track. Recall that processes do not exist at this stage, and are dynamically tagged as
they are created when the system is running.
Initially, information tags are initialized to unique meta-information describing the initial con-
tent of the container. This initial information is considered as being atomic8. Therefore, the
minimal policy tag of any container allows at least this initial information.
Definition 9. For any persistent container c, we note ptag0pcq its initial policy tag. It is defined
as the set of elements of the policy regarding this container, that we note c.policy9
@c P CP , ptag0pcq “ c.policy
with:
c.policy “ tS P ℘pI Y X q|pS, cq P PCP u
Definition 10. For any persistent container c eventually containing executable information, we
note xptag0pcq its initial execute policy tag. It is defined as the set of elements in the policy
regarding the execution of its content pi (executable code or program).
@c P CP , xptag0pcq “ pi.policy
with:
pi.policy “ tS P ℘pI Y X q|pS, piq P PΠu
When no initial executable content exist in the container, we do not attach an execute policy
tag to it.
3.5.4 User policy
As opposed to persistent containers, where the policy is distributed in each container, the policy
attached to each user is globally defined in the system (e.g. in a hash table). The policy for each
user is defined as a set of rules included in PU . Figure 3.2 illustrates the user's policy for a system
with N users.
8Atomic information are the smallest pieces of information that we are able to distinguish in the system.
9The theoretical notation c.policy refers to the set of rules of the policy restraining the container c. It differs
from the notation ptagpcq, which denotes the policy tag attached to c, i.e. ptagpcq contains p.policy.
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uid1 set1 P ℘p℘pI Y X qq
uid2 set2 P ℘p℘pI Y X qq
uidN setN P ℘p℘pI Y X qq
Figure 3.2: User policy
3.5.5 Processes
Because processes are dynamically created by the operating system upon execution of a program,
tags cannot directly be attached to processes before these actually exist. Instead, this is done at
runtime, at the time of execution. The policy for a process depends on the user on behalf of whom
it performs actions, as well as the program or code being run.
The policy tag of a process determines which are the legal information flows the process can
perform, given the context xuser, programy. The policy regarding the running program is stored in
the execute policy tag of the persistent container storing its code on disk. This policy is used along
with the policy attached to the current user, in order to determine the policy tag of the process.
Definition 11. The policy restraining a process p running a program pi on behalf of user u is
dynamically computed upon execution, as follows:
p.policy “ u.policy [ pi.policy
where:
A[B “ taX b|a P A, b P BuztHu
Formally, A [ B denotes the intersection of all the common sets of A and B. After this, the
policy tag of the new process is initialized to p.policy.
3.6 Legality of information flows
The legality of information flows remains the same as in the VTT model. Recall Definition 3
from Chapter 2. Intuitively, an information flow is legal if and only if the information tag of the
destination container, after the information flow occurred, is included in one of the sets of its policy
tag.
The legality of information flows is verified each time an information tag is updated, i.e,. after
each information flow towards a container.
3.6.1 Initialization of processes
In the case of the execution of programs, the state of the resulting new process must be verified, to
check whether the execution is legal. Figure 3.3 summarizes the creation and initialization of the
tags attached to processes upon execution of code (or binary programs in this figure, though this
applies as well to any other form of execution, such as executable memory mappings, see Chapter 4
for more details). When a new process is created, its policy tag and information tag are initialized
according to the rules defined in the previous sections of this chapter:
• The policy tag of the process is set according to the policy for the current user, as well as
the policy for the program being executed.
• The information tag of the process is set at runtime, as the image of the meta-data of the
executed code through the relation Run. Such code is stored in a persistent container, which
execute policy tag contains the appropriate policy to restrict its execution.
After the execution of a process p, we ensure that Legalpitagppq, ptagppqq stands, i.e.,
DS P ptagppq|itagppq Ď S
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In Figure 3.3, ptag, itag, and xptag refer to the policy tags, information tag and execute policy
tag of the containers, respectively.
Figure 3.3: Execution of a binary program
3.7 Lattice
The following demonstration shows that the policy in our model is based on a lattice. In order to
demonstrate this property, we need to introduce the following definitions.
Definition 12. Let SC be the set of all the security classes. A security class is a subset of the
policy such that for any s P SC, s P ℘p℘pI Y X qq
Security classes are subsets of the security policy attached to containers of information. In
practice, those are either policy tags or subsets of the policy attached to users.
Definition 13. We introduce the relation Ď such that for any C1, C2 P SC,C1 Ď C2 ô @A P
C1, DB P C2 : A Ď B
Figure 3.4: Lattice
From the previous definitions, we can establish that xSC,Ďy forms a partially ordered set:
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• Ď is reflexive: @C P SC,C Ď C
• Ď is transitive: @C1, C2, C3 P SC,C1 Ď C2 ^ C2 Ď C3 ñ C1 Ď C3
• Ď is antisymmetric: @C1, C2 P SC,C1 Ď C2 ^ C2 Ď C1 ñ C1 “ C2
Under the following assumptions, we can establish that xSC,Ď,J,Ky forms a universal bounded
lattice:
• SC is finite.
• SC has a lower bound K“ ttuu such that @C P SC,KĎ C.
• SC has a greatest bound J “ ℘p℘pI Y X qq such that @C P SC,C Ď J.
This shows that the security classes of the policy in our model can be represented in a lattice.
Our model can be represented in Denning's mathematical framework suitable for formulating the
requirements of secure information flow amongst security classes [7].
3.8 Derivation from a MAC policy
In this section, we present an algorithm to derive an information flow policy, usable in our IDS,
from a MAC policy as used by AppArmor, a LSM module presented in Chapter 1. This work
has been published along with our theoretical model in the proceedings of the IEEE International
Conference on Communications in 2011 [65].
AppArmor [54], introduced in Chapter 1, is a Linux security module enforcing a Mandatory
Access Control (MAC) policy. In the following paragraphs, we provide a solution for deriving an
AppArmor MAC policy into an information flow policy, usable in our model, and restricting the
execution of code or programs (PΠ). Such a policy does not specify rules based on users, and
thus the subset of the policy concerning users (PU ) remains empty. As we monitor information
flows, we discard pure access control rules which are unrelated to any possible information flow10.
In AppArmor, the policy is composed of so-called profiles, where each profile describes a set of
rules specific to an application (program). In order to derive a policy from a set of AppArmor
profiles, and which we can use as an information flow policy for our IDS, we proceed as follows:
for each statement of each AppArmor profile, we check whether such a statement is related to a
potential information flow, and transform it into a corresponding statement in our model if it does.
The ability to derive an information flow policy from such a wide spread format11 leads to two
major advantages. First, the specification of the policy for a given program or application can be
a burden in some cases, as a lot of operations and information may be accessed by the application.
Secondly, it can be very useful to use a common policy specification when comparing different
models together.
3.8.1 AppArmor profiles
In an AppArmor profile, the permission granted to a program pi over a object o can be one of the
following: (r,w,l,m,ix,px,Px,ux,Ux). These permissions are listed in Figure 3.5.
AppArmor profiles also constrain access to network resources and POSIX capabilities. However,
these are pure access control rules and thus these are not taken into account in our model. Instead,
possible information flows related to access to information are captured.
Definition 14. An AppArmor policy P is a set of profiles. A profile p P P is a set of rules of the
form po, αq where o is an object and α is a permission. All these rules confine a given program
pi P Π. We formally define such a profile as follows:
p “ ppi, tpo1, α1q, . . . , pon, αnquq
10Creating a file does not cause any direct information flow as long as nothing is written in it. However, reading
or writing information from/to a file does. We do only rely on such rules possibly responsible for information flows.
11AppArmor is used by default on some Linux distributions.
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r read (executing also needs this permission)
w write
a append
l link mode: mediates access to symlinks and
hardlinks
m allow executables mapping: mmap
ix inherit execute mode: The resource inherits the
current profile, even if a profile already exists for this
resource. AppArmor normally makes a transition to
the profile of the newly executed program on execve.
However, it is sometimes wanted to keep the current
profile's permission while executing the new program
(so as to avoid loosing permissions of the current pro-
file, or gaining new permissions from the target's pro-
file).
px discrete profile execute mode: if no profile is de-
fined for the resource, execution is denied. This re-
quires a profile for the executed program and forces
a transition to the new profile upon execution.
Px discrete profile execute mode/scrub the envi-
ronment: same as px but scrubs the environment
before execution. It will tell glibc to clean the en-
vironment before executing the resource, by clearing
some environment variables which may be used to
modify the behavior of programs. It helps protect
against e.g. LD_PRELOAD abuse. This is done by
using the kernel's unsafe exec routines (otherwise, the
kernel only scrubs the kernel environment in specific
situations, such as the execution of setuid/setgid bi-
naries).
ux unconstrained execute mode: no profile is needed
to execute the target.
Ux unconstrained/scrub the environment: same as
ux but scrubs the environment (see above).
Figure 3.5: AppArmor access modes
In order to compute an information flow policy which we can use in our model, from an Ap-
pArmor policy, we proceed as follows:
• For each AppArmor profile, we attach an information tag to each object (persistent contain-
ers) whose accesses are restricted by the profile, and we initialize it with a unique identifier.
• For each rule of a profile, we infer legal information flows towards the involved objects, and
set the policy tags to these objects using the algorithm described in Figure 3.6.
3.8.2 Algorithm
The algorithm presented in Figure 3.6 transforms an AppArmor policy (a set of profiles) into an
expression of an information flow policy (set of policy tags on containers). Let P be the set of all
the AppArmor profiles in the policy. For any profile p P P , p.container is the container associated
to the binary program constrained by p, p.canreadpq is the list of files on which a read_like access
is authorized, p.canexecpq is the list of executable files allowed to be executed, and p.canwritepq is
the list of paths where it is allowed to write. TOP represents the set of all atomic information tags
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in the system (it corresponds to J), inheritppq : bool returns true if the profile p inherits from its
parent's profile and false otherwise. unconstrainedppq : bool returns true if the associated program
(subject) is unconstrained and false if not. RunpIq is defined in Section 3.2.
function tag(P)
for each p in P ; do
class = Run(itag(p.container))
if unconstrained(p)
data = TOP
code = TOP
else
for r in p.canread() ; do
data += itag(r)
end
for x in p.canexec() ; do
code += Run(x)
end
end
xptag(p.container) = data + code
for w in p.canwrite() ; do
w.ptag += data + class
end
end
end
Figure 3.6: Derivation algorithm.
3.8.3 Examples
The following two examples respectively show how we can derive an information flow policy from
a simple AppArmor profile, and how intrusions are detected by our model when using such a
derived policy as well as how it compares to access control with respect to the detection of illegal
information flows (we consider AppArmor being setup in permissive mode). Here, the security is
centered on programs, with no user-related policy rules.
{/usr/bin/apache,
{(/etc/apache2.conf, w), (/etc/apache2.conf, r),
(/www/index.php,r), (/usr/bin/ftpd, px)}
}
{/usr/bin/ftpd,
{(/etc/ftpd.conf,w), (/etc/ftpd.conf,r),
(/home/ftpd/data,w)}
}
Figure 3.7: Example profile for derivation
Example 6. Consider the AppArmor policy example shown in Figure 3.7, where two programs
are confined : apache and ftpd. Both own files that the other is not allowed to read. Using the
algorithm in Figure 3.6, we can derive an information flow policy and compute its expression on
the tag system. This leads to the information flow policy shown in Figure 3.8.
Example 7. The following execution sequence takes place, as presented in Figure 3.1. The
apache process first reads its configuration file /etc/apache2.conf. Then it reads and interprets
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path itag ptag xptag
/usr/bin/apache ti1u ti1u tRunpi1q, Runpi2q, i3, i6u
/usr/bin/ftpd ti2u ti2u tRunpi2q, i4u
/etc/apache2.conf ti3u tRunpi1q, i3, i6u J
/etc/ftpd.conf ti4u tRunpi2q, i4u J
/home/ftpd/data ti5u tRunpi2q, i4, i5u J
/www/index.php ti6u tRunpi1q, i3, i6u J
Figure 3.8: Tags derived from the policy
/www/index.php, containing a security flaw. Arbitrary code is injected and executed through
apache. It introduces a malware in the binary code of /usr/bin/ftpd. In this first part of the
execution, the process running apache is not expected to write into /usr/bin/ftpd : the policy tag
of this container is not allowed to receive information by a process running apache. Furthermore,
the information apache previously read (and figuring in its information tag) does not belong to
the policy tag of /usr/bin/ftpd. In such a situation, both AppArmor (configured in permissive
mode) and our reference monitor would report an alert.
Then, apache runs the modified ftpd. The process running apache is allowed to execute ftpd
in the security policy, hence AppArmor would allow this execution. But here, the information
tag of ftpd has been modified when the arbitrary code was written into it, and meta-information
have been added to it. Those new meta-information do not figure in the policy tag of the process
running apache, thus it is not authorized to run ftpd anymore, and our reference monitor would
trigger an alert for illegal code execution.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a model of intrusion detection based on an information flow
policy, dynamically checking that it is respected. The policy specifies which pieces of information
may be combined together and which ones the containers are allowed to contain. This model offers
high expressiveness since we are able to assign meta-information to any data in the system and to
constrain the behavior of programs when those data are involved. The policy expresses restrictions
on access to information regardless of where it is located in the system by using a tag system
associating meta-information to information containers. We explain how we maintain tags when
information flows occur and how we can check whether the policy is respected. A central concept
of this model is the execution of programs. This model performs dynamic checking at execution
time, and is able to detect executions of illegal code or illegal flows of information. Today's MAC
implementations in the Linux kernel come with extensive default security policies. It is possible
to set up a policy for the model we propose from an existing MAC policy. We have shown how to
derive a Blare information flow policy from an AppArmor MAC policy, and we gave an example
of practical use. This model and its implementation (introduced in Chapter 4) represent our
first contribution. Our new model differs from existing information flow models in the literature,
such as Flume [40], Asbestos [21], Histar [76] and other DIFC models, using integrity and secrecy
labels for enforcing the information flow policy. Such models are similar to multi-level security
and use security classes, but provide declassification mechanisms to application programmers, so
as to decentralize the authority. However, in such models, code and data are similarly considered
as information, and no distinction is made between the two. For instance, a process labeled with
a given secrecy level may not access a piece of code that is stored in a file with a higher secrecy
level. On the contrary, our model defines the legal interactions of users and applications' code
with respect to each individual pieces of information, allowing to track access to information and
the execution of code separately. Furthermore, existing DIFC models do not keep the history of
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information flows. While this last aspect is not required when enforcing the security policy, it
is a major advantage when tracking information flows as it provides useful information, e.g., for
diagnosis of attacks or malware analysis.
TaintDroid [22] is a related work using taint data in a similar manner, however it focusses on
privacy issues by attaching taint information to specific pieces of information, so as to track their
illegitimate use. TaintDroid does not allow for a fine-grained policy definition, and instead relies
on basic non-interference mechanisms. It is specifically designed for the Android platform, and
does not allow to track off-the-shelf applications (such as binary applications) which is one of our
requirements to provide system-wide supervision.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
This chapter presents our implementation, which we built from the model described
previously, in Chapter 3. This implementation is the basis for all the experiments
which have been conducted during this Ph.D project. It integrates in the LSM
framework, with slight modifications, and makes use of kernel standard API and data
structures. It was designed to provide a generic and versatile implementation ready
for future improvements and changes in the underlying model, with manageable
performance overhead.
We track information flows within the operating system by using a reference monitor
(see Section 1.4.3), which we will call KBlare1 in the reminder of this chapter. This approach is
commonly used to enforce Mandatory Access Control policies in most modern operating systems,
where subjects may (or may not) perform a set of operations on objects. We borrowed this
principle from access control mechanisms in order to track information flows between such subjects
and objects, however we do not enforce any policy, but rather make use of these mechanisms to
observe all information flows in a dynamic fashion. We have implemented this reference monitor
at the kernel level, as it has several advantages:
• We do not need to modify userspace programs.
• We can monitor a substantial amount of information flows.
• Only kernel exploits may possibly affect our IDS.
Though our model could have been implemented in other operating systems, we have chosen to
implement it in the Linux kernel for several reasons: Linux is free and open-source, it has a great
community of developers and is used by the industry as well as many individuals and researchers.
Furthermore, with the development of SELinux [64], the kernel developers and the NSA2 have
extended the Linux kernel with a new framework, the Linux Security Modules3 (LSM), in order to
allow different security models to be implemented (see Section 1.1.2). LSM is built on top of a set
of hooks, initially suited for access control but those can be diverted to implement various security
models and policies [71]. Our implementation makes use of these hooks because they provide the
following advantages and guarantees:
• The code has been proven to be safe, and the hooks well placed, based on static analysis,
avoiding race conditions and such flaws [79].
• The LSM framework is part of the mainstream kernel and exports a (rather4) stable API,
1KBlare is the name of this reference monitor in our open-source project.
2National Security Agency of the United Sates of America.
3When the NSA introduced SELinux in 1998 [64], the Linux kernel security was based on DAC, and did not offer
any generic framework for implementing other security models and policies. Such a framework was required in order
to implement SELinux.
4At the beginnings, the API was not quite stable, which has been widely criticized by the community. The
current API, however, is much more stable and it is now an easy task to back/forward port a set of patches using
LSM on any kernel version since around kernel version 2.6.26.
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which simplifies the task of following the latest kernel versions.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we present an overview of general
principles used in our implementation. Then, we present common data structures available in the
kernel API, and discuss about some practical considerations regarding their use in our code. After
this, we discuss about the operations involved in our analysis, and their complexity in terms of
algorithms. Finally, we present all the hooks that we used in order to track information flows
within the kernel, and show an exhaustive list of system calls that we track.
4.1 Overview
Our implementation builds on top of the LSM framework. Such access control hooks are used by
kernel MAC mechanisms, and several modules can be chosen, one at a time, to enforce a different
kind of security policy. As these hooks have been thought with access control in mind, they are
not always practical for information flow control, and we have been obliged to introduced a few
supplementary hooks for that matter. Also, we do not make use of all the hooks available in LSM,
as a lot of these are specific to access control, and are unrelated to any potential information flow.
Examples of this include hooks related to the flock() system call, defined in fs/locks.c, which
triggers security_file_lock(). Except eventual hidden channels making use of the state of file
locks, no information flows are involved in such a situation. However, it is unpractical to observe
hidden channels, and this is out of the scope of this work.
4.1.1 Kernel access control hooks
The Linux kernel provides mandatory access control mechanisms, but this is not the only access
control implementation available. Traditionally, discretionary access control has been used for
years, and it is still the case by default on many Linux distributions. Discretionary access control
has precedence over mandatory access control, in such a way that if an access is denied by DAC
mechanisms, the code will return without reaching MAC related hooks and functions, as shown on
Figure 4.1. In other words, MAC is more restrictive than DAC, but it does not replace it.
Discretionary Access Control
Mandatory Access Control
Application
Userspace
Kernelspace
syscalls
Figure 4.1: Access control hooks in the kernel
4.1.2 Tags
Recall that in our model, taint marking is performed at each object level by appending (taint)
elements in sets called information tags, in ℘pI Y X q. Information tags are attached to objects,
or containers and describe their content. Those tags are represented as ordered sets of integers in
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this implementation. Positive integers represent elements of I, whereas negative integers represent
elements of X :
• I “ N`˚
• X “ N´˚
Example 8. This is a valid information tag : {1,2,3,4,5}
The policy, determining the legality of information flows, is defined at each object level by a
set of sets in ℘p℘pI Y X qq called policy tag.
Example 9. The following is a valid policy tag :
{ {1,2,3},{-4,5,6},{7,8,9} }
Tags are represented differently in system memory and on the filesystem. When representing
tags in system memory, operations such as checking the legality of an information flow, or append-
ing taint data to an existing tag must be efficient in terms of CPU and memory space. When
representing tags on the filesystem, we aim to minimize the impact on input/output operations.
The following section is a discussion about possible data structures to be used amongst those
available in the Linux kernel.
4.1.3 Granularity
This implementation is based on Linux abstractions. The containers of information that we de-
scribed in our model in Chapter 3 are operating system objects, including files, sockets, memory
pages, pipes, network packets etc.. In order to track information flows, we attach meta-information
to such OS objects. Thus, the level of granularity of our analysis is bound to the granularity of
these objects. Because files are the only persistent objects of the operating system (i.e. stored
on the filesystem, and available after reboot), we define the initial content of files as atomic in-
formation, as this is the finest level of granularity that it is possible to observe at the operating
system abstractions level (e.g. we cannot distinguish information from two distinct bytes nor two
distinct lines of a file from the OS perspective). In a word, information tags are attached to each
OS object, and describe which atomic information are contained in those objects, as well as the
origin of their content.
File Meta-information
file 1 i1
file 2 i2
. . . . . .
Figure 4.2: Atomic information in files at initialization time
Figure 4.2 is an example of how atomic meta-information can be attached to files at initialization
time. Files content is described by a unique meta-information as long as their content is not altered.
Whenever an information flow occurs towards a file, its information tag is updated so as to match
the new content.
4.2 Data structures
The choice of data structures to be used is important, especially because our code runs in kernel
space, where memory has a much higher cost than it has in userspace, because memory is mostly
allocated in a physically contiguous manner, but also because there is a limited amount of memory
available for the system kernel. It is also important to pay particular attention to evaluating the
cost of all operations required by our analysis, as these occur for each information flow between
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subjects and objects of the operating system, and this may considerably affect overall system
performances. Information tags are sets of elements which could be represented as bitmaps, arrays
of integers, binary trees, linked lists and other data structures. Policy tags are each composed of
multiple sets, and may also be represented by such data structures. The following outlines our
choices and compares data structures suiting our requirements. We equally refer to tags as policy
tags or information tags, i.e. ordered sets of meta-information.
Bitmaps
Bitmaps can be implemented with any contiguous zone in memory, such as C arrays. When
representing a set with a bitmap, each bit represents a distinct element of the set, and its value
in t0, 1u represents respectively the absence or presence of this element in the set. Therefore, we
need as many bits in the bitmap as there are atomic information to represent.
• Advantages : this leads to very fast logical operations using masks (logical AND, OR, etc.) to
test the presence of individual or multiple elements at once.
• Drawbacks : it is memory hungry in situations where many files are labeled (i.e. the bitmap
must contain as many bits as there are labeled files in the filesystem initially). Bitmaps
also have a fixed size, which is not practical for our analysis, because the actual number of
meta-information in information tags is dynamic.
Bitmaps provide good performances in the case of analyses supervising a reduced subset of the
filesystem. It would be suitable if we enforced the policy instead of tracking information flows, as
described in Chapter 7 (in this case, the upper bound of the size of information tags depends on
policy tags), but in the present case, these are impractical when the system grows larger due to
memory limitations.
Bloom filters
Bloom filters [10] are probabilistic and space-efficient data structures, and are used to represent
sets of information. Testing the presence of an element in a set represented by a bloom filter can
be subject to false positives, but not to false negatives. Elements can be added to the set, but not
removed. Adding elements increases the probability of false positives. A bloom filter relies on a
bitmap along with a variable number of hash functions. When the bloom filter is empty, all bits
of the bitmap are set to 0. For any given element of the set, each hash function maps it to one
positions in the bitmap, with a uniform random distribution. Adding an element to the bloom filter
is done by first passing it to each hash function, and then by setting the mapped bits to 1. Testing
the presence of an element is done by checking that all the mapped bits (through all of the hash
functions) for a given element are set to 1. If any of the bits is not set to 1, then it is guaranteed
that the element is not present in the set. Otherwise, the element may be present. Examples of
use of bloom filters include symbols resolution by the dynamic linker to load shared libraries on
Linux [20], where a hash table is traditionally used for the resolution. Using bloom filters to test
the presence of an element before the actual lookup in the hash table leads to a dramatic increase in
lookup time by filtering 80% to 90% of the unnecessary lookups. Bloom filters may be used in the
same manner to avoid unnecessary lookups in policy tags, but using such a structure to represent
information tags would increase the number of false positives in our intrusion detection model (i.e.
increasing the number of intrusion alerts where no actual intrusion occurred). Policy tags may also
directly be represented with bloom filters. Each policy tag being composed of several sets, it would
require the same number of bloom filters to represent each set of the policy. However, this would
lead to false negatives in our intrusion detection model, as information may be wrongly reported
as present in the sets of the policy, thus allowing illegal information flows to occur.
Linked lists
The Linux kernel provides an implementation of doubly linked lists in include/linux/list.h. In the
case of our implementation, doubly linked lists provide a scalable alternative to bitmaps, where
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the size can be dynamically adjusted by inserting or removing elements without significant change
in the underlying structure.
• Insertion and deletion time is in θp1q.
• Fusion sort is in Opnq time if the lists are preliminary sorted (which is the case here) or
Opn.logpnqq otherwise.
Trees
The Linux kernel provides rbtree.h, an implementation of the so called Red Black Trees5. Inser-
tion, deletion and iteration cost is Oplogpnqq. According to the Linux kernel documentation, in
Documentation/rbtree:
Red-black trees are a type of self-balancing binary search tree, used for storing sortable
key/value data pairs. This differs from radix trees (which are used to efficiently store
sparse arrays and thus use long integer indexes to insert/access/delete nodes) and hash
tables (which are not kept sorted to be easily traversed in order, and must be tuned for
a specific size and hash function where rbtrees scale gracefully storing arbitrary keys).
Red-black trees are similar to AVL trees, but provide faster real-time bounded worst
case performance for insertion and deletion (at most two rotations and three rotations,
respectively, to balance the tree), with slightly slower (but still O(log n)) lookup time.
Arrays
Arrays can also be used to represent sets. An array of int of size N for instance, noted int[N] in
C, may be used to represent up to N distinct elements, with a memory load of Nˆ sizeof(int),
where sizeof(int) “ 32 bit (or 4 bytes) on all architectures. Allocating such an array has a very
bad impact on kernel memory, as the kernel memory allocator needs a contiguous slab of N ˆ 32
bits of memory.
4.2.1 Practical considerations
The number of atomic information in a container at a given time can vary from zero to potentially
(but unlikely) all the information of the filesystem (e.g. in the case where a single file, process or
other object contains data from all the files of the filesystem). However, a lot of containers contain
only one atomic information. Such containers include containers exclusively accessed read-only
by all processes, and in this case their information tags are never tainted with any new meta-
information. Usually, most containers have an asymptotic limit of possible content from various
files of the filesystem. The memory overhead of tags depends on:
• The number σ of distinct meta-information in the system (i.e. how many files were initially
labeled with distinct meta-information).
• The average size (length) l of tags, i.e. from how many sources does the content of containers
come from.
Dynamic vs static
In the following, c1 and c2 are two constants respectively representing the memory space require-
ment per element in a static (fixed-size) structure and in a dynamic structure (e.g. c1 “ 1 in the
case of a bitmap). When using fixed size data structures, such as bitmaps, the memory overhead
m of tags is constant, and l “ σ, thus:
m “ σ ˆ c1
Conversely, using dynamic data structures, such as doubly linked lists, to represent each set of the
tags, the memory overhead m depends on the average length l of tags:
m “ l ˆ c2
5see http://lwn.net/Articles/184495/ for more information about their implementation in the Linux kernel.
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Example 10. Figure 4.3 is an example of a filesystem from a production server, running several
services including a web server and a database. The filesystem of this server contains 66544
files. Figure 4.4 shows the maximum memory overhead per set of meta-information represented
as bitmaps, arrays and doubly linked lists, considering that all the 66544 files have been labelled
initially. Using bitmaps requires a constant size of 66544 for each set, where using doubly linked
lists requires pp32 ` 8q ˆ lq6 bits per element of the set, and arrays of integers require 32 ˆ l bits
per element of the set.
---
# find / -print | wc -l
66544
---
Figure 4.3: Number of files on a Linux server.
The example on Figure 4.4 shows that, in the case of a filesystem containing 66544 files, it is
preferable to use dynamic data structures when the average length of tags is below around a thou-
sand of files. When containers contain information from a limited number of distinct sources, using
dynamic data structures leads to a more efficient memory management. This can be generalized
as follows, where l is the average length of tags.
pc1 ˆ σ “ l ˆ c2q ô l “ σ ˆ c1
c2
 1
 10
 100
 1  10  100  1000  10000
M
a x
i m
a l
 s
i z
e  
o f
 a
 t a
g  
( o r
d e
r e d
 s e
t )  i
n  K
B
Lenght of a tag (ordered set) (l)
Arrays
Bitmaps
Linked lists
Figure 4.4: Data structures memory overhead
Memory allocation in the kernel
Another critical aspect to consider is the way the kernel handles memory. In order to minimize
fragmentation due to allocation and deallocation of memory inside the kernel, the developers
6Linked lists of integers require at least an integer and two pointers (4 bit each) per element, sizeof(int) = 32
and sizeof(struct list_head) = 8.
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introduced a new mechanism called slab allocation [8]. This mechanism is based on the fact that
initializing and destroying objects has a superior cost than allocating and freeing memory for the
same objects. The so-called slab allocator maintains caches of the same objects types, so that the
basic structure of frequently used objects is preserved between uses. When allocating memory for
untypical object types, with uncommon sizes, the kernel does not directly make use of slab caches,
but rather allocates chunks of contiguous memory to fit the objects. This is handled by the buddy
allocator, which maintains caches of multiples sizes (2k page frames each), and delivers a chunk of
memory of the most appropriate size, from those available. This process involves some waste of
memory: for any object o, there is a waste of 2k ˚ sizeofppageq ´ sizeofpoq. The slab allocator
itself is built on top of of the buddy allocator, so as to efficiently maintains caches of 2k pages.
In order to keep memory overhead small, it is preferable to work with small objects with common
sizes, so that a slab cache is available, rather than big chunks of memory, which is more difficult for
the kernel to handle, and is more likely to waste memory. In order to allocate and free contiguous
chunks of memory, the kernel provides, the two functions kmalloc() and kfree(). These are
implemented on top of the slab allocator, and the kernel maintains pools of various sizes for this
purpose. Figure 4.5 illustrates these three layers of the memory allocation system. It is possible to
directly work at any of these three levels, by invoking different functions exported by the kernel.
kmalloc()/kfree()
Slab allocator
Buddy allocator
Figure 4.5: Memory allocation layers in the kernel
Statistics of the usage of slab caches are available with the slabtop command, as showed on
Figure 4.6. Caches named kmalloc-* are slab caches used by kmalloc.
Active / Total Objects (% used) : 1194073 / 1293683 (92.3%)
Active / Total Slabs (% used) : 44670 / 44670 (100.0%)
Active / Total Caches (% used) : 78 / 111 (70.3%)
Active / Total Size (% used) : 348175.33K / 363819.84K (95.7%)
Minimum / Average / Maximum Object : 0.01K / 0.28K / 14.88K
OBJS ACTIVE USE OBJ SIZE SLABS OBJ/SLAB CACHE SIZE NAME
146568 146547 99% 0.66K 6107 24 97712K reiser_inode_cache
88434 83521 94% 0.89K 5202 17 83232K ext4_inode_cache
[...]
73472 68244 92% 0.06K 1148 64 4592K kmalloc-64
67116 66627 99% 0.09K 1598 42 6392K kmalloc-96
36768 36166 98% 0.25K 2298 16 9192K kmalloc-256
24960 20207 80% 0.03K 195 128 780K kmalloc-32
23072 22805 98% 1.00K 1442 16 23072K kmalloc-1024
12032 12032 100% 0.02K 47 256 188K kmalloc-16
10592 10110 95% 0.12K 331 32 1324K kmalloc-128
9728 8055 82% 0.01K 19 512 76K kmalloc-8
5859 3203 54% 0.19K 279 21 1116K kmalloc-192
848 710 83% 0.50K 53 16 424K kmalloc-512
[...]
Figure 4.6: Output of the slabtop command.
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4.3 Tags in kernel memory
Operations such as checking the legality of information flows, updating information tags etc. are
done in kernel memory, on behalf of processes, which are the active agents responsible for all
information flows [7].
4.3.1 Information tags
In the previous section, we have shown in paragraph 4.2.1 that using dynamic data structures
minimizes memory overhead in the cases where the average number of meta-information per tag
does not exceed a certain limit. In paragraph 4.2.1, we also made some considerations about the
average size of tags, being either limited to a single meta-information in some cases, or bound by
an asymptotic limit in other cases. Finally, we have shown that allocating small data structures
with common types is handled efficiently by the kernel, by using slab caches. We therefore chose to
represent information tags, being ordered sets of integers, in doubly linked lists, as represented on
Figure 4.7. We may also have chosen to use red black trees, as both structures allow for dynamic
expansion of data and make efficient use of slab caches. However, as it is shown later in this chapter,
the operations we perform in our information flow analysis require iterating over all the elements of
information tags, which makes doubly linked lists, as available in the kernel API, the most simple
and efficient way to represent such ordered sets of integers. Information tags are represented by
the following structure in the code of KBlare (defined in security/blare/blare.h):
iNi3i2i1
Figure 4.7: Information tags are represented as doubly linked lists
struct information{
struct list_head node;
int value;
};
where node is a structure containing information related to the list layout (list_head being the
type for list nodes in the kernel API, containing pointers to the next and previous nodes), and value
is an integer representing one atomic information. We decided to encode information as follows:
positive values represent data (i.e. elements of I), while negative values represent executed code
(i.e. elements of X ).
4.3.2 Policy tags
Policy tags describe the legal content of containers. Contrary to information tags, such tags are
statically defined, and thus are rarely modified, these may only be updated when changes happen
in the policy. The policy attached to a container is a set of multiple ordered sets, each describing
one possible combination of legal content. Each ordered set within the policy tag is represented as
a balanced binary tree. It makes verifying the legality of information (against the policy) faster
than it would be with a linear structure, as search operations in a binary tree are performed in
Oplog2pnqq. Binary trees of the same policy tag are linked together inside a linked list, as the
process of verifying the legality of information consists in iterating over all the sets of the policy
until one makes it legal. In other words, policy tags are linked lists of binary trees. Figure 4.8
shows an example of policy tag, composed of three sets, with roots r1, r2, . . . , rN linked together
in a doubly linked list. The following data structures are used to represent policy tags (defined in
security/blare/blare.h):
struct policy{
struct list_head list;
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struct policytree tree;
};
struct policy_tree{
struct list_head list;
struct rb_root *root;
int cardinal;
};
a2 a1
bN
r1
r2
cN c1c2
rN
aN
b1b2
Figure 4.8: Policy tags are linked lists of binary trees
4.3.3 Execute policy tags
Recall from Chapter 3 (Section 3.6.1) that the policy regarding programs and executable code is
distributed in the execute policy tags of objects. We refer to this subset of the policy as the execute
policy and it is stored:
• On disk, in the extended attributes of files containing executable code (e.g. binary files and
shared libraries) which we want to confine, as described later in this chapter.
• In memory, in the execute policy tags of processes, shared memory mappings, pipes, queues
and sockets, which we will further discuss here.
The semantics differs in each case. The execute policy tags of files are used at runtime (along with
the policy of users) to determine the policy tags of processes (as presented in Chapter 3). When
attached to processes, execute policy tags are stored in kernel memory, and are updated whenever
processes either execute or read some code (e.g., a shared library) with an information flow policy
attached to it (i.e. the file containing the code has an execute policy tag). In such a case, the
execute policy tag of the process is tainted by the execute policy tag of this executable content: we
compute a new tag containing the common set of both execute policy tags, as described later in this
chapter, in Section 4.6.2. The aim of tainting processes with execute policy tags is to make sure
the execute policy of all executable content that has been accessed is kept when new information
flows occur towards other containers. The following example shows a possible issue which happens
if we do not taint objects with execute policy tags.
Example 11. File /home/alice/flash_plugin.bin has the following execute policy tag :
{{1,2,5},{-1,2}} Now imagine that Alice (or any program on her behalf) runs :
alice@alicebox:„/ cat flash_plugin.bin > .firefox/plugins
After running this command, the shell will fork and execute cat, which in turn will read
flash_plugin.bin, and output its content to another file in .firefox/plugins. The new file
will not have any execute policy tag attached to it unless we do make sure execute policy tags get
tainted.
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To overcome this issue, we need to ensure that :
• Whenever a process reads a file or other object containing executable code, we read the
execute policy tag of this object, and append it to the execute policy tag of the process.
• Whenever a process writes to an object, it appends its execute policy tag to the execute policy
tag of the object.
By doing so, we make sure that all objects have their execute policy tag updated when code
gets copied to another object. Whenever a new subset of the execute policy (i.e. an element of
℘p℘pI Y X qq), bound to a piece of executable information, is read or executed, it is included7 in
the execute policy tag of the current process. When processes write information to files or shared
memory mappings, the execute policy tags of these objects also get tainted the same way.
4.4 Tags on disk
The persistence of a system with everything running into memory is very limited. It would also
be very inefficient in terms of memory to maintain in-memory data structures for every object,
especially for every file of the filesystem. In order to be able to restore the state of the system
after rebooting, or to be able to free in-memory information tags of files no longer accessed by any
running process, tags are stored on disk, in the extended attributes of the filesystem, in the form
of name:value pairs, each containing up to 64 KB of binary data8. We store values in the security
namespace (security.*), as used by the other LSM modules.
• Information tags use one field of the extended attributes: security.blare.info
• Policy tags and execute policy tags use several fields (one key:value pair for each ordered set
of the policy). For a policy tag with N subsets, fields names are:
security.blare.policytku, with 0 ď k ă N
For an execute policy tag, fields names are:
security.blare.xpolicytku, with 0 ď k ă N .
Example 12. The policy tag { {1,2,3},{-4,5,6},{7,8,9} } of a given file, would be represented in
three distinct key:value pairs:
• security.blare.policy0
• security.blare.policy1
• security.blare.policy2
4.4.1 Serialization
Serialization is the process of converting data structures from an in-memory format, into a format
that can be stored, or transmitted over a network connection, in such a way that it can later
be restored back to its original live form, by an operation called unserialization. We need a
serialization mechanism in our implementation, in order to be able to store live tags into the
extended attributes of the filesystem, and to restore live tags back into memory when processes
access information stored into files not currently in use. The extended attributes are represented on
disk as flat and contiguous sets of bytes. Such a representation requires an intermediate structure
that is contiguous in memory, so that we can dump it into a key:value pair (i.e. we cannot write
non contiguous data structures in the extended attributes). We chose to use ordered arrays of
integers for this purpose. On access to files, meta-information into tags are converted from their
disk representation to their memory representation, and vice-versa.
7The result is the union of the two sets of sets.
8According to the manpage of attr, extended attributes on XFS filesystem objects on Linux.
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• On read accesses, meta-information is read from the extended attributes and converted into
a live representation (tree or list).
• On write accesses, meta-information is written to the extended attribute and thus converted
into a linear representation (continuous memory region).
Example 13. int array[6] allocates 6 * sizeof(int) in a contiguous region of memory.
In kernel code, operations that we can perform on inodes, such as operations on the extended
attributes, are associated to each inode structure. The following two operations are used in our im-
plementation, and are available after filesystem initialization (the kernel would return -EOPNOTSUP9
before this stage, or when extended attributes are unavailable on the filesystem in use).
inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, name, buffer, size)
inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry, name, buffer, size)
4.5 Users policy
Recall from Chapter 3 that in our model, the information flow policy is composed of three distinct
subsets, PΠ,PU and PCP , respectively expressing the policy regarding executable code, the policy
regarding users, and the policy regarding containers. The following gives implementation details
about PU .
4.5.1 On disk
A user policy defines what a user (or uid) is allowed to do. In practice, it is used to determine
which subsets of information a process on behalf of a given user is allowed to access. For each uid,
a user policy can be defined, and is similar to the policy tag of containers in the sense that it is a
set of ordered sets.
Example 14. The following is a valid user policy : { {1,2,3},{-4,5,6},{7,8,9} }.
Where the policy tags can be stored in the extended attributes of each file, user roles need to
be centrally defined somewhere on the filesystem. The policy for each user (uid) can be defined
and stored, from userspace, in the extended attributes of a file /etc/blare/uid. This ensures that
the users policy is stored in a persistent fashion, and it allows us to restore it at boot time.
4.5.2 In memory
The policy for each user is stored in a linked list of binary trees, the same way policy tags and
execute policy tags are represented in memory. It is used at runtime along with execute policy tags
to compute the policy tags of processes (as presented in Chapter 3).
4.5.3 Communication between userspace and kernelspace
The kernel should not directly read the special file storing users policy in the filesystem
(/etc/blare/uid) because the location of such file is a policy and thus should not be defined within
kernel code. Instead, we use the securityfs interface (mounted as /sys/kernel/security), which
exports a pseudo-filesystem available from userspace, to load users policy at boot time. For each
user, a special file is created in the pseudo-filesystem, thus allowing the system administrator to
load the policy (set of sets) of this user. Each set of the policy that is loaded this way is copied into
kernel memory, into a policy tag attached to the appropriate user id. Each special file is named
after the uid of the corresponding user, and is created in /sys/kernel/security/blare/users.
When a running process on behalf of a user runs the exec system call, it checks whether a policy
has previously been loaded in kernel memory for this user, and uses it along with the execute policy
tag of the executable file.
9Return code standing for operation not supported.
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4.6 Operations and complexity
4.6.1 Updates on information tags
Information tags are updated when information flows occur (the destination container's information
tag is updated). If both the source and destination containers are in memory (sockets, processes,
IPC, . . . ), the involved operation is the fusion of two linked lists, which complexity is Opn `mq
for two lists of respective sizes n and m. If one of the containers is a file, a conversion from/to a
linear structure is needed (see Section 4.4.1).
• On read operations from files, the extended attributes are dumped in a memory buffer (
of type int*). We iterate over the resulting array, and store each array value in the (in-
memory) information tag (linked list) of the current process performing the read operation.
See itag_insert from security/blare/itag.c.
• On write operations, we overwrite the information tag of the file with the information
tag of the current process. We iterate over the linked list, and create an array of inte-
ger from it, so as to write it into the extended attributes. See blare_write_info from
security/blare/itag.c.
• On append operations, we first read the information tag of the file, append it together with
the information tag (linked list) of the current process into an array of int and write the
new array to the extended attributes of the file.
A process P reading information from a container C has its information tag updated as follows:
itagpP qi`1 “ itagpP qi Y itagpCqi
where i ` 1 refers to the state of the tag after the information flow occurred, and i refers to the
state of the tag before the information flow occurred.
4.6.2 Updates on execute policy tags
Execute policy tags of processes are also updated dynamically, whenever an information flow occurs,
potentially involving executable code confined by the execute policy. This operation involves the
restriction of two policy tags against each other, i.e. the intersection of all the sets of one execute
policy tag with all the sets of the other one. If we consider the fusion of two execute policy tags
A “ pa1, a2, . . . , anq and B “ pb1, b2, . . . , bmq, then the complexity of this operation is in Opn2.m2q.
We define this operation as A [ B, as presented in Definition 11 previously in Chapter 3. It is
implemented by the pseudo-code described in Figure 4.9.
4.6.3 Legality check
To verify the legality of an information flow between two containers, we check that the information
tag of the destination container (Cdest) is legal with respect to its policy tag:
DS P ptagpCdestq|itagpCdestq Ď S
The legality check is performed by iterating over the information tag of Cdest, checking that
all of its elements belong to its policy tag. This is a linear operation with respect to the size of
the information tag. Its complexity is in Opk ˆ `ˆ log2pnqq, where k is the length of the involved
information tag, l is the number of subsets of the policy and n is the maximum size of the sets of
the policy.
4.7 System calls and hooks
System calls are the interface between applications and the kernel. A lot of operations such as
opening files, creating shared memory mappings or executing programs involve system calls, most
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new := {}
s i z e := 0
f o r ( i := 1 to n) do
f o r ( j := 1 to m) do
c := ai X bj
f o r ( k := 1 to s i z e ) do
i f ( c Ď new [ k ] ) then
break
done
i f ( k = s i z e +1) then
new := new Y c
s i z e++
f i
done
done
Figure 4.9: Execute policy tags intersection algorithm
often indirectly by calling wrapper functions from the C library10 rather than directly invoking the
underlying system calls. It is necessary to track system calls in order to track information flows
between processes. The LSM framework provides hooks for tracking system calls involving access
to information. In Appendix A, we provide a detailed list of the system calls in the Linux kernel
version 3.2, where system calls which may lead to information flows are identified. In this section,
we show how our reference monitor uses LSM hooks and which system calls correspond to it. All
the hooks that we use are defined in security/blare/lsm_hooks.c. The LSM framework made
changes to the structures used in kernel space to represent kernel objects, including file descriptors,
inodes and processes credentials, by adding an opaque security field of type void*, that the LSM
modules can use to store their own security attributes [71]. Furthermore, processes credentials11
have been extended to support concurrent access, and now have a supplementary void* security
field to store opaque structures. The credentials (including the security field) are protected by
Read Copy Update (RCU) mechanisms [47].
Special structures
As previously described in our theoretical model in Chapter 3, containers of information are sep-
arated into three classes: volatile objects, persistent objects (i.e. backed on the file system), and
processes. The blare_tags structure is used for all volatile objects. It is defined as follows:
struct blare_tags{
struct list_head *info;
/* Used by softirqs invoking rcv_skb*/
spinlock_t info_lock;
atomic_t refcount;
int info_rev; //unused
struct list_head *policy;
struct list_head *xpolicy;
};
Where info is a pointer to an information tag, policy is a pointer to a policy tag, and xpolicy is
a pointer to an execute policy tag. Files and processes have their own data structures, respectively
blare_file_struct and blare_task_struct and are described later in this chapter.
10The GNU C library is the most common C library on Linux, often called glibc.
11Credentials are used to store various security information related to processes, and are attached to the
task_struct structure in the cred field. See documentation/credentials.txt in the kernel source tree.
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4.7.1 Fork and clone
Fork
When a process forks by calling the libc function fork (which in turn calls the clone system call
with special flags), the resulting child process is an exact copy of the parent process in terms of
memory, except for a couple of properties (listed in the manpage of fork (2)). A number of flags
may affect the behavior of fork, by determining how the parent and the child may share system
objects. Amongst those flags, MADV_DONTFORK, which can be set on memory mappings using the
madvise system call, affects the semantics of possible information flows between the child and the
parent. Memory mappings (described in the next subsection) are normally inherited during the fork
process, unless those have been marked with this flag. Similarly, the set of open file descriptors is
inherited by the child, however we track the actual access to files (through fread or fwrite system
calls), so this does not affect our analysis. The same goes with open message queue descriptors, as
we track actual calls to msgget. In all cases,
• The child's information tag is an exact copy of the parent's information tag.
• The child's policy tag is an exact copy of the parent's policy tag.
• The child's execute policy tag is an exact copy of the parent's execute policy tag.
Clone
The clone system call is mostly used to create threads. When the CLONE_VM flag is passed, the
child process uses the same address space as the parent (and any call to mmap or munmap affects
both processes). Otherwise, the child process has its own address space. In this later case, existing
anonymous shared mappings of the parent are shared with the child. If the CLONE_NEWIPC flag is
passed, then the child uses a new IPC namespace, and will not be able to see the objects created
in the parent's namespace. If this flag is not set, the child shares the same IPC namespace, and is
able to access shared memory segments through shmat and messages through msgget. In the case
of shared memory segments, KBlare considers an over-estimate of the possible information flows
from the time when the segment is attached with shmat until it is detached with shmdt.
Related hooks
Both clone and fork are hooked in the LSM framework (security_task_create) and trigger two
functions in KBlare. The first one is defined as follows:
static int blare_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
It is not yet used in our implementation, but it gives useful information about the clone flags,
which may be used in the future to track individual threads of the same process12. The second
one is defined as follows:
static int blare_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t
gfp);
This function is part of the RCU13 mechanisms protecting access to the credentials of processes,
and returns an exact copy of the protected structures (blare_tags in this case).
12We do not track individual threads in our current implementation, because all threads of a process share the
same address space. Therefore, there is no way to dynamically track information flows between threads. In order
to track threads individually, it would be necessary to ensure no information flow can possibly occur, by auditing
the code, which is out of the scope of this work.
13RCU stands for Read Copy Update, it is a low overhead synchronization mechanism widely used in the Linux
Kernel. See McKenny and Walpole's work [47] for more about RCU.
4.7. SYSTEM CALLS AND HOOKS 73
4.7.2 Memory mappings
In this section, we describe separately how KBlare deals with shared memory mappings (i.e. mmap)
and shared memory segments (System V shared memory, i.e. shmat).
Mapping a file to memory
Processes have the ability to create memory mappings, by calling the mmap system call. Memory
mappings are often used to map the content of files to memory, but they can also be used without
any underlying file. In this case, it is similar to shared memory segments (as described in the next
subsection).
void *mmap(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags,
int fd, off_t offset);
Any mapped file can be unmapped by calling the munmap system call. Amongst the possible flags,
MAP_PRIVATE, MAP_ANONYMOUS and MAP_SHARED change the behavior of memory mappings, and
how other processes may access it.
• MAP_PRIVATE: the memory mapping is not visible by other processes, and changes made to
the mapping are not backed to the underlying file. Conversely, changes to the underlying
file may or may not affect the memory region, this behavior is unspecified by the POSIX
specification. In order to keep a conservative approach, changes to mapped files should
update memory mappings as well in our implementation. This particular aspect is not taken
into consideration in our current implementation, and it will be fixed in the future.
• MAP_SHARED: updates on the memory mapping are visible to other processes mapping the
same file. Content is also updated on the filesystem, but it may not actually be updated
until msync or munmap is called. Note: Calling mmap with MAP_SHARED before a fork will
make those mappings available to the child.
• MAP_ANONYMOUS: the memory mapping is not backed to any file. The information is
kept in memory. Anonymous shared mapping are available to the child after a fork
(MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_SHARED).
The protection flags also affect the way information may flow between processes and a mapping
(these flags are enforced by the hardware, when possible):
• PROT_EXEC allows execution of the pages' content.
• PROT_READ allows reading the pages.
• PROT_WRITE allows writing to the pages.
In our implementation, information tags are attached to shared memory mappings, when those
allow at least write access to the owner process14. Non shared memory mappings directly affect the
process's information tag in a way that is similar to the other file system operations. Information
flows between a process and a shared memory mapping are tracked until the process unmaps the
file (or memory region in case no file descriptor exists).
Hooks
KBlare tracks calls to both mmap and munmap. The latter is not part of the LSM framework and
had to be manually added in our kernel patch. The following hook ensures that we update the
information tags of processes having access to mapped files or regions:
14Non writeable mappings occur quite frequently, e.g. when loading shared libraries. Such mappings are equivalent
to reading the file, in terms of information flows
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static int blare_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only);
The semantics is the following, when pages are writeable:
• In the case of non anonymous shared mappings, a blare_tags structure is attached to the
file descriptor of the mapping, in its file->_security field, in order to store the information
tag of the memory mapping (we do not set any policy on the mappings, the policy verification
is left to the processes, as described in the model in Chapter 3).
• In the case of anonymous shared mappings, only the child process may have access to it,
unless MADV_DONTFORK was set. No file descriptor is available for this kind of mappings, as
it is not backed to any file. Information tags of the parent and the child have to be kept
synchronized until one of them releases the mapping. This is not supported in our current
implementation. A special flag should be added to blare_task_struct, and set to 1 for
all parents having child processes sharing memory mappings with them (this can be done in
security_task_create).
• In the case of non anonymous non shared mappings, information is backed to the file in case
of changes to the mapping.
System V shared memory
From userspace, shared memory segments are allocated by processes invoking shmget. Once a
shared memory segment is created, processes can attach it to their address space by calling shmat.
If the SHM_RDONLY flag is passed, then the calling process has read-only access to the memory
segment, and otherwise it has read and write access to it. Processes detach memory segments from
their address space by invoking shmdt. Processes attached to a memory segments can access it
directly, and this is not caught by the operating system. In kernelspace, shared memory segments
are represented by struct shmid_kernel *shp:
struct shmid_kernel /* private to the kernel */
{
struct kern_ipc_perm shm_perm;
struct file * shm_file;
unsigned long shm_nattch;
unsigned long shm_segsz;
time_t shm_atim;
time_t shm_dtim;
time_t shm_ctim;
pid_t shm_cprid;
pid_t shm_lprid;
struct user_struct *mlock_user;
};
Each struct shmid_kernel embeds a struct kern_ipc_perm:
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struct kern_ipc_perm{
spinlock_t lock;
int deleted;
int id;
key_t key;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
uid_t cuid;
gid_t cgid;
mode_t mode;
unsigned long seq;
void *security;
};
The security field of struct kern_ipc_perm is used by KBlare to store meta-information con-
cerning the shared memory segment. Such meta-information is stored in a struct blare_tags,
as with other volatile objects.
struct blare_tags{
struct list_head *info;
/* Used by softirqs invoking rcv_skb*/
spinlock_t info_lock;
atomic_t refcount;
int info_rev; //unused
struct list_head *policy;
struct list_head *xpolicy;
};
Hooks
The LSM framework provides a hook for shmat, but a hook for shmdt had to be manually added
in our patch set, in order to be able to stop tracking processes after a shared memory segment
is released. A process attaches a shared memory segment to his address space by invoking the
shmat() system call. KBlare tracks this system call with the security_shm_shmat hook, with a
callback on the following function in our security module:
static int blare_shm_shmat (struct shmid_kernel *shp,
char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg);
KBlare maintains a list of currently attached shared memory segments for each process (in
cred->security->shm). For each memory segment of the list, a pointer to the tags of the memory
segment (of type struct blare_tags), as well as the flags determining the access mode (e.g.,
SHM_RDONLY) are stored in the following structure:
struct blare_shmptr{
struct list_head node;
struct blare_tags *ptr;
int shmflg; //shmat() flags, i.e. SHM_RDONLY etc.
};
Processes detach a memory segment from their address space by invoking the shmdt system call.
KBlare tracks this system call with the security_shm_shmdt hook, with a callback on the following
function in our security module:
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static void blare_shm_shmdt(struct shmid_kernel *shp);
On release of a memory segment, the following actions are performed:
• The information tag of the current process is updated with the information tag of the shared
memory segment.
• The memory segment is removed from the list of attached memory segments for the current
process (cred->security->shm).
Access to shared memory
As previously mentioned, access to attached shared memory segments is not subject to any system
call and is not tracked by the operating system. Therefore, KBlare calculates an overestimation of
the possible information flows between a process and its attached shared memory segments.
• When a process P reads new content and updates its information tag (e.g., by reading
information in a file or socket), all the shared memory segments it has attached with write
(read and write) access also have their information tag updated.
• Before any process writes or appends information to a container, the information tags of all
the attached shared memory segments are merged into the process's information tag.
4.7.3 Files and pipes
The most common way for processes to access information is certainly through the filesystem.
Processes access files using system calls. Amongst available system calls, fopen and fclose are
used to respectively open and close a file descriptor. When a file is opened, a flag called open mode
is specified, and takes a value in {a,w,r}.
• r opens the file in read mode if it exists.
• w opens the file in write mode or create it if it does not exist. Any content in the file is
overwritten (the file is truncated to zero length).
• a opens the file in append mode, content may be written at the end of the file, and existing
content cannot be altered.
• Furthermore, r+, w+ and a+ are also valid modes. r+ is like r with write access allowed, w+
and a+ are like w and a with read access allowed
After this, input/output access is performed by read and write or pread and pwrite. The p
variants allow to read or write from a given offset. These system calls are responsible for information
flows between processes and files, and are tracked in KBlare. Similarly, pipes can be created with
the pipe system call, and accessed with the system calls read and write.
Hooks
In the LSM framework, access to files and inodes is verified by two distinct hooks:
security_file_permission and security_inode_permission. In kernel space, file descriptors
may describe regular files or pipes. Each file descriptors is linked to an underlying inode (except
before filesystem initialization). When it describes a pipe, the inode has a special field i_pipe,
which we use to distinguish it from regular files. However, inodes are also used by sockets, and
other objects. As the kernel relies on inodes in many cases, hooking inode accesses results in a lot
of callbacks for each process. In our implementation, we rather verify access at other levels. In the
case of files, the security_file_permission hook triggers the following callback:
static int blare_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask);
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where file is a pointer to the file descriptor, and mask is the access mask (which determines the
access mode). KBlare stores its security attributes in the opaque security pointer field of the file
structure, as introduced by the LSM framework: file->f_security. The security attributes we
attach to files are specified as follows:
struct blare_file_struct{
int *info_array;
int info_size;
struct policy_array **policy_arrays;
int policy_count;
struct policy_array **xpolicy_arrays;
int xpolicy_count;
struct blare_tags tags; // used for unnamed pipes
};
Recall from Section 4.4 that tags associated to files are stored in the extended attributes of the
filesystem. Such a representation is flat, i.e. it is represented as a contiguous region of memory.
• When a process reads a file, KBlare reads the extended attributes and stores it in the
info_array data structure, and sets info_size to the size (number of elements) of the
array. This is later converted into a live representation, as previously described in this
chapter in Section 4.3.
• In the case of pipes, no extended attributes are used, as pipes are residing in memory, and
the live representation is used directly by using a blare_tags structure.
4.7.4 Message queues
Message queues are another inter process communication mechanisms allowing processes to ex-
change so called messages, stored in queues. Messages have a priority, and messages with the
highest priority are delivered to the receiving process first. Linux implements POSIX message
queues, as well as SYSV message queues. Both use a distinct API.
SYSV message queues
As with files, and other data structures, SYSV message queues as well as their messages themselves
have been modified by the LSM patches to add an opaque security field. The structure struct
msg_queue is defined in include/linux/msg.h as follows:
struct msg_queue {
struct kern_ipc_perm q_perm;
time_t q_stime; /* last msgsnd time */
time_t q_rtime; /* last msgrcv time */
time_t q_ctime; /* last change time */
unsigned long q_cbytes; /* current number of bytes on queue */
unsigned long q_qnum; /* number of messages in queue */
unsigned long q_qbytes; /* max number of bytes on queue */
pid_t q_lspid; /* pid of last msgsnd */
pid_t q_lrpid; /* last receive pid */
struct list_head q_messages;
struct list_head q_receivers;
struct list_head q_senders;
};
As for shared memory structures (see Section 4.7.2), the structure for message queues embeds a
kern_ipc_perm structure, itself having an opaque security field. However, rather than labelling
the message queues, KBlare labels individual messages. Messages are defined as follows:
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struct msg_msg {
struct list_head m_list;
long m_type;
int m_ts; /* message text size */
struct msg_msgseg* next;
void *security;
/* the actual message follows immediately */
};
The security field of this structure is used by KBlare to store its tags (in a blare_tags structure).
Related hooks
Two hooks are used by KBlare, and are triggered upon sending or receiving messages:
security_msg_queue_msgrcv and security_msg_queue_msgsnd. Those hooks trigger the fol-
lowing functions of our module:
static int blare_msg_queue_msgrcv (struct msg_queue *msq,
struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target,
long type, int mode);
static int blare_msg_queue_msgsnd (struct msg_queue *msq,
struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg);
One of the caveats with the reception of inline messages (i.e. fetching the first message available
in the queue) is that the target process is not equal to the current process15 in this portion of the
code (the kernel runs in a different context). Whenever the target differs from the current process,
we are unable to alter the credentials of the receiving process, because of the RCU protection
mechanisms, forbidding a task to alter other tasks' credentials (there are good reasons16 for this,
as it would make the credentials management much more complex). The best way we found to
work around this was to force the scheduler to wake up the target process:
/* We cannot alter target's credentials unless it is the current process */
if (target != current)
wake_up_process(target);
POSIX message queues
Posix message queues make use of inode structures to pass messages. This could be tracked by
using the security_inode_permission hook, but it is not yet supported in our implementation.
4.7.5 Networking
UNIX domain sockets, or IPC sockets, allow processes of the same host to communicate through
network packets. Furthermore, network sockets allow processes of different17 hosts to communicate
over a network. KBlare tracks communication over UNIX domain sockets of type AF_UNIX, and
network sockets of type AF_INET. After receiving messages through a socket (at state i), the new
information tag of the process (at state i` 1) is updated by appending the new content from the
information tag of the socket to it.
15See include/linux/security.h.
16From Documentation/security/credentials.txt:[. . . ]As previously mentioned, a task may only alter its own
credentials, and may not alter those of another task. This means that it doesn't need to use any locking to alter its
own credentials.[. . . ]
17It can also be used on the same host.
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itagpprocessqi`1 “ itagpsocketqi Y itagpprocessqi
Similarly, when sending information through a socket, the information tag of the socket is
updated with the information tag of the process in the same manner:
itagpsocketqi`1 “ itagpsocketqi Y itagpprocessqi
Kernel structures
Sockets are described in kernel space by the socket structure, defined as follows in
include/linux/net.h:
struct socket {
socket_state state;
kmemcheck_bitfield_begin(type);
short type;
kmemcheck_bitfield_end(type);
unsigned long flags;
struct socket_wq __rcu *wq;
struct file *file;
struct sock *sk;
const struct proto_ops *ops;
};
The socket structure has a pointer to a sock structure, containing the network layer representation
of sockets. This is a quite complex structure, and we will not fully describe it here. The sock
structure contains a field called sk_family, and we use it to determine whether sockets are of type
AF_UNIX or AF_INET. As other volatile objects, sockets are labeled by KBlare with a blare_tags
structure, attached to their opaque security field. This field is defined in the sock structure as
sk_security of type void*.
Related hooks
Communication over AF_UNIX sockets is monitored by two hooks. Sending messages is caught
by security_unix_may_send, and receiving messages is caught by security_socket_recv_msg.
This later hook is also triggered when receiving information through internet sockets, and KBlare
treats both cases in the same place, by determining the kind of socket. Sending messages over
AF_INET sockets is caught by security_socket_sendmsg.
Netlink messaging
Netlink is a communication mechanism between kernelspace and userspace. It uses BSD sockets
of the AF_NETLINK family. It can also be used to communicate between userspace processes, even
thought this is not its primary goal. Netlink messages are not supported yet in KBlare, this is left
for future work. At the moment, the following stubs are defined:
static int blare_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb);
static int blare_netlink_recv (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
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Part III
Distributed Intrusion Detection
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Chapter 5
Network Extension
In the previous chapters, we have introduced a model of intrusion detection based
on taint marking techniques. It tracks information flows between objects of the oper-
ating system, and allows to detect abnormal behavior caused by intrusions on a local
host. The next step towards detecting intrusions in distributed systems is to track
information flows at the network level. This chapter presents a network extension to
the previous model, adding further control over information with respect to outgoing
traffic (the more complex case of incoming traffic is presented in Chapter 6). We
have extended the previous information flow policy with a so-called network policy,
stating how information may leave the system, restraining sockets given the current
(user, code) context. Furthermore, we have developed a framework that allows users
to trace how their private data is used by applications, and to monitor sensitive in-
formation that flows out over the network. This led to experiments presented in
Chapter 8, and to a publication in the proceedings of the Australasian Information
Security Conference (AISC) 2012 [32]. Details regarding the implementation of this
network extension are presented in Chapter 7.
5.1 Overview
Most of today's personal computers rely on untrusted third party applications such as browser
plugins or so called `apps'. Many of these are closed source, which makes static analysis extremely
difficult (if not impossible) in the case of native code. And even in the case of opensource appli-
cations, there is always a risk of security flaws or coding errors potentially leaking sensitive data.
Dynamically detecting the leak of sensitive information is challenging given that:
• One application can exchange information with another through IPC, shared memory, etc.
• It is impractical to modify off-the-shelf applications; instead, we prefer to implement a refer-
ence monitor in the operating system kernel as a more pragmatic solution.
• The performance overhead must be small to maintain a responsive system, i.e., not affecting
the user's experience and causing them to disable the security mechanisms.
As presented in Part II, we use dynamic tracking of information flows between objects of the oper-
ating system. A defining aspect of our approach is that we distinguish data from containers: data
is the actual information we track, whereas containers are storage entities such as files, memory
pages, etc. Sensitive data is first identified and their containers are labeled with meta-data called
tags. As information flows between containers, tags are dynamically updated to reflect the contain-
ers' content. When it comes to protecting sensitive data against leakage by untrusted applications
or via malware that exploits security flaws, existing approaches have several limitations. Individ-
uals can use software firewalls on their internet-connected personal/portable computing devices
to filter network connections without changing the security policy of the underlying operating
system. However, while such mechanisms may successfully protect a host from outside threats,
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they typically do not prevent the leak of information by untrusted or misconfigured applications.
Deep packet inspection firewalls are able to identify data patterns in network packets, however
this approach is too coarse-grained to efficiently track the presence of sensitive data in network
exchanges and is thus not an effective solution to protect against sensitive data leaks. Mandatory
access control tools such as AppArmor [54] and Tomoyo [30] are similarly not practical when it
comes to protecting confidentiality:
• When used in enforcement mode, information flows are blocked, which may break some
functionalities. This effectively renders the approach unusable for most end users.
• When used in permissive mode, these tools are unable to track indirect information flows
[65].
Figure 5.1 presents our approach to taint tracking for monitoring data leaks. A kernel reference
monitor has been implemented in the Linux Kernel and allows for efficient dynamic information
flow tracking at the level of system objects (processes, filesystem inodes, etc.).
Figure 5.1: Network information flow tracking
Sensitive data is labelled at the filesystem level, and the level of granularity of our approach
is at the file level (i.e., files are considered as atomic pieces of information). Our implementation,
presented in Chapter 4, takes advantage of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) framework available
in the Linux kernel, and taint propagation is triggered by access control hooks. Our design goals
are to provide a model that is easy to use, does not lock all the system by default by labelling only
the sensitive information, and does not miss any information flow (no false negatives).
5.2 Network extension
We have extended our previous model so as to supervise network interactions. Network sockets
are information channels, and we track information flowing towards them. There are different
families of sockets, including UNIX domain sockets and internet sockets. The latter are used to
communicate with untrusted remote hosts through the internet, and we focus on their usage by
userspace applications. Sockets by themselves are not labelled, as we consider those as part of the
process memory. Instead, tracking is performed when processes actually send information through
those information channels.
5.3. PRACTICAL USE CASES 85
5.2.1 Network policy tag
The policy for communicating with internet sockets is defined globally through a unique shared net-
work policy tag. The network policy tag is a set of sets defining which combinations of information
may legally leave the local system through internet sockets, and optionally which applications may
communicate, as well as which information each application may communicate (per-application
profiles).
A network policy tag is defined as follows:
Pnet P ℘p℘pI Y X qq
It is a set of sets that can contain any combination of elements from I (passive data) and X
(running code).
The following semantics is associated with Pnet:
• Elements of I in the sets of Pnet represent mutually exclusive sets of data which can legally
flow out of the system (i.e., only one of the sets is legal at one time).
• Elements of X in the sets of Pnet represent supervised1 code which is allowed to communicate
through internet sockets.
• Any combination A P ℘pI Y X q in the sets of Pnet defines a profile for applications, where
elements of I define which data can be sent over the network, and elements of X define which
running code may send that information.
5.2.2 Legality of network information flows
When a process sends information through a socket, a legality verification is performed on its
current information tag against the global network policy tag. The information flow is legal if and
only if the content of its information tag is contained in one of the subsets of the network policy
tag.
Definition 15. For any information tag containing a set of data S P ℘pIYX q, the boolean relation
Legalnet is defined as follows:
LegalnetpSq ô Dp P Pnet|S Ď p
5.3 Practical use cases
Our approach covers the following use cases. In the following, the term labelling refers to the action
of attaching a unique information tag to a file.
5.3.1 All sensitive data must stay local
In this use case, the user of the system wants all of the sensitive data to stay local. Any network
transfer of those data is a violation of the policy and our reference monitor, in its extended version,
will report a privacy violation alert. This can be accomplished by only labelling sensitive data
(files) that should never flow out of the system. By defining an empty network policy tag, no data
can legally flow out through network sockets, and the user will be notified every time a socket sends
such tainted data over the network.
Pnet “ ttuu “ K
1The corresponding binary file is labelled with an information tag.
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5.3.2 Sensitive data may be sent over the network only through trusted
applications
In this use case, the system contains both trusted and untrusted applications, as well as some
sensitive data which may flow over the network only through trusted applications. This can be
accomplished by labelling all the binary applications on the system along with all the sensitive
data. The network policy tag is set to match the union of all the information tags of the binaries
and those of sensitive files on the filesystem. In this case, the network policy tag is a set with only
one set.
Pnet “ pS Y Cq
Here S is the set of all the sensitive data and C the set of all trusted code.
5.3.3 Per-application profiles
In this use case, the system contains both trusted and untrusted applications, and each trusted
application may send a different set of sensitive data over the network. This can be accomplished
by labelling all the binary applications on the system along with all the sensitive data. Then, the
network policy tag is a set of several sets, where each set represents one application profile, such
as:
Pnet “ t
Nď
i“1
psi Y ciq|si Ď S, ci Ď C,Legalnetpci Y siqu
where LegalnetpaYbq states that the application a is allowed to send information b over the network,
as presented in Definition 15.
5.4 Dynamic policy changes
Taint marking can sometimes lead to a growing number of false positives due to the fact that
tainted data remains tainted until the system reboots, and information flows keep propagating
tainted data between objects of the operating system. This may lead to repetitive alerts about
the same data leaking. Furthermore, the user or administrator may decide to declassify some
information that he or she previously considered as private, and allow it to flow over the network.
For this reason, users can decide to modify the policy on the fly while the system is running.
New sets can be dynamically added to the network policy tag at runtime. Several situations may
occur:
• Only sensitive data has been labelled, and may not flow over the network. There are no
trusted applications. In this case, the user can permanently neutralize alerts concerning a
set of sensitive data S by adding a new set S to the network policy tag.
• Both sensitive data and trusted application's code have been labelled, and the user wants to
neutralize alerts concerning one set of sensitive data S leaked by processes running code C.
This can be performed by adding a new set to the network policy tag containing pC Y Sq.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a first aspect of our network extension, focussed on tracking outgoing
information. We defined a network policy, stating how information may leave the operating system
through network sockets. The network policy can be set on its own, or on top of an information
flow policy confining users, applications and persistent containers, as presented in Chapter 3. This
extension led to a framework for detecting confidentiality violations through applications leaking
information towards the network, which we implemented and evaluated, see Chapter 8.
Chapter 6
Distributed Policy Over Multiple
Hosts
This chapter presents our distributed model of intrusion detection. It relies on the
host based model that we presented in the first part of this thesis, along with new
aspects to take into consideration with respect to the distribution of taint over the
network, towards multiple hosts of a supervised network. In the previous part of this
thesis, we have shown how using taint marking techniques along with an information
flow policy allows us to detect intrusions at the host kernel level. In the previous
Chapter, we have extended our host-level so as to track outgoing traffic, and im-
plemented a framework for confidentiality violation detection. In this chapter, we
introduce the distributed mechanisms and additions to our model that allow us for
intrusion detection in groups of supervised hosts.
6.1 Context
In the reminder of this thesis, we propose a distributed model allowing for rich policy specifica-
tion and fine-grained information flow tracking. We have extended our model in order to detect
intrusions in distributed systems composed of multiple hosts gathered in groups. Hosts of the same
group share a common information flow policy. It is distributed in each host at the container level.
In this chapter, we first present the distribution of taint information across all the supervised
hosts of a distributed system. After this, we define a distributed information flow policy, allowing
to specify the legal behavior of information flows amongst processes of multiple hosts with respect
to the involved pieces of information and users on behalf of which processes are running.
Recall from Part II that objects of the operating system such as files, sockets, memory mappings
etc. are considered as containers of information in our model, and that we attach labels to such
containers: information tags, policy tags and execute policy tags. Labels are composed of meta-
information represented by two sets I and X , representing respectively passive data and active code.
In the first part of our work, labels were containing meta-information specific to the particular host
running the IDS.
6.2 Host groups
Distributed systems are generally composed of multiple services running as processes across mul-
tiple hosts, involving variable amounts of information. Such information may involve public data,
confidential data, executable code etc., from multiple hosts. In order to define an information flow
policy for a distributed service, or for a whole distributed system involving multiple services, we
gather hosts in groups and define a distributed information flow policy per group. Let us consider
a given network N . Let H be the set of all hosts on network N . Each host of a group is identified
by a unique id hk P H.
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The first step towards defining a distributed policy amongst the hosts of a group is to identify
the information to track on each host. Recall from Part II that information tags are sets of elements
in I Y X , identifying passive data and active code residing in containers. For any given host hk,
we define Ik as the set of all passive data managed by this host, and Xk the image of Ik through
the Run function, i.e. the code originating from this host which may be executed by processes on
any host. Ik and Xk are partitions of respectively I and X representing all the information of the
group:
I “
ď
hkPH
Ik ^ X “
ď
hkPH
Xk
Figure 6.1: Host group
We also define a mapping allowing any host of the group to determine the origin of information:
for any piece of tainted information we must be able to determine which host manages it, i.e. from
which host does a specific tainted information come from.
Definition 16. The originating host of an element of pI Y X q, i.e. the host managing a given
piece information, is determined by the following relation:
Host : pI Y X q Ñ H
6.3 Network tainting
Operation i P I x P X
Read taint discard
Write taint taint
Execute taint with x “ Runpiq discard
Send taint taint
Receive taint check legality & discard
Figure 6.2: Tainting rules
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Processes are responsible for all information flows1. When processes perform actions on objects
(i.e. other containers), subsequent information flows occur (depending on the operation). The
way taint data is carried in our distributed model follows the tainting rules presented in Part II,
which apply to all the system objects, with the addition of two new rules, send and receive,
targeting network traffic (through sockets) from and towards other hosts of a group, as presented
in Figure 6.2. In this figure, Taint means that the destination process or container gets tainted by
the meta-information. Discard means the destination process or container does not get tainted by
the meta-information. (For details about the legality of information flows, see Section 6.4).
Hosts from the same group exchange information through network messages, which we consider
as containers, as well as any other object of the operating system containing information. We
therefore attach labels to messages, in order to carry information tags between multiple hosts, the
same way as we do between containers of the same host. In order to carry taint information, we
have considered two methods:
• Embedding information tags as security labels within network messages. This solution can
be effective when a small amount of taint data is used. This aspect is further detailed in
Chapter 7.
• Translating information tags into security tokens, which can then be resolved between hosts
in a peer to peer fashion, using a distributed protocol. We present this method in the next
subsection.
• Embedding so-called deltas relative to security tokens previously resolved, this is presented
later in this chapter.
6.3.1 Distributed security tokens
Information tags can be composed of any amount of meta-information, and thus have dynamic
sizes and require variable amounts of space. It may not always be possible to directly represent
information tags within the labels of networking messages. Therefore, we have introduced a dis-
tributed security token protocol allowing hosts of a group to exchange security labels in a peer to
peer fashion, as shown in Figure 6.3.
Definition 17. Security tokens are images of information tags through a cryptographic hash
function H as follows, where Θ is the set of all possible tokens:
H : ℘pI Y X q Ñ Θ
We use such tokens, images of information tags, as security labels on network messages. Recall
that information tags are dynamic: their content is updated after every information flow. There-
fore, processes often need to update the labels they attach to network messages. Our distributed
protocol involves so-called resolvers, one per host. Resolvers maintain caches of xkey : valuey
pairs, storing mappings between information tags and security tokens. From the point of view of
userspace processes, whenever a new token is needed, or an unknown token is received in a network
message, a request is made to the local resolver.
After every information flow, if the information tag of the process has changed, a request
is made to the local resolver to create a new token for this process, corresponding to its new
information tag. We call this step token creation in the protocol defined below. Whenever a
process receives an unknown token (i.e. a token which hasn't been seen before), it needs to query
the local resolver, which in turn will query the originating host in order to receive a mapping, in the
form of a xkey : valuey pair, associating the requested token with an information tag. We call this
step token resolution. Such a mapping allows to translate the new token into an information tag,
and to taint the process which received the network message accordingly. Local resolvers run on
each machine, represented as R1 and R2 in Figure 6.3, and are the only processes communicating
with no security labels, i.e. the code of resolvers is trusted and we do not track information flows
1processes are the only active objects of the system: the execution of any pieces of code is necessarily performed
through a process.
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1
2
3
4
Figure 6.3: P2P token exchange
between the resolvers of multiple hosts. In practice, the code of the resolvers needs to be audited
and verified against security flaws.
Figure 6.3 summarizes the steps involved in the protocol:
1. A message containing a security token is sent by a userpace process p1 on host h1 to another
process p2 on host h2.
2. Process p2 asks the local resolver R2 to look up in its local cache in order to resolve this
token.
3. If it cannot find it, R2 asks R1 for resolution using the protocol defined in the next section.
4. R1 replies to R2 with a mapping. R2 is now able to resolve the new token for p2.
6.3.2 Protocol
Resolvers maintain a local cache of sent and received tokens for each remote host of the group, as
shown in Figure 6.4. For any pair of hosts (h1, h2q, we name the caches as follows:
• senth1rh2s is the cache of tokens sent to host h2, on host h1.
• recvh1rh2s is the cache of tokens received from host h2, on host h1.
The sizes of sent and received caches are equal and noted `. Caches contain xkey : valuey pairs
in (Θˆ℘pIYX qq. Token resolution and token creation (described below) ensure that for each pair
of hosts (h1, h2), senth2rh1s is synchronized with recvh1rh2s. Token resolution is performed over
an alternate secure channel, using unlabeled messages (i.e. no security labels). Possible operations
on both caches are:
• Creating a new entry pCq.
• Overwriting an existing entry pOq.
• Reading an existing entry pRq.
a. Token resolution: when a process receives a network message labeled with a security token,
it needs to resolve it in order to be able to append the appropriate taint data to its information
tag. Token resolution is defined by the following relation:
resolve : Θ Ñ ℘pI Y X q
Token resolution can be done directly by the local resolver if the token is in the local cache of
received tokens. Otherwise, it is necessary to query the remote host using the protocol defined
below.
b. Token creation: when a process on host hlocal updates its information tag, the following
actions are necessary before sending data to any destination host hdest.
1. Create a new token tknew “ Hpitagq where itag is the current information tag of the process,
and H is a cryptographic hash function (see Definition 17).
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host1 host2
<tk1 : {I1}>
<tk2 : {I2}>
. . .
<tkN : {IN}>
Sent
Reeived
To host2
<tk1 : {I1}>
<tk2 : {I2}>
. . .
<tkN : {IN}>
To host3
<tk1 : {I1}>
<tk2 : {I2}>
. . .
<tkN : {IN}>
From host2
<tk1 : {I1}>
<tk2 : {I2}>
. . .
<tkN : {IN}>
From host3
<tk1 : {I1}>
<tk2 : {I2}>
. . .
<tkN : {IN}>
Sent
To host1
<tk1 : {I1}>
<tk2 : {I2}>
. . .
<tkN : {IN}>
To host3
Reeived
<tk1 : {I1}>
<tk2 : {I2}>
. . .
<tkN : {IN}>
From host1
<tk1 : {I1}>
<tk2 : {I2}>
. . .
<tkN : {IN}>
From host3
ℓ
ℓ
Figure 6.4: Distributed token protocol
2. Read local cache entries (R) and check for collisions2 with tknew: senthlocalrhdestsrtknews may
already exist as a key for a different information tag.
3. In case of collision, overwrite (O) existing values and set flag to O_REPLACE.
4. Otherwise, create (C) tknew in senthlocalrhdests and set flag to O_NEW.
5. Send token to remote host (using the protocol defined below and the appropriate flag).
c. Token exchange protocol: hosts of a group exchange tokens using a protocol based on
the two following operations:
• Function token_queryptoken, hostq: query host about token. The remote host replies with
token_send and sets a flag to either O_NEW or O_REPLACE. When O_REPLACE is set, a previous
cache entry with the same key already exists and must be replaced. Otherwise, it is a new
entry.
• Function token_sendptoken, flag, hostq: send the pair ptoken,Hptokenqq to host with flag
in {O_NEW, O_REPLACE}.
6.3.3 Frequent updates
The overhead of the protocol that we defined depends on how often information tags of commu-
nicating processes require updates. Considering that our model does not yet have support for
declassification3 the behavior of information tags is such that, for a given process, it can only grow
in size, and never diminish, until the process gets killed (or respawned). New elements may be
added to the information tags, but no elements may be removed.
Definition 18. Whenever a process p receives a network message m, while in state i, we compute
the update information tag of p as follows:
itagppqi`1 “ itagppqi Y itagpmqi
2Even though collision probability is extremely low, it may occur, as in practice, H is a hash function.
3In our model, the support for declassification would refer to the ability for users, programs or containers to
declassify information based on rules defined in the information flow policy. This could be done, for instance, by
untainting some information given such rules, or by tainting it with new identifiers.
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As opposed with labeling a connection between two hosts, we label each network message
individually, based on the state of processes at the moment when each message is sent. One
possible drawback of this approach is when small updates are performed frequently on a process's
information tag (e.g. because it accesses new tainted files before sending each message). In this
case, the performance overhead of the resolution protocol would increase considerably. In order to
avoid such a problem, we compute deltas.
Figure 6.5: Computing deltas
Deltas contain the difference between two information tags (i.e. their union minus their inter-
section), or the difference between two states of the same information tag, e.g. the information
tag of the process p1 in state i and in state i4 “ i ` 4. We embed deltas directly within network
messages, in the security labels, when possible. It is not always possible due to size restrictions,
therefore, deltas are used when small changes happen in information tags, i.e., when the memory
space required to represent the new elements to append does not exceed the maximum size of
security labels.
Definition 19. We define the ∆ relation as follows, returning the delta between two information
tags (sets of elements of ℘pI Y X q):
∆pa, bq “ tx|x P a^ x R bu
Definition 20. Let us define the maximum available space in a network message security label
as λlbl, and the size (space) of individual elements of information tags as λtag. Labelling network
messages with lambdas rather than with security tokens is preferred whenever the available space
in network messages is sufficient, i.e. whenever:
|∆pitagppqt, itagppqt`kq| ˆ λtag ă λlbl
Example 15. Figure 6.5 shows an example of two communicating processes p1 and p2. For
each process, bullet points represent the different states of their information tags. Process p1 has
states s1 to s5 and p2 has states σ1 to σ5. We consider the initial states s1 and σ1 synchronized
with respect to the token caches: senth1rh2s is synchronized with recvh2rh1s and senth2rh1s is
synchronized with recvh1rh2s.
1. Process p1 sends a message M1 to p2, labelled with the token tk1.
2. Due to network latency, p2 is in a new state σ2 when it receives the message. However it can
directly resolve the token tk1, as this one is present in the local cache of received tokens.
3. Process p2 now sends a message M2 to p1. As the state of p2 has changed from σ1 to σ2, it is
required to compute δ1 “ ∆pitagpp2qσ1 , itagpp2qσ2q. As this is a minor change, between two
consecutive states of process p2, δ1 can fit in M2.
4. Process p1 receives M2. Its information tag has changed two times since it sent M1, and it is
now in state s3. The delta since state s1 is d1. It uses δ1 to update its information tag with
the information in M2, and jumps to state s4.
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5. Process p1 sends message M3 to p2. In the local cache senth1rh2s, the last sent token is tk1,
p1 changed of state 4 times since then. It now computes δ2 “ ∆pitagpp1qs1 , itagpp1qs4q and
check whether it fits in the message label (see Definition 20). As it fits, M3 is labeled with
δ2.
6. Upon reception of M3, p2 reads delta δ2 and update its information tag.
6.4 Information flow policy
In Chapter 3, we have introduced the information flow policy of our model at the host level.
Processes run code (or programs) on behalf of users. Recall from Chapter 3 that their policy tags
are determined dynamically by PU and PΠ, at execution time, as the intersection of the policy
attached to the user on behalf of which the program is being executed, and the policy attached to
the executed program (i.e. Pu [ Ppi, u P U , pi P Π). When dealing with multiple hosts gathered in
groups, we need to take new aspects into consideration. With a distributed information flow policy,
each local information flow may involve tainted information from any host of the group. The local
information flow policy on each host therefore refers to such disperse information, as well as how it
may flow from one host to another. It involves users, active code (programs), persistent containers
(e.g. files) and network sockets.
Definition 21. The local information flow policy on any host hi of a group, is expressed indepen-
dently for users, active code (programs), persistent containers (e.g. files), and network packets,
and is specified in the policy tags of containers, in a decentralized manner. It is defined by the
quadruplet Phi “ pPCP ,PU ,PΠ,PNetq where:
• PCP is the set of all the policy tags restricting passive containers (mostly files).
• PU is the policy restricting local users.
• PΠ is the policy restricting executable code.
• PNet is the policy restricting network communication (as presented in Chapter 5).
Definition 22. The information flow policy Pgroup of a group of hosts ph1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , hN q, identified at
each host's level is defined as
Pgroup “ pPh1 , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,PhN q
The following properties can be expressed (any number of each), and verified by the reference
monitor of each host.
6.4.1 Users
Users in our model refer to the users on behalf of processes (in the UNIX sense). The following
properties may be expressed in the information flow policy so as to restrict the behavior of processes
towards information (data or code) from other hosts of the same group with respect to local users
on each machine.
@u P U ,Pu Ď ℘p
Nď
k“1
pIkqq (6.1)
(6.1) specifies the following properties:
• Local user u may only access the specified pieces of information from hosts h1, . . . , hk within
the group4, (secrecy w.r.t. users).
• Local user u may only mix together the specified piece of information from host h1, . . . , hk
within the group (integrity w.r.t. users).
4Including the local host, this goes for all the other properties as well.
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@u P U ,Pu Ď ℘p
kď
1
pXkqq (6.2)
(6.2) specifies the following property:
• Only the specified pieces of code from hosts h1, . . . , hk may be executed by user u on the
local host (execution w.r.t. users).
Properties 6.1 and 6.2 may be used together in the policy. In this case, the resulting policy contains
sets of elements of I and X , i.e. Pu Ď ℘pŤk1pIk Y Xkqq.
6.4.2 Programs
Programs refer to the active code being run by processes. Once (optional) rules have been defined
for user accounts (users, on behalf of which processes are being executed), the information flow
policy may also contain the following properties, specifying rules attached to pieces of active code
being run by processes (individual or multiple elements of X forming any program pi P Π).
@pi P Π,Ppi Ď ℘p
kď
1
pXkqq (6.3)
(6.3) specifies the following property:
• Local processes running pi as code on the local host may only execute the specified sets of
information from hosts h1, . . . , hk of the group (execution w.r.t. running code).
@pi P Π,Ppi Ď ℘p
kď
1
Ikq (6.4)
(6.4) specifies the following properties:
• Local processes running pi as code may only access the specified pieces of information from
hosts h1, . . . , hk within the group (secrecy w.r.t. programs).
• Local processes running pi as code may only mix the specified pieces of information from
hosts h1, . . . , hk together (integrity w.r.t. programs).
Properties 6.3 and 6.4 may be used together in the policy, leading to Ppi Ď ℘pŤk1 Ik Y Xkq.
6.4.3 Persistent containers
Persistent containers are individually protected by the following properties.
@c P PC ,Pc Ď ℘p
kď
1
Ikq (6.5)
(6.5) specifies the following properties:
• Persistent container c may only contain the specified pieces of information from hosts
h1, . . . , hk within the group (secrecy w.r.t. persistent containers).
• Persistent container c may only mix the specified pieces of information from hosts h1, . . . , hk
together (integrity w.r.t. persistent containers).
@c P PC ,Pc Ď ℘p
kď
1
Xkq (6.6)
(6.6) specifies the following properties:
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• Write (or append) access to the persistent container c is only authorized to processes running
the specified code, from hosts h1, . . . , hk within the group (integrity of containers w.r.t.
running code).
Properties 6.5 and 6.6 may be defined together, leading to Pc Ď ℘pŤk1 Ik Y Xkq.
6.4.4 Network packets
Incoming and outgoing traffic is tracked at the network packet level. The following properties may
be expressed in PNet so as to restrict incoming or outgoing traffic.
PNet Ď p℘p
kď
1
Ikq (6.7)
• In the case of incoming traffic, only the specified sets of information from hosts h1, . . . , hk
are allowed in.
• In the case of outgoing traffic, only the specified sets of information from hosts h1, . . . , hk are
allowed out.
PNet Ď ℘p
kď
1
Xkq (6.8)
• In the case of incoming traffic, only accept traffic from remote processes running the specified
sets of code (programs).
• In the case of outgoing traffic, only accept outgoing traffic from local processes running the
specified sets of code (programs).
Both properties 6.7 and 6.8 may be used together, resulting in:
PNet Ď ℘p
kď
1
Ik Y Xkq (6.9)
6.5 Legality of information flows
Recall definition 18 and Figure 6.2 from this Chapter, defining tainting rules with respect to
the different objects of the operating system. Such rules apply after each operation responsible
for information flows, made by processes running code on behalf of users. The legality of such
information flows depends on the updated information tags with respect to the local information
flow policy on the local host, on each host of the group. Therefore, information flows between several
hosts involve the local information flow policies of each host (subsets of Pgroup). An information flow
towards any container c is legal if and only if its new information tag itagpcq, after the information
flow occurred, is included in at least one of the sets of its policy tag ptagpcq. This applies to all
kinds of containers (i.e. processes as well as passive containers and sockets), based on the properties
defined above. In a group involving k hosts, itagpcq P ℘pŤk1 IkYXkq and ptagpcq Ď ℘pŤk1 IkYXkq.
This is verified by the relation Legal, defined in Part II (Definition 3), which can be generalized
as follows:
LegalpA,Bq ô Da P A|a Ď B
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6.5.1 Policy tags
In our model, policy tags are the link between the information flow policy with its different aspects,
or subsets, and the objects of the operating system we actually supervise at runtime. Each policy
tag contains rules, that are part of either PPC ,PU ,PΠ or PNet. In Chapter 3, we introduced the
notion of policy tags of persistent containers and processes, and how these two relate to different
subsets of the information flow policy. Recall from previous chapters that the policy tags of
processes are dynamically set up at runtime, upon process creation, from PU and PΠ. The policy
of persistent containers is initially attached to their respective policy tags, and expressed from rules
of PPC . Similarly, the network policy tag, directly equal to PNet, is attached to network sockets
so as to track incoming and outgoing network packets. However, it is common to all sockets,
regardless of which process created them. The reason for this is that processes each have their own
policy tag already. PNet is intended to track incoming and outgoing traffic based on the properties
defined above.
PPC PU PΠ PNet
Processes X X
Persistent containers X
Sockets X
Figure 6.6: Deriving policy tags from the policy
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown how we extended our information flow model to distributed systems
made of multiple hosts gathered in groups. Security labels are carried over the network, and we are
now able to define the legal interactions between processes of different hosts, given their underlying
tuser, codeu context. The information flow policy is distributed in a peer to peer fashion, and hosts
exchange security labels through a distributed token protocol. As our model may involve frequent
updates of security labels in some situations, we propose a solution to diminish the stress on the
token protocol by computing deltas, containing the relative difference between the states of the
information tags of communicating processes. The information flow policy is defined at each host
level, in the information tags of processes, persistent containers and sockets, as shown in Figure 6.6.
It is verified by each host kernel, the only trusted code in our model. This extended model and its
implementation represent our second contribution. Related work include Aeolus [13], DStar [77]
and Pedigree [74]. Our approach differs from these in multiple manners:
• Aeolus is a framework for building secure applications. It tracks information flows at the
thread level and allows users to restrict the use of their information, which is categorized in
tags. Such a framework offers finer-grained information flow tracking than our approach (we
work at the system object level, e.g., processes instead). However, this framework does not
provide system-wide supervision, and it is not applicable to native applications. Its policy
definition is user-centric and offers limited expressiveness.
• DStar [77] is an extension of decentralized information flow control models such as Flume [40]
and Histar [76], to distributed systems. It uses integrity and secrecy labels so as to categorize
information and restrict processes. It ensures that only processes allowed to communicate
may actually do so, and follows a no read-up, no write-down logic. As other decentralized
information flow control models, DStar requires applications to be modified in order to benefit
from the declassification mechanisms that it offers. DStar uses exporter daemons along with
cryptographic certificates to exchange security labels between hosts. Our approach uses
similar mechanisms (though it lacks mechanisms to enforce the integrity of security labels
in its current state) to exchange security labels amongst hosts. However, both our labels
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and our security policy differ from DStar. On the one hand, our labels contain unlimited
taint information elements, each describing one individual piece of information. On the other
hand, the definition of the policy in our model does not rely on security classes but instead
attaches individual sets of rules to each piece of information, in a fine-grained manner. This
allows us to track illegal execution of code as well as integrity or confidentiality violations by
users or applications.
• In Pedigree, taint information is attached to resources such as files. Taint information may
of two kinds: secrecy and integrity. As DStar, the policy is based on a lattice. However, as
opposed to DStar, the policy is centralized. The particularity of Pedigree is that it provides
capabilities mechanisms attached to taint information, so as to provide declassification. Our
approach does not offer declassification mechanisms, but it keeps information flow histories
and allows to define fine-grained policies (as described in the previous paragraph).
To the best of our knowledge, the model that we have introduced is the only anomaly detection
model combining OS-level taint analysis along with a fine-grained policy definition so as to detect
intrusions in distributed systems. In the next chapters, we present the implementation of this
model as well as our experiments along with a discussion of the strong and weak points of our
approach (in Section 8.4).
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Chapter 7
Network and Distributed
Implementation
This chapter presents our distributed implementation. It presents the additions we
added in the previous implementation in order to take the network and distributed
aspects of the model into account. This implementation is an extension of the im-
plementation presented in Chapter 4. It adds support for security labels on network
sockets, along with a network policy, checking that only processes allowed to do so may
leak the specified information, as presented in Chapter 5.2. Furthermore, it takes new
distributed aspects into consideration, by labelling individual network packets with
security information (information tags), so as to carry taint information between hosts
of a group.
7.1 Network policy
The Network policy tag, that we introduced in Chapter 5.2, is used to track outgoing traffic through
internet sockets, by specifying which processes (more exactly, which pieces of executed code) are
allowed to communicate information out of the system. A single network policy tag is centrally
defined for all the system. As the other policy tags, attached to other types of containers, it is
specified as a set of sets:
Pnet P ℘p℘pI Y X qq
It is implemented as a linked list of legal sets of information, where each set is stored in a red black
tree for fast oplogpnqq lookups. A userspace interface is exported through the securityfs1 filesystem,
in order to load the network policy tag in kernel memory at boot time. This interface is accessible
through sys/kernel/security/blare/network (once the securityfs filesystem has been mounted,
e.g. by adding the correct line to /etc/fstab). Userspace tools have been written to set and update
the network policy at runtime, and are available for download at http://blare-ids.org. These
tools add new sets of information, one at a time, to the network policy. Each set is represented
in userspace as an array of integers, contiguous in memory. The kernel code receipts the data and
converts it into blare_policy_tree elements.
1Securityfs is a pseudo filesystem based on sysfs and is used by the LSM modules, generally mounted as /sys/k-
ernel/security.
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/* A policy tag is a list of binary trees (a set of sets)
* Each binary tree has the following type:
* */
struct policy_tree{
struct list_head list;
struct rb_root *root;
int cardinal;
};
Such elements make use of the SLAB for efficient memory allocation (see Chapter 4). The
relevant code is defined in security/blare/network.h.
The network policy applies to both socket families AF_INET and AF_INET6, respectively related
to IPv4 and IPv6. A userspace daemon reports alerts to the user via the libnotify library (by
checking the output of the system logs for entries written by our reference monitor).
7.2 Distributed policy
The distributed version of this implementation carries security labels on network packets, so as to
transfer taint information between hosts of the same group. The information flow policy for the
group is distributed in each host, at the container level. Hosts are able to determine the origin
(i.e. which host it came from) of each piece of information, and the local policy tags of container
determine their legality. The network policy, as defined in the previous section, can be used to
track incoming and outgoing information on each host of the group. Therefore, the legality of
information flows towards processes is verified in a two way run:
• First, on packet reception, the reference monitor checks the content of the security label, and
verifies that it is legal with respect to PNet.
• Then, the data content of the label (elements of I only2) is merged with the information
tag of the process, and the updated information tag's legality is verified. This process is the
same as when reading files: elements of X are discarded, see Chapter 3.
7.3 CIPSO
To achieve the transportation of security labels over the network, we use CIPSO labels: CIPSO3 is
an IETF draft proposing a Commercial IP Security Option. It defines a type of security options
for IPv4 packets. Note that we do not support IPv6 yet in this implementation. Existing efforts
to support labels on IPv6 packets include the Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option
(CALIPSO), however no support for any such option exists in the Linux kernel at this time. As
Type 134 Option Length Domain of interpretation Tags
8 bit 8 bit 32 bit 272 bit
Ð 320 bit Ñ
Figure 7.1: CIPSO option
shown on Figure 7.1, CIPSO option size is limited to 40 bytes (320 bits), the current limit for
IPv4 options. The tags field is used to pass the actual security information related to the packets
2Recall that elements of X in a process's information tag refer to the code currently being run. Similarly, elements
of X on a network packet security label refer to the code being run by the process which sent the message. Therefore,
merging such elements in the information tag of processes on packet reception would make the new tag inconsistent.
3https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-cipso-ipsecurity-01
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content, describing so-called categories (in our case, categories refer to the meta-information of
information tags). The Domain of interpretation (DOI) field gives the ability to define separate
domains where categories may have different meanings, e.g. for some systems, a value of 5 in
the tags may be equal to the MLS level top secret, where in some other domains, it could be
interpreted as public.
Tag type Tag length Tag Information
8 bit 8 bit 256 bit
Figure 7.2: Tag types
CIPSO allows for up to 128 tag types, however the current draft only defines types 1, 3 and 5.
• Tag type 1 defines a bitmap of categories, (i.e. values representing information in the packets)
from category 0 to category 239.
• Tag type 3 defines a set of enumerated categories (i.e. representing sparse values).
• Tag type 5 defines categories ranges, where each range includes multiple categories.
Tag type Tag length Alignment Octet Sensitivity Level Bitmap of Categories
8 bit 8 bit 8 bit 8 bit 240 bit
Figure 7.3: Tag type 1
In our implementation, information tags are sets of 32 bit integers, thus we cannot have more
than 10 information tag elements per IP option if we directly taint network packets with infor-
mation tags. In order to overcome this limitation, we have designed a distributed security token
management protocol, allowing any host of a group to securely exchange security labels, as pre-
sented in Chapter 6. However, for the sake of simplicity, our current implementation labels network
packets directly by using the tag type 1 as defined in CIPSO, as shown on Figure 7.3. By using
a bitmap, we are able to represent up to 240 distinct information tags, and thus track up to 240
distinct information elements (including data and code) per group of supervised hosts, which lets
us track a sufficient amount of taint information for realistic experiments. Therefore, each host
h1, . . . , hN of the group has reserved space in the bitmap to represent its local information IN and
code XN .
7.4 Netlabel
CIPSO labels are supported in the Linux Kernel, through the NetLabel subsystem. NetLabel
provides an API for LSM modules to attach CIPSO labels to outgoing or incoming network traffic
generated by userspace applications. The API provides functionalities exported to LSM modules,
translating operations on packets into low level protocol operations. This is defined in the kernel
source, in the header file include/net/netlabel.h.
7.4.1 Internal representation
The main structure that is used by NetLabel to represent security information is the following:
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struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
u32 flags;
[...]
u32 type;
char *domain;
struct netlbl_lsm_cache *cache;
struct {
struct {
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
u32 secid;
} attr;
};
This structure contains the necessary fields to represent a CIPSO option. It embeds a so-called
category mapping in struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *cat;. This latter structure is used to
represent the tags. Labels can be attached and removed from sockets. When a label is attached to
a socket, all the packets leaving the system through this socket are labelled with it. The following
functions are used to set or remove a label on a socket:
static inline int netlbl_sock_setattr(struct sock *sk, u16 family, const struct
netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
static inline void netlbl_sock_delattr(struct sock *sk);
It is also possible to directly label network packets, by using the following function:
static inline int netlbl_skbuff_setattr(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
7.4.2 Conversion
In order to convert from and to NetLabel CIPSO bitmap representation into information tags (i.e.
doubly linked lists of integers, see Chapter 4) as used in our model, we defined two functions in
security/blare/netlabel.c:
struct list_head *blare_catmap2itag(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap);
int blare_itag2catmap(struct list_head* itag, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap
*catmap);
These two functions respectively convert a category mapping in the form of a 240 bit bitmap into a
linked list of 32 bit integers, and the other way round. It allows us to embed bitmaps into outgoing
packet headers using CIPSO option type 1, and to retrieve them from incoming packets. The LSM
hooks that we use for this purpose are presented later in this chapter.
7.5 Execution contexts
Before going into further details about how we have implemented network information flow tracking,
let us introduce the notion of execution contexts. Kernel code may run in different contexts.
When executing code on behalf of a userspace process (e.g., executing a system call), it runs in
process context, where it has access to all the data structures of the current userspace process.
The code running in process context can sleep (and be rescheduled later). Most aspects of this
implementation run in process context. Networking code, however, is often related to low level data
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structures, involving time critical operations, e.g., copying data from the network card buffers into
memory on reception of packets. When a piece of hardware uses an interrupt to notify the CPU
about some event, the CPU immediately schedules the appropriate interrupt handler (based on
the interrupt number). When executing an interrupt handler, the kernel is in interrupt context.
This context is not attached to any process (though the address space of the interrupted process is
left as-is), and the code cannot sleep. Interrupt handlers may interrupt important code, including
other interrupt handlers, or may disable all other interrupts for the time of their execution. For
these reasons, interrupt context code has to run for the shortest possible time. Therefore, the
processing of interrupts is split in two parts: top half and bottom half. The interrupt handler is the
top half, and it only processes immediate and time critical operations. All the remaining processing
is left for the bottom half, generally deferred in a softirq or in a tasklet. We will not go into further
details about these inner mechanisms, please refer to Robert Love's Linux Kernel Development
book [44], or Understanding the Linux Kernel by Daniel Bovet and Marco Cesati [9] for a more
comprehensive description.
7.6 Socket operations
In Chapter 4, we showed how network traffic between local processes is tracked, involving UNIX
sockets (AF_UNIX) or internet sockets (AF_INET). We will now present mechanisms to track infor-
mation between processes of different hosts of the same group by using CIPSO labels.
7.6.1 Sending messages
We attach labels to outgoing network packets by using the LSM hook security_socket_sendmsg,
hooking the function __sock_sendmsg() in net/socket.c. This hook calls back functions in our
LSM module, and the code runs in the context of the userspace process which called the sendmsg
system call. Whenever the destination host is different from the local host, information tags are
converted into bitmaps at this stage, and embedded into the network packet using the Netlabel
LSM API. Otherwise, the information tag of the socket itself is labelled, as presented in Chapter 4.
The relevant code is defined in security/blare/lsm_hooks.c. In order to avoid concurrent access
to to the underlying sock structure, attached to the socket, we need to take extra precaution when
attaching a security label to it.
local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
local_bh_enable();
The local_bh_disable() macro disables bottom halves on the local CPU. This ensures that we
are not interrupted by a softitq, like those triggered by the reception of network packets (see next
Section). However, bottom halves may still execute on other CPUs, therefore we also need locking
on the sock structure, and this is what the macro bh_lock_sock_nested() does by disabling the
preemption (by calling preempt_disable()) and holding a spinlock.
7.6.2 Receiving messages
Incoming traffic is tracked with the LSM hooks security_sock_rcv_skb and
security_socket_recvmsg. The former is called on frames reception, just after those get
attached to the related socket. The code calling this first hook does not run in the context
of the userspace process which received the message. In other words, we do not have access
to the data structures related to the process receiving the message. This is due to the fact
that receiving messages is done in interrupt context. The interrupt handler copies the packet
(or frame) in an sk_buff structure and initializes some other data structures before notifying
the kernel about the new received frame, and deferring further processing to a softirq. The
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hook security_sock_rcv_skb is triggered by the function sk_filter() in net/core/filter.c,
filtering socket buffers. The caller of this hook holds spinlocks and runs in a softirq, therefore the
code from our module that is called back at this very instant cannot sleep (otherwise resulting
in a catastrophic behavior, most likely ending up as a kernel panic). Note that there are no
mechanisms avoiding the same softirq to run concurrently on several CPUs, therefore specific
precautions have to be taken so as to avoid concurrency issues. Furthermore, when allocating
kernel memory in such a context, one needs to make sure that the GFP_ATOMIC flag is used, so as
to avoid the underlying call to get_free_pages() to sleep. In this part of the code, we perform
the following operations:
1. Dump the security attributes attached to the headers of the packet. This is done by calling
netlbl_skbuff_getattr() from the netlabel API.
2. Acquire a spinlock on the socket's tags. blare_tags structures (see Figure 7.4 below) are
attached to sockets in their sk->sk_security field. This ensures that no concurrent softirq
running the same code accesses the same data structure at the same time. Note that we
do not disable local bottom halves here, on the first hand because softirqs never preempt
each other (only interrupt handlers may preempt softirqs), and on the second hand because
the only possible concurrent code in this situation is the same softirq running on another
processor, which is solved by the spinlock.
3. Extract the bitmaps from network packets and make the conversion into the information tag
of the socket.
4. Release the spinlock.
/* Set of tags to attach to any object */
struct blare_tags{
struct list_head *info;
/* Used by softirqs invoking rcv_skb*/
spinlock_t info_lock;
atomic_t refcount;
int info_rev; //unused
struct list_head *policy;
struct list_head *xpolicy;
};
Figure 7.4: The blare_tags structure, attached to sockets (and other objects)
At this point, the information tag of the socket, stored in the info field of the socket's tags, is
up to date. We now have to update the information tag of the process which received the message,
with the socket's information tag. This is done by a second hook, security_socket_recvmsg.
This part of the code does:
1. Get a copy (RCU) of the current process's information tag.
2. Merge the socket's information tag into this copy of the process's information tag.
3. Commit (RCU) the new information tag (which replaces the current process's information
tag with the new one).
No specific precautions are required here, as this code run in process context: we can access the
relevant data structures directly (which we could not in the previous hook), and we can safely sleep
(no precautions regarding memory allocation or specific function calls). Furthermore, though the
two hooks may run concurrently (i.e. a new frame may arrive in the network card buffer, deferring
work in a softirq, triggering the first hook, while the code called by the second hook runs on another
CPU), this code is perfectly safe without any locking. This is due to the fact that information tags
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of sockets are, like those of processes, implemented as doubly linked lists. Such data structures are
safe in the case of concurrent readers and writers, as long as there is no more than one writer at
the same time.
7.7 Bug and patch
During the development of our kernel monitor, we stumbled across an issue due to a bug in the
code of the kernel, outside our module in the Netlabel subsystem. Our testing environment was
composed of several virtual hosts running our modified kernel, connected over a virtual bridged
network. The host kernel was the default Debian kernel. In our test case, all the packets containing
a CIPSO label were dropped by the host kernel. After a period of testing and discussion with the
author4 of the code, we could figure that this was due to a bug in the code of Netlabel and identify
possible ways to reproduce it. A patch has been released by Paul Moore to fix this bug5, and it
was accepted in the Linux kernel in version 3.5-rc1. Before this patch, it was required that the
host kernel be configured to use netlabel with the same domain of interpretation as the guests.
Not doing so was resulting in a host kernel failing to route network packets in the case of bridged
networks.
7.8 Future work
In the future, several optimizations and new features should be considered, so as to increase
performance and stability to a higher level.
7.8.1 Distributed security token
We have not implemented the distributed security token protocol presented in Chapter 6, this is
left for future work. Therefore, the current implementation has a limitation on the number of
distinct meta-information that can be carried on network packets. The protocol we defined can
be implemented using netlink messaging [52], so as to communicate with a user space daemon on
each host. Labels resolution would then be performed by the local userspace daemon towards the
remote daemon in a peer to peer fashion every time a new and unseen token arrives in a network
packet.
7.8.2 Copy on write
Information tags of processes, sockets, shared memory segments, and every other objects repre-
sented in memory, should be implemented using copy on write so as to reduce the memory overhead
of our reference monitor. Objects of the system tainted by the same information tag should hold a
pointer to the same data structure rather than a copy of it, until it needs to modify it to add new
taint data. A cache could be used to maintain all existing information tags in the system, using
reference counts to free up memory when some elements are no longer in use.
7.8.3 Filesystem bottleneck
Our experiments (presented in Chapter 8) show that a bottleneck exists at the filesystem level,
slowing down our reference monitor. This is due to the frequency of updates on the extended
attributes of files, which are performed in a very synchronized way every time a read or write
access occurs. Recall from Chapter 4 that the extended attributes are represented as contiguous
flat portions of memory. Therefore, accessing such information requires conversions to our in-
memory representation of information tags on read access, and the other way round on write
access. Furthermore, on write access, it is also required to load the policy tags of the files into
4Many thanks to Paul Moore for his kind help and cooperation.
5This patch was released on the mailing lists of the kernel, with the following subject: cipso: handle CIPSO
options correctly when NetLabel is disabled.
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memory before checking the legality of their new content. A solution to cope with this shortcoming
would be to maintain a cache of open file descriptors, containing for each file:
• The current policy tag.
• The current information tag.
7.8.4 Enforcement mode
Our primary goal is intrusion detection, therefore we do not block any information flow in the
present model and implementation (we run in so-called permissive mode). However, the ability
to enforce a policy may be considered in some situations including the deployment of an IPS
(Intrusion Prevention System) based on our model, or setting up information flow control6 in a
trusted computing environment. As our implementation uses the LSM framework, providing access
control mechanisms to security modules, the choice of enforcing the policy instead of raising an alert
requires minor code modifications. Also, in terms of data structures, blocking illegal information
flows reduces the amount of space required by the tainting: when running in permissive mode, we
need to taint all the information present in all information flows. When enforcing a policy, some
information flows are blocked, thus reducing the amount of tainting. Some simplifications can be
done in the information tags in such a situation. Consider a container c, with a policy tag ptagpcq
and an information tag itagpcq. Recall the Legal relation from definition 3 in Chapter 2. When
enforcing the policy, the state of the information tag of the container is always legal with respect
to its policy tag: Legalpitagpcq, ptacpcqq always stands. In such a case, the information tag of any
container is always a subset of its policy tag.
One possible optimization of our implementation, when used in enforcement mode, would be
the use of fixed-sized bitmaps to represent information tags, rather than doubly linked lists. The
latter are very efficient in the case of dynamic allocation, when no size boundary exists. However,
in the present case, the size of information tags is bound by the policy: each subset of the policy
defines one possible legal state of the information tag of the container. For any policy tag P “
ttp1u, tp2u, . . . , tpNuu, the corresponding legal information tag is bound by:
I “
Nď
1
pi
We could represent such information tags in a fixed-size bitmap for every supervised container of
the operating system, thus reducing the memory overhead of our implementation when enforcing
the policy.
7.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the distributed aspects of our implementation, relying on the
Netlabel subsystem to attach CIPSO labels to network packets leaving each host of a group.
The distributed token protocol (and the computation of deltas) has not been implemented at the
moment. Instead, we use fixed-size bitmaps in the labels that we attach to network packets. In its
current state, this implementation allowed us to perform the experiment presented in this thesis,
and available for download from our website7, released under the GPLv2 license. At the time of this
writing, researchers outside our team have contacted us and started using it for other purposes, as
a framework for information tainting, claiming that this is the only freely available implementation
of such a tainting framework today. In an effort to distribute and cooperate on this project even
more, our research team8 is currently pursuing this project with several Ph.D. students and a
research engineer.
6As opposed to information flow tracking, information flow control systems block illegal traffic.
7http://www.blare-ids.org
8The CIDre team, at Supélec, www.supelec.fr.
Chapter 8
Experiments
To conclude on the third part of this thesis, introducing network and distributed
aspects to the intrusion detection model presented earlier in previous chapters, we
will now detail our experiments based on the implementation explained in Chapter 7.
We first present a case of intrusion on the client side, by visiting a malicious service
using a web browser and a flawed plugin. The malicious service targets sensitive
data on the client by using a remote exploit on the Java Virtual Machine. This
first experiment shows how we are able to detect confidentiality violations and data
leaks with our IDS along with a network policy, as introduced in Chapter 5.2. After
this, we present a second experiment, involving a distributed web service composed
of supervised hosts sharing a distributed information flow policy. We show how the
reference monitor of each host is able to individually identify illegal information flows
spawned by a successful attack. We finally present an assessment of the performances
at the host level and discuss about the usability, advantages and shortcomings of our
approach.
8.1 Data leaks through a web browser
This first experiment makes use of the network policy, that we introduced in Chapter 5.2. The
following scenario, as illustrated on Figure 8.1 shows how our new model and implementation can
detect confidentiality violations by untrusted code interpreted by a Web browser. Web browsers
were initially simple applications displaying HTML content to the final user, but those have evolved
into complex applications running JavaScript and other interpreted languages on the client machine,
inevitably exposing user data to a number of real threats. In this scenario, a client is running
a modified Linux kernel with our reference monitor, including the network extension that we
presented in Chapter 5.2. The client visits a malicious web page using Mozilla Firefox 3.5 and
the Java runtime environment plugin (JRE) version 6 update 10. This version is subject to the
Java calendar deserialization vulnerability (CVE 2008-5353) that may lead to the execution of
arbitrary code by an attacker. The client executes malicious Java code exploiting this issue and
embedding a payload that allows the attacker to get a remote shell on the machine.
Assume the folder/home/alice/confidential/ contains 64 confidential files. We labeled these
files as being confidential, and assigned an information tag containing a unique identifier between 1
and 64 to each of them. The information tag of these files is a set containing one unique identifier,
e.g., {1}. This experiment is similar to the use case all sensitive data must stay local introduced
in Chapter 5.3.1. We defined an empty network policy tag as follows :
Pnet “ ttuu “ K
In this configuration, any application sending any of the labelled files to any remote host
is a security policy violation and triggers an alert. Now we visited a crafted web page
http://www.malicious-host/malicious-page.html embedding a malicious Java applet containing an
attack against the previously mentioned vulnerability. This malicious page causes Mozilla Firefox
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Figure 8.1: Monitoring outgoing information
to execute the Java virtual machine (JVM) in a separated process, which in turn interprets the
Java code containing a remote shell allowing the attacker to connect to the local machine. As the
attacker accesses labelled files of the local filesystem, the information tag of the process running
Java is updated with information tags of the files it reads. At the moment when it sends infor-
mation through a socket, our kernel reference monitor considers that the data being sent contains
information from the files it previously read, and proceeds to a lookup throughout the network
policy tag to ensure this behavior is allowed by the user. For every illegal attempt to illegally
send information by the Java process, we were warned by the reference monitor with the following
message:
[BLARE_POLICY_VIOLATION] Illegal information sent to socket by
process [PID] running java
8.2 Attack on a distributed web service
WEB SERVER DATABASE
TRUSTED CLIENT UNTRUSTED HOST
UNTRUSTED
TRUSTED
Figure 8.2: group of trusted hosts
The following describes an experiment in a distributed system. We have set up an attack
scenario targeting a group of trusted hosts running our modified kernel. This group is composed of
three hosts: a web server, a database server and a client, all three connected to the same Virtual
Private Network (VPN). The web server (Apache) hosts two websites, isolated in two virtual hosts
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www1 and www2 (Apache vhosts1.) The database server (PostgreSQL) hosts two databases, storing
data of the two virtual hosts: db1 stores information related to www1, and db2 stores information
related to www2. Connections to www1 are allowed from the outside. Connections to the other
hosts of the VPN and to www2 are forbidden from the outside. This policy is enforced by classical
firewall rules. The following shows how it is possible with our intrusion detection model to detect
illegal information flows between hosts caused by an intrusion. We used Debian Squeeze virtual
guests running as KVM [29] instances. The two websites run Wordpress. The website www1 runs
the e-commerce plugin Foxypress2. We used the version 0.4.2.2 of this plugin, which is vulnerable
to an upload exploit (EDB-ID: 18991)3. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary file upload and
remote code execution.
8.2.1 Scenario
As shown on Figure 8.3, we labeled all the files of www1 and www2 as well as the PHP5 dynamic
library (used by apache to interpret PHP code) with distinct information tags on the web server.
On the database server, we labeled the PostgreSQL binary as well as two tables on each database.
We could label information at the table level by using the option default_with_oids = on in
PostgreSQL's configuration file. Object identifiers (OIDs) are used in PostgreSQL as primary keys
for system tables, as well as user-created tables when using this option. Each table in PostgreSQL
is mapped to a file named after its OID. Thus, we could label the files related to the supervised
tables.
Host Files Itag Execution
Web server www1 i1 x1
www2 i2 x2
libphp5.so iphp xphp
apache2 ia xa
Database server db1: wp_users iu1 xu1
db1: wp_posts ip1 xp1
db2: wp_users iu2 xu2
db2: wp_posts ip2 xp2
postgres ipg xpg
Figure 8.3: Labels on files
By default, both Apache and PostgreSQL create a new process for each connection. Recall
the Run function from Definition 3.4.3. When a process executes a binary file (or the content of
a dynamic library) labeled with ik, its information tag is set to xk “ Runpikq. Therefore, both
Apache and PostgreSQL processes always have their information tags initialized to respectively
xa “ Runpiaq and xpg “ Runpipgq. We used the following policy tag for both Apache and Post-
greSQL processes: P “ ttxa, xpg, xphp, i1, iu1 , ip1utxa, xpg, xphp, i2, iu2 , ip2uu. Such a policy makes
it illegal for any process running Apache or PostgreSQL to hold information from both websites
simultaneously, or to run any code other than Apache and PosgreSQL binaries and libphp5. When
an external visitor visits www1, the web server creates a new process for this connection and reads
files labeled with i1. It also maps libphp5.so in executable memory pages which taints the pro-
cess with xphp. It queries the database server. The database server forks a new process and reads
information from db1. At this stage, the information tag of the PostgreSQL process is tainted
with S1 “ txa, xpg, xphp, i1, iu1 , ip1u. After the PostgreSQL process has responded to the Apache
1From http://www.apache.org: the term Virtual Host refers to the practice of running more than one web site
on a single machine.
2www.foxy-press.com
3http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19100/
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process, both processes have equal information tags4, as each process labels network packets with
a CIPSO option containing its information tag (in a bitmap, as described in Chapter 7). When
an internal host connects to the internal virtual host www2, similar interactions happen between
the hosts, and the information tags of both processes handling the connection are tainted with
S2 “ txa, xpg, xphp, i2, iu2 , ip2u. In both cases, information flows are legal, and so no alert is raised,
because information tags are subsets of the policy tags in both containers: S1 Ď P ^ S2 Ď P .
8.2.2 Attack
The following attack leaks information from the private web site www2 located on the intranet.
The attacker runs the upload exploit on the Foxypress plugin on www1 and injects a malicious
PHP file on the web server. We used Metasploit5 to run the attack. After injecting the file, the
running web server process's information tag was equal to S1 “ txa, xpg, xphp, i1, iu1 , ip1u, and so
was the information tag of the malicious PHP file. From there, any illegal action triggered an alert:
• Executing the malicious PHP file, which taints6 the process's information tag withRunpS1q “
tx1, xu1 , xp1u is illegal, as RunpS1q Ł P
• Querying the database server to access data from www2, which taints the process's informa-
tion tag with S3 “ txa, xpg, xphp, i1, iu1 , ip1 , iu2 , ip2u is illegal as well, as S3 Ł P .
Information tags are carried over the network through CIPSO labels, therefore both the web
server and the database server raise an alert in the case of illegal information flow, as both servers
are affected by the attack: data from the database server leaks, and the web server runs arbitrary
code.
8.3 Evaluation of performances
The following is an evaluation of our implementation in terms of performances. In order to assess
the performance overhead of our LSMmodule, we uncompressed a Linux kernel source tree and used
it as a dataset containing 39048 files, that we individually labeled with a unique information tag.
The machine we used is a Pentium 4 3.0 Ghz with 2.5 GB of RAM. We evaluated the performances
of our kernel by transferring all the files of our dataset through a SSH tunnel, following the scenario
all sensitive data must stay local as presented in Chapter 5.2.
Figure 8.4 compares the CPU idle time when using Linus Torvald's kernel (that we call Vanilla)
and the Blare kernel. As expected, the Vanilla kernel gives lower CPU overhead during the transfer
(higher CPU idle value). Our security framework adds 30% to 40% of extra overhead to the data
transfer.
Figure 8.5 compares the memory overhead of our kernel and makes a comparison with a Vanilla
kernel executing the same file transfer operation. As KBlare is attaching meta-information to every
system object, the memory consumption remains higher by 30% on average when using our Kernel.
8.3.1 Overall completion time
The overall completion time was 300% longer with our kernel than with the Vanilla kernel. This
limitation is due to a bottleneck at the filesystem level in our prototype (as described in Chapter 7).
The extended attributes of the filesystem are used extensively in our implementation with no
optimization. We believe that the overall performances of our system can be improved dramatically
by optimizing the current prototype as follows: rather than updating tags at each filesystem
operation (i.e. fread and fwrite), we could instead maintain a cache for open file descriptors,
and synchronize it with the actual filesystem whenever a call to fclose is performed. An efficient
cache may be implemented with a binary tree indexed on the inode numbers of each file.
4At the time of this experiment, we did not discard elements of X when receiving network packets, and the
network policy and the policy of the process were combined into the policy tag of the process. This experiment is
still valid in the current model, with minor changes in the way tags propagate.
5http://www.metasploit.com
6Apache maps PHP files in executable memory pages (PROT_EXEC), like it does with dynamic libraries.
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Figure 8.4: CPU overhead on SSH transfer
8.4 Discussion
8.4.1 Detection rate
When evaluating an intrusion detection system, a common measure is the rate of false negatives and
false positives. By design, our conservative approach does not allow false negatives7. Our model
of information flow tainting makes an overestimate of all possible content residing in containers,
and maintains it updated after every information flow, both at the operating system level and on
the network. Network traffic, or other forms of datasets, are a common basis for evaluating misuse
IDSes, or anomaly IDSes based on statistical models. As our approach does not rely on network
traffic analysis, nor on learned profiles, no such dataset can be used to evaluate our model. In our
case, the dataset is determined by the pool of attacks we run. These attacks are included in the
Metasploit framework as well as in the Common Vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) database8.
In our experiments, we have been able to successfully detect intrusions with no false positives
as long as the system was following a legal behavior. Each time an event involving an illegal
information flow occurred, all the subsequent information flows performed by the same process (or
set of processes involved in the attack) in read access were considered illegal, as well as all the
information flows towards supervised objects in write access (i.e. objects protected by a policy
tag restraining their legal content).
Our model does not rely on a fixed information flow policy. The policy is manually adjusted
to fit the different requirements of each supervised system. Therefore, the rate of false positives is
highly variable. It depends on the following parameters:
1. The accuracy and consistency of the defined information flow policy.
2. The lifetime of tainted processes (these tend to accumulate more tags with time, leading to
more false positives).
3. The use of IPC (Inter Process Communication).
4. The number of processes or services accessing the same set of files (including temporary files)
or common objects.
It is impractical to perform a comprehensive study of the false positive rate in our current work.
However, we can identify the following behavior from our experiments.
7Except in the case of eventual covert channels, which by nature are very difficult if not impossible to track.
Furthermore, attacks relying on such methods are very uncommon.
8http://cve.mitre.org/
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Figure 8.5: Memory overhead on SSH transfer
Situation with low false positive rates
Server-side services and applications often involve multiple processes, where each process handles
one client connection, like in the experiment on a distributed web service previously presented in
Section 8.2. Running the attack on the web server spawns illegal information flaws that we are able
to detect. As both Apache and PostgreSQL fork one process per connection, the number of alerts
reported by our reference monitor after an illegal information flow occurs is limited by the lifetime
of such processes. Once a connection ends, the related process is killed. When a new connection
occurs, a new process is forked from a clean process: the so-called worker process, from which
new processes are forked, does not get tainted by information flows of its child processes, and
every new connection leads to an untainted process. Furthermore, such server-side applications
handle isolated sets of files (e.g. Apache works with files in /var/www where PostgreSQL stores its
database tables in files located in /var/lib/postgresql), which eases the task of defining suitable
information flow policies.
Situations with high false positive rates
On the contrary, desktop applications often involve buses such as DBUS, graphical environments,
and other long term processes, staying active until the current user closes his or her session. Defining
a suitable information flow policy in such a situation is more complex. Furthermore, by computing
an overestimate of possible information flows, our reference monitor lacks accuracy in this context.
Recall the experiment from Section 8.1. In this scenario, alerts are reported when sensitive data
may have left the system through a network connection. When conducting this experiment, no
false positives occurred until the web browser accessed sensitive information. From this point on,
all subsequent information flows were considered illegal. This approach is valid for tracking access
to sensitive information which should by no mean leave the system, and where access is performed
by unwanted and/or malicious events.
In other situations, where a finer analysis inside applications' code is required, our approach
involves a high number of false positives, and lacks accuracy.
8.4.2 Improving accuracy
In this Ph.D., we focused on OS-level mechanisms. Our model and implementation provide a
basis for system-wide intrusion detection based on taint marking. The level of granularity of our
approach in terms of tracking is limited, in our current implementation, by the abstraction of
UNIX systems. Figure 8.6 illustrates our approach. It represents a process with inputs i1, i2, i3
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and outputs o1, o2, o3. From our level of abstraction, we cannot determine how information flows
within processes (or applications). Therefore, we compute an overestimate of the possible flows:
the outputs of the process are considered as function of all the previous inputs, at any time. This
overestimate generates variable amounts of false positives depending on the context, as presented
in the previous section.
Taking this current work as a basis, a solution to dramatically reduce the amount of false
positives is to increase the accuracy of our data flow analysis. By combining application-level
information flow tracking techniques with our OS-level reference monitor, it becomes feasible to
finely observe information flows within processes, and to supervise multiple applications as well as
their interactions through the operating system in a fine-grained manner. This aspect is out of the
scope of this Ph.D., and is part of current research in the CIDre team.
Figure 8.6: Information flows within applications
8.4.3 Usability
This model does not replace access control mechanisms, nor enforce any security policy but instead
helps to ensure that no unwanted behaviour happens with respect to defined sets of information
managed by users and applications of multiple hosts. The situation where a web-browser accesses
some personal information is a good example of our goals: where access control mechanisms could
have been used to block this particular access in the first place, it would not prevent applications
from indirectly accessing the same information by another channel (shared memory, IPC with
another application etc.). Furthermore, in this example, we focus on the fact that this information
should not leave the system through the network, therefore no alert would be raised when an
application accesses such information but does not send it over.
The main limitation of our OS-level approach is its accuracy, as it computes an over-estimate
of the actual content involved in information flows. This has a direct impact on the false positives
rate. Work in progress in the CIDre team seeks to address this shortcoming by several means:
1. By filtering alerts in userspace. For instance any sequence of false positives triggered by the
same event can safely be discarded after the event has been reported.
2. By using our framework in cooperation with language or architecture-level monitors.
3. By instrumenting native applications.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented our experiments, as well as an analysis of the performances and accu-
racy of our intrusion detection model. We have shown that it is suitable for detecting intrusions in
both isolated and distributed systems. The maximum performance penalty that we have measured
was close to 30% in terms of memory overhead, and 30-40% in terms of CPU overhead. Due to
a bottleneck at the filesystem level in our current implementation, the overall completion time of
our experiments was 300% longer when using our IDS. We believe that this could be dramatically
improved by the mean of optimizations (e.g., using caches). We have identified situations where our
114 CHAPTER 8. EXPERIMENTS
model is suitable for realistic intrusion detection, as well as situations highlighting its shortcomings
in terms of accuracy, leading to high rates of false positives. Solutions exist so as to address the
identified shortcomings, and are considered in current research in the CIDre project team.
Conclusion
In response to the complexity of securing ever evolving information systems, often relying on
distributed services across multiple hosts, we have designed and implemented an information flow
model using taint marking techniques, in order to detect intrusions at the OS kernel level. Our
approach of anomaly detection is based on the specification of an information flow policy. By
tracking information flows between objects such as files, sockets, pipes, memory mappings etc., as
well as in network packets flowing between hosts, we are able to successfully detect intrusions, both
in isolated hosts and in distributed services composed of multiple hosts (gathered in groups).
We have presented our model of information flow tracking, specifying a fine-grained policy at
four different levels: containers of information, users, applications and network. Our reference
monitor was implemented in the Linux kernel, as a Linux Security Module. This model and its
implementation represent our first contribution. The validation of the implementation was exper-
imental. For each experiment, the involved aspects in the theoretical model were identified, and
the results were compared to the expected behavior of the system with respect to the theory. Our
new intrusion detection principles have been validated through our experiments. In Chapter 8, we
have practically set up and presented two realistic applications of this approach. A first application
followed a scenario involving an attack against confidentiality, by exploiting a security flaw in a
plugin, inside a web browser. We demonstrated that our model was able to successfully detect
the illegal information flaws spawned by the attack. A second application focused on distributed
services across several hosts. Our reference monitor was successful at detecting attacks against
a frontal web server. Illegal information flaws spawned by the attacked web server, communicat-
ing with remote processes, were also detected at the level of each host composing the distributed
service, and alerts were reported by each reference monitor. The extension of our model and
implementation to distributed systems represents the second contribution of this work.
The performance overhead of our reference monitor reaches 30% in memory consumption, and
30-40% in CPU, in extreme situations involving a high number of distinct taint information. Its
main limitation is an overhead on the completion time of some operations in some cases, reaching
up to 300% in extreme situations. Our current prototype may be further optimized so as to
decrease the involved performance penalty, and we proposed possible tracks for improvement in
Chapter 7.
Our model and its implementation are suitable for the following applications:
• Supervision of users and programs: our model can be used to track applications by attaching
a policy (i.e., a set of policy rules) to their related code (binary programs, scripts, shared
libraries etc.). A policy may also be attached to local users. When a process executes some
code, such a policy is used along with the policy of the current user (if defined) to determine
the legal information flows caused by the resulting processes. Any violation of the policy
triggers an alert. This may be used to protect users' privacy, as well as the integrity of
information.
• Supervision of network communications: a network policy can be used to define the legal in-
teractions between processes (i.e., applications executed by users) of different hosts involving
sets of supervised information.
• Tracking the changes made by viruses: by keeping the origins of all data present in each
container, we can retrieve all the information flows that were caused by a virus (or any given
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piece of executable information). This may be used e.g. to and track the modifications that
were made in order to perform a rollback of the system to a safe state.
• Detect the presence of an attacker by detecting abnormal behavior of programs, services or
daemons.
• Detect the execution of modified applications and rootkits: as we do not trust code that has
been illegally modified, we can detect malware and rootkits. When the code of an application
or library is altered by a process, we keep tracks of such changes in the information tag of
the modified application file(s). These meta-data give information about the running code
as well as information hold by the process which altered the file. Whenever such changes are
illegal, the execution of the new code is illegal too.
The framework that we presented provides a basis for system-wide intrusion detection in dis-
tributed systems and services. The overall accuracy of our model depends on the level of granularity
offered by the underlying OS abstractions. Even though we were able to successfully detect intru-
sions with this model, it presents shortcomings in situations where accuracy is required, as shown
in Chapter 8. It is impractical, at the OS level, to finely observe information flows within applica-
tions. Therefore, in its current state, our framework is usable in simple situations, but it generates
high rates of false positives in environments where processes communicate with IPC mechanisms.
In order to address these shortcomings, current work in the CIDre team focuses on the cooperation
of our OS-level reference monitor with application-level reference monitors.
Our model may also be further distributed in future work. We proposed a distributed protocol
allowing hosts of a group to exchange security tokens in a peer to peer fashion. While the resolvers
on each host manage information tainting in a fully distributed manner, the specification of the
policy in our current work is done manually on each host of the groups, by a central system
administrator. The specification of the policy could instead be determined independently on each
host in a decentralized way. Such a policy could rely on a peer-to-peer protocol, allowing each
pair of hosts to agree on a common set of rules, regarding legal interactions of their processes with
respect to the data they manage.
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Appendix A
System Calls
The following is the list of all system calls on Linux-3.2/x86_64. We analyzed the semantics
of all system calls in order to determine in which cases information flows may occur between
two or more objects of the operating system. In our implementation, we track information flows
resulting in a communication between userspace processes. We consider the kernel as trusted (if
the attacker can modify the kernel, he already has full access over the system). Special cases,
where information flows may occur, potential hidden channels may exist, particular aspects are
highlighted, are numbered in the information flow column of the table below, and are described
at the end of this section. The system calls that we track in our implementation are marked with
a cross in the Tracked column. A „ symbol indicates that only a partial or indirect tracking is
performed.
Number Name Description Flow Tracked
0 read read from a file descriptor yes1 X
1 write write to a file descriptor yes1 X
2 open open and possibly create a file or
device
no1
3 close close a file descriptor no
4 stat get file status no
5 fstat  no
6 lstat  no
7 poll wait for some event on a file descrip-
tor
no
8 lseek reposition read/write file offset no
9 mmap map files or devices into memory yes
10 mprotect set protection on a region of mem-
ory
yes2 „
11 munmap unmap files or devices into memory no3 X
12 brk change data segment size no
13 rt_sigaction examine and change a signal action no
14 rt_sigprocmask examine and change blocked signals no
15 rt_sigreturn return from signal handler and
cleanup stack frame
no
16 rt_ioctl manipulates the underlying device
parameters of special files
no4
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17 pread64 read from from a file descriptor at
a given offset
yes1 X
18 pwrite64 write to a file descriptor at a given
offset
yes1 X
19 readv read data from multiple buffers yes1 X
20 writev write data into multiple buffers yes1 X
21 access check real user's permissions for a
file
no
22 pipe create pipe no1
23 select synchronous I/O multiplexing no
24 sched_yield yield the processor no
25 mremap remap a virtual memory address no5
26 msync synchronize a file with a memory
map
yes6 „
27 mincore determine whether pages are resi-
dent in memory
no
28 madvise give advice about use of memory no
29 shmget allocates a shared memory segment no7
30 shmat attaches the shared memory seg-
ment identified by shmid to the ad-
dress space of the calling process
yes7 X
31 shmctl shared memory control no
32 dup duplicate a file descriptor no1
33 dup2  no1
34 pause wait for signal no
35 nanosleep high-resolution sleep no
36 getitimer get value of an interval timer no
37 alarm set an alarm clock for delivery of a
signal
no
38 setitimer set value of an interval timer no
39 getpid process identification no
40 sendfile transfer data between file descrip-
tors
yes1 X
41 socket create an endpoint for communica-
tion
no8
42 connect initiate a connection on a socket no8
43 accept accept a connection on a socket no8
44 sendto send a message on a socket yes8 X
45 recvfrom receive a message from a socket yes8 X
46 sendmsg send a message on a socket yes8 X
47 recvmsg receive a message from a socket yes8 X
48 shutdown shut down part of a full-duplex con-
nection
no
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49 bind bind a name to a socket no8
50 listen listen for connections on a socket no8
51 getsockname get socket name no
52 getpeername get name of connected peer socket no
53 socketpair create a pair of connected sockets no8
54 setsockopt set options on sockets no
55 getsockopt get options on sockets no
56 clone create a child process yes9 X
57 fork create a child process yes9 X
58 vfork create a child process and block par-
ent

59 execve execute program yes10 X
60 exit terminate the calling process no
61 wait4 wait for process to change state,
BSD style
no
62 kill send signal to a process no
63 uname get name and information about
current kernel
no
64 semget get a semaphore set identifier no
65 semop semaphore operations no
66 semctl semaphore control operations no
67 shmdt detaches a shared memory segment no11
68 msgget get a message queue identifier no
69 msgsnd send message to a message queue yes12 X
70 msgrcv receive message from a message
queue
yes12 X
71 msgctl message control operations no
72 fcntl manipulate file descriptor no
73 flock apply or remove an advisory lock on
an open file
no
74 fsync synchronize a file's in-core state
with storage device
no
75 fdatasync  
76 truncate truncate a file to a specified length no
77 ftruncate  
78 getdents get directory entries no
79 getcwd Get current working directory no
80 chdir change working directory no
81 fchdir  
82 rename change the name or location of a file no
83 mkdir create a directory no
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84 rmdir delete a directory no
85 creat open and possibly create a file or
device
no
86 link make a new name for a file no
87 unlink delete a name and possibly the file
it refers to
no
88 symlink make a new name for a file no
89 readlink read value of a symbolic link no
90 chmod change permissions of a file no
91 fchmod  
92 chown change ownership of a file no
93 fchown  
94 lchown  
95 umask set file mode creation mask no
96 gettimeofday get time no
97 getrlimit get resource limit no
98 getrusage get resource usage no
99 sysinfo returns information on overall sys-
tem statistics
no
100 times get process times no
101 ptrace process trace yes13
102 getuid get user identity no
103 syslog read and/or clear kernel message
ring buffer; set console_loglevel
no
104 getgid get group identity no
105 setuid set user identity no
106 setgid set group id no
107 geteuid get user identity no
108 getegid get group id no
109 setpgid set process group no
110 getppid get process identification no
111 getpgrp get process group no
112 setsid creates a session and sets the pro-
cess group ID
no
113 setreuid set real and/or effective user ID no
114 setregid set real and/or effective group ID no
115 getgroups get list of supplementary group IDs no
116 setgroups set  
117 setresuid set real, effective and saved user ID no
118 getresuid get real, effective and saved user
IDs
no
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119 setresgid set real, effective and saved group
ID
no
120 getresgid get real, effective and saved group
ID
no
121 getpgid get process group no
122 setfsuid set user identity used for file system
checks
no
123 setfsgid set group identity used for file sys-
tem checks
no
124 getsid get session ID no
125 capget get capabilities of thread(s) no
126 capset set capabilities of thread(s) no
127 rt_sigpending examine pending signals no
128 rt_sigtimedwait synchronously wait for queued sig-
nals
no
129 rt_sigqueueinfo queue a signal and data to a process no14
130 rt_sigsuspend wait for a signal no
131 sigaltstack set and/or get signal stack context
132 utime change file last access and modifica-
tion times
no
133 mknod create a special or ordinary file no15
134 uselib load shared library yes16 X
135 personality set the process execution domain no
136 ustat get file system statistics no
137 statfs  
138 fstatfs  
139 sysfs get file system type information no
141 getpriority get program scheduling priority no
141 setpriority set program scheduling priority no
142 sched_setparam set scheduling parameters no
143 sched_getparam get scheduling parameters no
144 sched_setscheduler set scheduling policy/parameters no
145 sched_getscheduler get scheduling policy/parameters no
146 sched_get_priority_max get static priority range no
147 sched_get_priority_min  no
148 sched_rr_get_interval get the SCHED_RR interval for
the named process
no
149 mlock lock memory no
150 munlock unlock memory no
151 mlockall local memory no
152 munlockall unlock memory no
153 vhangup virtually hangup the current tty no
128 APPENDIX A. SYSTEM CALLS
Number Name Description Flow Tracked
154 modify_ldt get or set ldt no
155 pivot_root change the root file system no
156 _sysctl read/write system parameters no
157 prctl operations on a process no
158 arch_prctl set architecture-specific thread
state
no
159 adjtimex tune kernel clock no
160 setrlimit set resource limits no
161 chroot change root directory no
162 sync commit buffer cache to disk no
163 acct switch process accounting on or off no
164 settimeofday set time no
165 mount mount a filesystem no
166 umount2 umount a file system no
167 swapon start swapping to file/device yes17
168 swapoff stop swapping to file/device no
169 reboot reboot or enable/disable Ctrl-Alt-
Del
no
170 sethostname set hostname no
171 setdomainname set domain name no
172 iopl change I/O privilege level no
173 ioperm set port input/output permissions no
174 create_module create a loadable module entry no
175 init_module initialize a loadable module entry yes18
176 delete_module delete a loadable module entry no
177 get_kernel_syms retrieve exported kernel and mod-
ule symbols
no
178 query_module query the kernel for various bits
pertaining to modules
no
179 quotactl manipulate disk quotas no
180 nfsservctl syscall interface to kernel nfs dae-
mon
no
181 getpmsg receive next message from a
STREAMS file (not implemented)
yes
182 putpmsg send a message on a STREAM (not
implemented)
yes
183 afs_syscall not implemented n/a
184 tuxcall not implemented n/a
185 security not implemented n/a
186 gettid get thread identification no
187 readahead perform file readahead into page
cache
yes1 X
129
Number Name Description Flow Tracked
188 setxattr set an extended attribute value yes19
189 lsetxattr  
190 fsetxattr  
191 getxattr retrieve an extended attribute value yes19
192 lgetxattr  
193 fgetxattr  
194 listxattr list extended attribute names no
195 llistxattr  
196 flistxattr  
197 removexattr remove an extended attribute no
198 lremovexattr  
199 fremovexattr  
200 tkill send a signal to a thread no
201 time get time in seconds no
202 futex Fast Userspace Locking system call no
203 sched_setaffinity set a process's CPU affinity mask no
204 sched_getaffinity get a process's CPU affinity mask no
205 set_thread_area Set a Thread Local Storage (TLS)
area
no
206 io_setup create an asynchronous I/O context no
207 io_destroy destroy an asynchronous I/O con-
text
no
208 io_getevents read asynchronous I/O events from
the completion queue
no
209 io_submit submit asynchronous I/O blocks for
processing
no
210 io_cancel cancel an outstanding asyn-
chronous I/O operation
no
211 get_thread_area Get a Thread Local Storage (TLS)
area
no
212 lookup_dcookie return a directory entry's path no
213 epoll_create open an epoll file descriptor no
214 epoll_ctl_old
215 epoll_wait_old
216 remap_file_pages create a nonlinear file mapping no
217 getdents64 get directory entries no
218 set_tid_address set pointer to thread ID no
219 restart_syscall restart a system call no
220 semtimedop semaphore operation no
221 fadvise64 predeclare an access pattern for file
data
no
222 timer_create create a POSIX per-process timer no
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223 timer_settime arm/disarm and fetch state of
POSIX per-process timer
no
224 timer_gettime  no
225 timer_getoverrun get overrun count for a POSIX per-
process timer
no
226 timer_delete delete a POSIX per-process timer no
227 clock_settime clock and time functions no
228 clock_gettime  
229 clock_getres  
230 clock_nanosleep high-resolution sleep with specifi-
able clock
no
231 exit_group exit all threads in a process no
232 epoll_wait wait for an I/O event on an epoll
file descriptor
no
233 epoll_ctl control interface for an epoll de-
scriptor
no
234 tgkill send a signal to a thread no
235 utimes change file last access and modifica-
tion times
no
236 vserver not implemented n/a
237 mbind Set memory policy for a memory
range
no
238 set_mempolicy set default NUMA memory policy
for a process and its children
no
239 get_mempolicy Retrieve NUMA memory policy for
a process
no
240 mq_open open a message queue no
241 mq_unlink remove a message queue no
242 mq_timedsend send a message to a message queue yes12 X
243 mq_timedreceive receive a message from a message
queue
yes12 X
244 mq_notify register for notification when a mes-
sage is available
no
245 mq_getsetattr get/set message queue attributes no
246 kexec_load load a new kernel for later execution yes20
247 waitid wait for process to change state no
248 add_key Add a key to the kernel's key man-
agement facility
yes21
249 request_key Request a key from the kernel's key
management facility
yes21
250 keyctl Manipulate the kernel's key man-
agement facility
no
251 ioprio_set set I/O scheduling class and prior-
ity
no
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252 ioprio_get get I/O scheduling class and prior-
ity
no
253 inotify_init initialize an inotify instance no
254 inotify_add_watch add a watch to an initialized inotify
instance
no
255 inotify_rm_watch remove an existing watch from an
inotify instance
no
256 migrate_pages move all pages in a process to an-
other set of nodes
no
257 openat open a file relative to a directory file
descriptor
no
258 mkdirat create a directory relative to a di-
rectory file descriptor
no
259 mknodat create a special or ordinary file rel-
ative to a directory file descriptor
no
260 fchownat change ownership of a file relative
to a directory file descriptor
no
261 futimesat change timestamps of a file relative
to a directory file descriptor
no
262 newfstatat get file status relative to a directory
file descriptor
no
263 unlinkat remove a directory entry relative to
a directory file descriptor
no
264 renameat rename a file relative to directory
file descriptors
no
265 linkat create a file link relative to direc-
tory file descriptors
no
266 symlinkat create a symbolic link relative to a
directory file descriptor
no
267 readlinkat read value of a symbolic link rela-
tive to a directory file descriptor
no
268 fchmodat change permissions of a file relative
to a directory file descriptor
no
269 faccessat check user's permissions of a file rel-
ative to a directory file descriptor
no
270 pselect6 synchronous I/O multiplexing no
271 ppoll wait for some event on a file descrip-
tor
no
272 unshare disassociate parts of the process ex-
ecution context
no
273 set_robust_list get/set the list of robust futexes no
274 get_robust_list  
275 splice splice data to/from a pipe yes22
276 tee duplicating pipe content yes22
277 sync_file_range sync a file segment with disk no
278 vmsplice splice user pages into a pipe yes22
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279 move_pages move individual pages of a process
to another node
no5
280 utimensat change file timestamps with
nanosecond precision
no
281 epoll_pwait wait for an I/O event on an epoll
file descriptor
no
282 signalfd create a file descriptor for accepting
signals
283 timerfd_create timers that notify via file descrip-
tors
no
284 eventfd create a file descriptor for event no-
tification
yes23
285 fallocate manipulate file space no
286 timerfd_settime timers that notify via file descrip-
tors
yes24
287 timerfd_gettime  
288 accept4 accept a connection on a socket no
289 signalfd4 create a file descriptor for accepting
signals
no
290 eventfd2 create a file descriptor for event no-
tification
no
291 epoll_create1 open an epoll file descriptor no
292 dup3 duplicate a file descriptor no
293 pipe2 create pipe no
294 inotify_init1 initialize an inotify instance no
295 preadv read or write data into multiple
buffers
yes1 X
296 pwritev  
297 rt_tgsigqueueinfo queue a signal and data yes14
298 perf_event_open set up performance monitoring no
299 recvmmsg receive a message from a socket yes8 X
300 fanotify_init initializes the fanotify subsystem no
301 fanotify_mark Management of notification events no
302 prlimit64 get and set a process resource limits no
303 name_to_handle_at convert name to handle no
304 open_by_handle_at Open the file handle no
305 clock_adjtime posix clock operation no
306 syncfs commit buffer cache to disk no
307 sendmmsg send a message on a socket yes8 X
308 setns reassociate thread with a names-
pace
no
309 getcpu determine CPU and NUMA node
on which the calling thread is run-
ning
no
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310 process_vm_readv transfer data between process ad-
dress spaces
yes25
311 process_vm_writev  
A.1 Special cases
1. read, write, open, pread64, pwrite64, readv, writev, sendfile, pipe, dup,
dup2, readahead: we do not directly track all these calls, but instead, we track calls to
read, write, from/towards the underlying file descriptor or inode, were actual information
flows occur.
2. mprotect: even though mprotect does not directly cause information flows, it changes the
protection mode of memory pages. In cases where shared memory mappings exist with other
processes (attached via mmap1 with the MAP_SHARED flag), it may affect the way information
flows occur. As stated in the manpage of mprotect: On Linux it is always permissible to
call mprotect() on any address in a process's address space (except for the kernel vsyscall
area). In particular it can be used to change existing code mappings to be writable. For this
reason, we need to hook calls to mprotect as well.
3. munmap: as stated in the system calls table, this system call does not cause any information
flow, however it helps us refine our analysis. When a process shares a memory mapping with
another process, there is no way to know which information is swapped between the two,
therefore we compute an overestimate of the possible information flows: all information read
by one process having write access to the memory region is assumed to be read by the other
processes having read access to it. A call to munmap tells us when to stop tracking the caller
process (w.r.t a given memory mapping). Tracking munmap is done by a custom added hook,
it is not part of LSM.
4. rt_ioctl: this system call manipulates the underlying device parameters of special files. This
is commonly used in drivers, for instance, and information may usually be transfered towards
a particular device. The last argument of this system call is an untyped pointer to memory,
and in some situations, this may possibly lead to information flows between objects of the
operating system that we track. However, this case is not handled in our implementation at
the moment due to the underlying complexity of hardware drivers. We think reasonable to
consider such a case as a hidden channel.
5. mremap, move_pages: the pages remain accessible by the same process through its own
address space, therefore there is no communication with other processes.
6. msync: an information flow occurs, as the corresponding memory mapping is synchronized
with its underlying file. However, we track information flows at the level of shmat and shmdt,
and we consider that the mappings are always synchronized (this is an overestimate).
7. shmat,shmget: we do not directly track the creation of memory segments by processes with
shmget, but rather when processes actually attach or detach them to and from their address
space, with shmat and shmdt.
8. socket, connect, accept, sendto, recvfrom, sendmsg, recvmsg, bind, listen,
socketpair: we do not directly track all these calls, but instead, we track calls to sendmsg
and recvmsg, were actual information flows occur.
9. clone, fork:
1POSIX says that the behavior of mprotect() is unspecified if it is applied to a region of memory that was not
obtained via mmap(2)
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• clone is mostly used to create threads within one process's address space. If called with
CLONE_VM or CLONE_THREAD flags, the memory space of the parent is shared with the
child.
• fork is a glibc wrapper, it invokes clone with the corresponding flags.
10. execve: execute a program. This is tracked in our implementation.
11. shmdt: this system call does not cause any information flow. However, as with munmap,
we need to keep tracks of processes detaching memory segments, in order to stop tracking
information flows from and towards to the detached memory segment.
12. msgsnd, msgrcv, mq_timedsend, mq_timedreceive: send/receive a message from message
queue. This is tracked by our implementation.
13. ptrace: information flows are involved when a process is traced: the caller may ac-
cess information from the child, and communicate information towards the child. Trac-
ing processes as well as accessing sensitive information in /proc is tracked by LSM (hooks
security_ptrace_access_check and security_ptrace_traceme). We do not track calls
to ptrace in our current implementation.
14. rt_sigqueueinfo: this system call provides the low-level interface to send a signal plus data
to a process or thread. We consider it as a hidden channel, as the main purpose of this
interface is signal handling. The receiver of the signal can obtain the accompanying data
by establishing a signal handler with the sigaction(2) SA_SIGINFO flag. We do not track
this in our current implementation. This could be tracked by adding a hook on calls to
sigaction.
15. mknod: file is created empty, therefore there is no information flow.
16. uselib: we do not directly track these calls, but we track the underlying calls to mmap when
mapping the shared library into memory.
17. swapon: starts swapping to file/device. Even though swapping involve information flows, we
do not track access to the swap area, as is impractical to do so (because swapping is managed
by the kernel, and we do not hook kernel code, that we consider as trusted). Accessing the
swap area from userspace is only allowed to the system administrator. Future versions of
our implementation may restrict access to the swap area from userspace (even to the system
administrator).
18. init_module: loads an ELF binary into kernel space. This system call requires privileges,
and is not tracked by our implementation as it modifies the kernel.
19. setxattr, lsetxattr, fsetxattr, getxattr, lgetxattr, fsetxattr: get/set file ex-
tended attributes. An information flow occurs and may be used to exchange infor-
mation between userspace processes. We do not track it in our current implementa-
tion, however this is achievable by using LSM hooks (security_inode_setxattr and
security_inode_getxattr). It will be implemented in future releases.
20. kexec_load: this is used to load a new kernel at runtime (live booting of a new kernel over
the currently running kernel). We do not track such a low-level mechanism: it would be
required to flag portions of the memory that are not overwritten by the new kernel.
21. add_key, request_key: access kernel's key management facility. This is used e.g. to mount
remote filesystem which require authentication or a key to enable access. It is possible to use
it in a diverted way to establish communication between userspace processes. It is untracked
in our current implementation.
22. splice, tee, vmsplice: move data between file descriptors without copying between
userspace and kernelspace  copy standard output to files and standard output  move user
pages into a pipe. Information flows occur between userspace and kernelspace.
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23. eventfd: can be used by userspace applications as a wait/notify mechanism. Possible hidden
channels may be implemented with it. Untracked in our implementation.
24. timerfs_settime, timerfd_gettime: those operate on a timer delivering notifications via
a file descriptor. These may be used as hidden channels. Untracked in our implementation.
25. process_vm_readv, process_vm_writev: transfer data between the address space of two
processes (a local process and a remote process). The data is moved directly, without passing
through kernel space.
